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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND TURKEY 
by 
Bilal Ciplak 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
The dissertation documented the degree of Turkey’s involvement in the promotion 
of democracy in the Arab Middle East (ME). Initially, I investigated why and under what 
conditions Turkey promotes democracy in the ME, and then I explained strategies through 
which Turkey promotes democracy in the region. I applied the neo-classical realist 
theoretical framework and a mixed methodology in the research, and I provided evidence 
from two sources: face-to-face interviews with the Turkish and foreign officials and 
common citizens, and the statistical data from institutions, such as the OECD, Turkish 
Statistical Institute, and World Bank. 
My research indicates that Turkey promotes democracy through seven channels. 
These channels are official development assistance (ODA), mentoring, demonstrative 
effect, normative pressure, conditionality, military power, enlargement, and civil society 
organizations. Turkey promotes democracy in the ME for three substantial reasons: first, 
to advance its security and economic interests; second, to improve the political, social, and 
economic conditions of people living in the region; and third, to create long-term regional 
stability, crucial for cooperation in economic and security realms.  
viii 
I attempted to engage in debates with two distinct, but interrelated fields of 
comparative politics and international relations. My most important contribution to the 
field is that I documented Turkey’s case of democracy promotion regarding the degree of 
Turkey’s involvement in this endeavor, its strategies, specificities, and effectiveness in the 
region. I also contribute to the field as I explained the difference between democracy 
promotion policies of a regional power, such as Turkey, and global powers, such as the 
US. I further engaged in discussions that illuminate some aspects of the interplay between 
the identity and strategic interests in states’ foreign policy decisions. 
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CHAPTER I: SIGNIFICANCE, THEORY, & METHODOLOGY 
Context of the Study 
“There exists an unmistakable demand in the Middle East and in the wider Muslim 
world for democratization,” proclaimed Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the very onset of his 
tenure in office as Prime Minister of Turkey in January of 2003 at Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government. (International Strategic Research Organization 2003) This 
announcement heralded the nature of his government’s initial public rhetoric and the 
subsequent policy toward the Middle East. The view that democracy should be ‘exported’ 
and supported abroad is not new. Such diverse policy makers as John F. Kennedy, William 
J. Clinton, and George W. H. Bush subscribed to it and actively promoted it. Thus, 
“[d]emocracy promotion has become a pervasive feature of international politics mostly 
because of the highly held belief that democratic regimes offer greater human freedom, 
economic prosperity, and international peace.” (Peksen 2012) 
While democracy has been traditionally promoted by wealthy Western states, in the 
present research I focus on Turkey, a developing country that has promoted democracy in 
the Arab Middle East over the past decade. My question is why and how Turkey, under the 
leadership of a political party with roots in political Islam, is counter-intuitively engaged 
in promoting democracy abroad. Conventional wisdom suggests that Turkey’s current 
AKP (Justice and Development Party) government should have acted to preserve stability 
and the regional status quo by supporting authoritarian political regimes, not by challenging 
them. To address the aforementioned questions, I have developed a theoretical framework 
that combines elements from two related but distinct categories of identity and strategic 
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interests. The research has implications both for diverse sets of policy makers and 
academics. In Chapter I, I develop my research question, show its significance, and 
describe the theoretical framework and methodology in greater details. 
In contrast to many expectations, during the AKP’s (Justice and Development 
Party) rule, Turkey has emerged as a promoter of democracy in the Middle East (ME). In 
2004, Turkey became a co-chair of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD) along with 
Italy and Yemen within the framework of the Broader Middle East and North African 
(BMENA) Initiative. (Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) BMENA initiative sets up a platform to 
discuss and promote democracy in the Middle East. (Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) Although 
participation in this initiative marked Turkey’s emergence as a promoter of democracy and 
human rights, Turkey’s effort to promote democracy precedes the AKP government. 
Initially, Turkey started advocating Turkish minority rights in Bulgaria, Greece, and Iraq 
since its establishment as a republic. (Ozel and Ozcan 2011) Turkey did defend Muslims’ 
collective and individual rights during the collapse of the former Yugoslavia even though 
Ankara was involved in human rights abuse against the citizens of Kurdish descent and, 
ironically, its own practicing Muslims. Thus, Turkey’s human rights activism did not 
receive serious attention and, whenever it did, was largely dismissed as hypocrisy. (Ozel 
and Ozcan 2011) 
Turkey started to develop a more balanced approach to the promotion of human 
rights and democracy in its foreign policy after the AKP came to power. (Ozel and Ozcan 
2011) The AKP has been involved in democratization both in domestic and in international 
spheres simultaneously. (Kirisci 2012) The AKP’s support for democracy and human 
rights has become more vocal since the beginning of the Arab Spring. (Kirisci 2012) The 
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AKP has been involved in a number of initiatives and projects that aim to advance human 
rights, good governance, and open market economies, in the Arab Middle East, during its 
tenure in office.  
The AKP’s decision to promote democracy raises many significant questions. For 
example, what motivates the AKP to promote democracy? How does the outside influence 
coming from the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) impact the way the 
AKP promotes democracy? Richard Morningstar, in Promoting Democracy and the Rule 
of Law: American and European Strategies, argues that “the critical point from the policy-
making standpoint is that democracy and democracy promotion are multi-faceted concepts 
that are difficult to define and often difficult to agree on.” (Morningstar 2009) As different 
actors might have different understandings of democracy, it is particularly important to 
question the AKP’s conception of democracy and the kind of democracy the AKP promotes 
in the Arab Middle East. Therefore, the concern is whether the AKP promotes a liberal 
democracy as it is understood in the West or a different type of democracy, distinct from 
the Western conception of democracy.  
I utilized a flexible theoretical framework to answer the aforementioned questions. 
Also, I employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. The numerical 
data was obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute, World-Bank, OECD, TIKA, and 
United Nations’ web sources. Semi-structured interviews with the Turkish deputies were 
also incorporated into the present research. Official and unofficial interviews with CSO 
representatives, common citizens, and societal leaders were also incorporated into the 
research. All these issues are further discussed in the following sections.   
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Research Question 
In this dissertation, I examined the question of why and how Turkey promotes 
democracy in the Arab Middle East (ME), or to put it in a larger context, what are the 
reasons that make Turkey behave the way it does in the ME since the AKP came to power? 
To answer this question, the dissertation explored the reasons and conditions under which 
Turkey promotes democracy. To be more specific, does the AKP support democratization 
in the Arab Middle East for normative reasons or to advance national interests? Moreover, 
I further examined the type of strategies and tools the AKP utilizes to promote democracy 
in the region, such as coercion, diplomacy, and development aid. Most importantly, this 
dissertation documented the strategies and initiatives through which Turkey supports 
democratization in the ME. On a wider level, I intended to provide an assessment that 
speaks to the leading debates in international and comparative politics about why, how, 
and under what circumstances states promote democratization.  
Significance of the Study 
This research hopes to affect the terms of scholarly debates in the field of 
international relations and comparative politics for at least three reasons. First of all, 
democracy promotion is generally discussed from the perspective of the major powers. 
Democracy promotion literature often examines the US and the EU’s democracy 
promotion agendas. Scholars have been conducting research on the role non-governmental 
organizations (CSOs), international organizations (IOs), and civil society organizations 
(CSOs) play in promoting democracy in other states. (Peksen and Comer 2012) 
Nevertheless, research on the role of regional powers, such as Turkey and Brazil, in 
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promoting democracy is very limited. Consequently, researching Turkey’s democracy 
promotion will significantly contribute to our understanding of how a regional power 
differs from a global power in its promotion of democracy abroad.  
In addition to Turkey’s regional power status, Turkey’s Muslim identity makes it 
an interesting case for research on democracy promotion. Democratization literature often 
argues that non-Western cultures are incompatible with democratic values, because of their 
emphasis on the hierarchical societal order in such cultures, which are believed to 
undermine individual freedoms. (Huntington 1993) Islam as an Eastern religion, then, is 
described as irreconcilable with democracy. Nevertheless, the case of Turkey demonstrates 
that democracy is promoted by the AKP, which is deeply rooted in political Islam, and 
promoted by a wide range of Islamic CSOs aligned with the AKP. Democracy promotion 
by Islamic political and social groups is a new development that needs a fresh examination 
and a nuanced explanation. Thus, the research will contribute to the newly emerging 
literature on Turkey’s support for the democratization in the Arab ME. The present 
research will also help us understand the nature and degree of Turkey’s impact on the 
transitioning Arab states. 
Thirdly, Turkey is still a transitional democracy and an ongoing target of 
democracy promotion from the US and the EU. As discussed earlier, democracy promotion 
is often being debated from the perspectives of the US and Europe. These states are 
wealthy, consolidated democracies. (Kirisci 2012) Turkey’s democracy, on the other hand, 
is yet to be consolidated. In fact, the AKP promotes democracy both in Turkey and in the 
Middle East simultaneously. Moreover, my research tries to uncover the relationship 
between the Western democracy promotion in Turkey (target identity of Turkey) and 
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Turkish democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East (donor identity of Turkey). In other 
words, I will attempt to explain whether there is a connection between Turkey’s donor and 
target (of democracy promotion) identities, and whether Turkey has learned anything from 
its experiences with its Western donors. Therefore, I attempt to make a theoretical 
contribution to our understanding of the link between target experiences and donor 
experiences of a promoter state. 
Theoretical Framework 
The present research follows a top-down conception of the state similar to that of 
neo-classical realists1. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009) In this conceptualization, 
states are represented by the national security executive, including the head of government, 
ministers, and officials responsible for making foreign policy decisions. The chief 
executive has access to privileged information about the international constraints, as well 
as domestic issues from the responsible state institutions. Therefore, he is well-positioned 
to frame issues of national interest. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009) Although the 
executive is potentially autonomous from the society, the institutional arrangements force 
her/him to engage with the societal actors, such as economic institutions, representatives, 
political parties, and the societal leaders. (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009) The 
perceptions, norms, and values of the leader also influence his/her behaviors. (Rose 1998)  
                                                            
1 For more information about neo-classical realism, see Gideon Rose. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of 
Foreign Policy. World Politics, 51: 1, 144-172, 1998; Randall L. Schweller. US Democracy Promotion: 
Realist Reflections, in: Cox et al. 41-62, 2000; William C. Wohlforth. Realism and foreign policy, in: 
Smith, Steve Hadfield, Amelia Dunne, Tim (eds.), Foreign Policy. Theories Actors Cases, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 31-48, 2008. 
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To contextualize the propositions of neo-classical realism for Turkey, Turkey’s 
democracy promotion policy is being carried out by the AKP government with deep roots 
in political Islam. In Turkey, the head of the government, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, is also the national security executive.2 He makes foreign policy decisions 
with his ministers (Ahmet Davutoglu being the most important), advisors, and experts from 
relevant state institutions.3 The key AKP members are devoted Muslims. Therefore, their 
ideas and values influence their policy priorities and foreign policy decisions. In fact, it is 
not a coincidence that the Turkish state started to engage more assertively with the ME, a 
region with predominantly Muslim population, during the AKP administration.  
In addition, the leader formulates the national interest by conducting a risk 
assessment calculation. He has to take into consideration the state’s relative power 
capabilities and goals vis-à-vis the other states’ power capabilities and intentions. 
However, the leader also needs to take into consideration domestic factors, such as public 
opinion, as well as the domestic constraints that may limit or circumscribe his agenda. 
(Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009) In the process of foreign policy formulation, 
institutions – such as the MIT (Turkey’s National Intelligence Service), Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and Ministry of Domestic Affairs – provide the PM and his foreign policy circle 
with privileged information to which the ordinary people do not have access. In Turkey, 
during the AKP rule, the substantial domestic factors impacting Turkish foreign policy 
have been the Kurdish separatist movement (the PKK), the Kemalist status quo, and public 
                                                            
2 The Turkish President has a more symbolic role in the Turkish political system. However, compared to 
the other European parliamentarian systems, Turkish president has more power.  
3 I make this claim on the basis of my interviews with a number of deputies.  
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opinion. The most significant external factors are the influence of the United States and the 
EU over Turkey’s decision makers.    
Finally, the national security executive needs to calculate the power capabilities of 
his/her state to advance a foreign policy goal. There are various power instruments 
available to states. These are soft power, hard power, and structural power instruments.4 
Soft power refers to “the ability to get others to want what you want.” (Nye 2007) The 
power of attraction, persuasion, credibility, and carrots (incentives) and sticks (coercion) 
are important soft power tools. (Nye 2007) For example, Turkey’s democratization in the 
last 12 years is strongly being influenced by the carrots and sticks of the EU membership. 
On the other hand, hard power is “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would 
not do.” (Dahl 1957) Hard power has two components: military power (more important) 
and economic power (less so). States, including Turkey, have sometimes employed hard 
power to promote democracy abroad, such as in Japan and Libya. Finally, structural power 
is the institution-building capacity of states, determined largely by economic factors.5 
While the soft and hard powers are important in terms of the promotion and the spread of 
the democratic values and institutions, the structural power arguments are especially 
helpful in explaining the effectiveness of Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the 
target states. It is necessary to acknowledge the aforementioned approaches of power to 
                                                            
4 For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s power, see Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mustafa Kutluay. Turkey’s 
Power Capacity in the Middle East: Limits of the Possible, An Empirical Analysis. International Strategic 
Research Organization, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, USAK Report No: 12-04, 
June 2012.  
5 For structural power arguments, see Susan Strange, “An Eclectic Approach”, in Craig N. Murphy and 
Roger Tooze (eds.), The New International Political Economy, Lynne Publishers, Boulder, 1991, p. 34. 
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have a meaningful understanding of why Turkey does what it does and how much influence 
Turkey has in the rapidly changing ME. (Kutluay and Dincer 2012)  
In this dissertation, neoclassical realists give us a sense of context in which to 
explain the democracy promotion policy of Turkey. However, Turkey’s identity will enable 
us to better understand the specific articulation of Turkey’s foreign policy choices. In the 
following section, I will broadly explain the interplay between the Turkish identity and 
strategic interests. 
Identity 
The AKP conceptualizes Turkey as a “regional power” in the ME. However, before 
going further in my analysis, I would like to briefly introduce the concept of regional 
power. I define a region as a cluster of states that share a substantial amount of 
commonalities with each other. An example of regional power is a major state that has the 
capacity to generate substantial change in that region. As global powers also have interests 
in that region, changes in the distribution of power at the regional level have global 
implications. In this regard, Turkey, as a regional power, needs to take the interests and 
policies of the global powers, such as the US, into consideration while engaging with the 
ME. In fact, this research indicates that the US has a great influence on the calculation of 
Turkey’s foreign policy goals. 
However, there are several factors that determine whether or not a state is effective 
in wielding power within a particular region. Firstly, regional power needs to have a role-
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conception6 towards the region. This role conception is the regional power’s vision of the 
region. Secondly, the global powers have to be aware of the state endorsing itself as a 
regional power. Thirdly, there should be a certain level of acceptance of the regional power 
role of the state that endorses itself as such. Fourthly, a regional power needs to have the 
power capabilities to realize its goals, such as military, economic, and institution building 
capacity. (Thompson 1973) Turkey, as the second largest NATO army, 16th biggest 
economy globally, and 6th biggest market in the EU, has a population of 75 million.7 
Therefore, with these credentials, Turkey can play a regional power role in the ME. 
Turkey’s historical relationship as the heir of the Ottomans with its neighbors also 
strengthens its position as a regional power.  
There are different explanations for why states promote democracy abroad. 
According to some scholars, states promote democracy to serve their security8 and 
economic9 interests; according to other scholars, democracy promotion is a result of the 
                                                            
6 For the impact of states’ role conceptions on their foreign behaviors, see, for example, Kalevi J. Holsti. 
National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 14: 3, 233-309, 
1970. 
7 For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s power, see “Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mustafa Kutluay. Turkey’s 
Power Capacity in the Middle East: Limits of the Possible, An Empirical Analysis. International Strategic 
Research Organization, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, USAK Report No: 12-04, 
June 2012.”    
8 See, for example, Randall L. Schweller, US Democracy Promotion: Realist Reflections, in: Cox et al. 41-
62, 2000. 
9 For more information about the relationship between states’ commercial interests and democracy and their 
foreign policies, see Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics, in International Organization, 51: 4, 513-553, 1997; Robert Gilpin, (War and Change in the World 
Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998) as a realist from the political economy field assigns 
a greater importance to economic power than the traditional realists, such as Hans J. Morgenthau (Politics 
among Nations, Alfred A. Knop, New York, 1962).  
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projection of states’ democratic identity in the international arena.10 However, another 
group of scholars argues that states promote democracy for a combination of strategic and 
normative reasons. According to the third group, well-established democracies have both 
a normative claim to and a genuine strategic interest in promoting democracy.11  
I find the liberal approach, which is the third argument, the most appealing for the 
Turkish case. However, the liberal approach needs to be put in its proper context. Similar 
to Olsen, I argue that states could have both normative and strategic goals in promoting 
democracy. However, when their strategic interests are threatened, their concerns for 
strategic interests prevail over their normative goals.12 From the liberal perspective, 
advanced democracies initially promote democracy to serve their own security and 
economic interests. Secondly, states promote democracy, as it serves the collective interest 
of the international society by paving the way for mutually beneficial economic and 
security cooperation. Finally, states promote democracy, as it also serves the interests of 
                                                            
10 For example, see Mark Peceny. A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The Ambiguous 
Case of the Spanish-American War. Journal of Peace Research 34: 4, 415-430, 1997; Paul Kowert and 
Jeffrey Legro, Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise, 451-497, 1995. 
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz12.html  
11 Also, see Edward D. Mansfield, Helen Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorf. Why Democracies Cooperate 
More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization, 56: 3, 477-513, 
2002; Thomas Risse Kappen. Democratic Peace, Warlike Democracies: A Social Constructivist 
Interpretation of the Democratic Peace. European Journal of International Relations, 1: 4, 491-517, 1995; 
finally see Emmanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 1795. 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm  
12 For example, see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 1999; also, see McFaul, Ukraine 
Imports Democracy, 2007; furthermore, see Dalacoura, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion in 
the Middle East, 2010; Moreover, see Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, 2014; also, see Karakas, 
Democracy Promotion or Demotion, 2010; Moreover, see Ozer and Ozcan , Do New Democracies Support 
Democratization, 2011;   Also, see Graye .R. Olsen, Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post-Cold 
War Africa: How Serious is Europe and for What Reason?, African Affairs, 97/388: 366, 1998. 
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the recipient societies, such as the protection of human rights, fostering social development, 
economic growth, and domestic political stability.13 (Czempiel 1996)  
Turkey as a regional power has a mixture of normative and strategic motivations 
for promoting democracy in the ME. The AKP, which perceives Turkey as a regional 
power,14 promotes democracy in the ME for three significant reasons: firstly, the AKP 
promotes democracy to advance Turkey’s security, strengthen its strategic alliances with 
elected, like-minded Islamist governments, and protect its economic interests in the ME. 
Secondly, Turkey promotes democracy, as the AKP thinks that democratization in the 
region will foster mutually beneficial economic (open market) and security cooperation. In 
this regard, stability is crucial for sustainable economic and political relations between the 
neighboring countries. Thirdly, the AKP thinks that democratization in the ME will foster 
positive social change, such as diminishing inequalities between genders and races; will 
increase economic development by fostering intra-regional trade; will rise the human 
capital necessary for the functioning of the system; protecting human rights which is the 
precondition of domestic political stability; and will lead to the enforcement of a clear rule 
of law which is important both for the protection of human rights and economic activities 
of the Turkish investors.    
However, regardless of whether states promote democracy for their ideals or not, 
when their substantial interests are threatened, their concerns for their strategic interests 
                                                            
13 Also, see Peter J. Schraeder. The State of the art in International Democracy Promotion: Results of a 
Joint European– North American Research Network. Democratization 20(2): 21–44, 2003; Kant, Perpetual 
Peace, 1795; Wolff and Wurm, Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion, 2011.  
14 Dincer and Kutluay, Turkey’s Power Capacity in the Middle East: Limits of the Possible, An Empirical 
Analysis, 2012.    
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prevail over their ideals.15 The reason behind this is that promoting democratization is “a 
complex and conflict-ridden process of political change.”16 (Wolff and Wurm 2011) In this 
process, “(potential) rewards do not come quickly, while costs are immediate.”17 (Wolff 
and Wurm 2011) To provide an example, “whenever the ideal of democracy clashed with 
the US national security objective of containing communism during the Cold War, for 
example, both Democratic and Republican administrations were willing to downplay the 
authoritarian shortcomings of a variety of US allies, such as Ferdinand Marcos of the 
Philippines, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, in favor 
of their strong support for US anticommunist policies.”18 (Schraeder 2003) 
Similarly, Turkey has been faced with substantial challenges that have threatened 
its security, alliances, and economic interests while promoting democracy in the ME. When 
this happens, Turkey tries to find a middle way not to backtrack from promoting democracy 
and scarify its strategic interests. However, when the developments starts to threaten the 
Turkish strategic interests, then Turkey makes the best use of available foreign policy tools, 
such as military and diplomacy, to eliminate the threats. In such times, Turkey’s democracy 
                                                            
15 For example, see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 1999; also, see McFaul, Ukraine 
Imports Democracy, 2007; furthermore, see Dalacoura, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion in 
the Middle East, 2010; Moreover, see Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, 2014; also, see Karakas, 
Democracy Promotion or Demotion, 2010; Moreover, see Ozer and Ozcan , Do New Democracies Support 
Democratization, 2011;   Also, see Graye .R. Olsen, Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post-Cold 
War Africa: How Serious is Europe and for What Reason?, African Affairs, 97/388: 366, 1998. 
16 See Wolff and Wurm, Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion, 2011, pp 80. 
17 See Wolff and Wurm, Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion, 2011, pp 80. 
18 Also, see Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 1999. 
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promotion gains a highly strategic orientation.19 For example, Turkey’s support for 
democratization in Syria and Libya in the process of the Arab Spring, and in Iraq after the 
occupation of the US in 2003 is a good example of this case.  
Another important question concerns how states promote democracy. There are a 
number of tools available to the states when promoting democracy. These are diplomacy, 
foreign aid, political conditionalities, economic sanctions, covert intervention (such as 
coup d’états and psychological warfare), paramilitary intervention (such as funding a 
guerilla organization), and finally military intervention. (Schraeder 2003) The examination 
of the last twelve years of the AKP rule indicates that Turkey prefers to rely on non-
coercive ways of democracy promotion, such as foreign aid, diplomacy, and mentoring. 
However, when Turkey’s strategic interests are threatened, Turkey makes use of military 
tools as well.   
When the AKP started to promote democracy in the ME, it stressed a multilateral, 
consistent, internally driven, and long term process of change. Turkey as a regional power, 
which based its policies towards the ME on the notion of regional ownership, did not want 
to see the occurrence of radical developments, such as foreign interventions, which could 
destabilize the whole ME for the purpose of promoting democracy. Nevertheless, Turkey 
was compelled to deviate from the aforementioned principles in the process of the Arab 
Spring. Initially, when the Arab Spring arrived to Libya, Turkey was being engulfed into a 
limited military intervention as a NATO member state. Next, when the conflict in Syria 
                                                            
19 Ozel and Ozcan, in Do New Democracies Support Democracy? (Turkey’s Dilemmas, 2011) explain how 
Turkish democracy promotion is strategically driven. I think, the authors underestimate the importance of 
Turkey’s ideals in its democracy promotion policy.  
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started to threaten the Turkish security interests, Turkey provided assistance to the Syrian 
rebels and refugees in a number of ways, such as humanitarian aid, intelligence, and 
weaponry. In both cases, Turkey’s military support was reluctant.  
However, an important question is that although Turkey has major strategic 
interests in other parts of the world, such as the Central Asia, the Balkans, and Iran, why 
does Turkey, under the AKP rule, promote democracy in the ME? I argue that the identity 
of Turkey’s policy makers influence the articulation of their foreign policy priorities. For 
example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey under the nationalist conservative 
government rule (Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party) prioritized Central Asian Turkish 
Republics in its foreign policy. Similarly, Turkey under the AKP rule, which has deep roots 
in political Islam and which assigns a “regional power role”20 to Turkey in the region, 
promotes democracy in the Arab ME.  
Furthermore, examining the AKP’s relations with the groups in the Arab ME, it is 
seen that Justice and Freedom Party of Egypt, Justice and Construction Party of Tunisia, 
Hamas in Palestine, and Justice and Development Party of Libya come out as important 
partners of the AKP. This brings up the question, why does the AKP establish firm relations 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, but not other groups? The reason is that the AKP’s 
willingness alone is not enough; that is to say, the attitudes of the corresponding groups 
towards the AKP matter just as much. In this regard, strong partnership requires the consent 
                                                            
20 For example, Kalevi J. Holsti in National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy (International 
Studies Quarterly 14: 3, 233-309, 1970) argues that states have different role conceptions that influence 
their relations with other states. In this regard, the AKP’s conception of Turkey as the heir of Ottoman 
Empire and as a regional power in the ME influences its behaviors in the ME. The AKP tries to create a 
democratic order in the ME partly because of its role conception towards the region.  
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of both sides. Despite some divergences, both the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood share 
similar ideas and goals regarding the Muslim world. (Fuller, 2014) Therefore, the 
ideological similarities that the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood share facilitate the 
formation of strong ties between them. 
 To sum up, in the present research, identity refers to the norms, perceptions, and 
values of the AKP government. The AKP perceives Turkey as a regional power, which is 
connected to the ME by common geography, culture, religion, and history. The AKP also 
comes from the Islamist (political Islam) tradition. The AKP’s roots in political Islam 
influences its choice of groups with which the AKP forms alliances, and the tools the AKP 
utilizes to promote democracy in the ME. In this dissertation, Turkey’s strategic interests 
refer to its survival (territorial integrity), alliances, and economic interests in the ME.  
This research conceptualizes the impact of identity and strategic interests on 
Turkey’s democracy promotion policy as: Promotion of Democracy = Security/Economic 
Interests × Identity, where the multiplicative term represents the interactive impact of these 
two factors. However, the impact of identity on states’ foreign policies is not constant. The 
identity might have more influence at times, and less influence at some other times. In this 
regard, when states’ immediate security risks are not present, their identities influence their 
behaviors more. However, when they face a security threat, their identities matter less.  
In the research, my main goal is to document Turkey’s democracy promotion case 
in the Arab ME. Therefore, the non-Arab states will not be included in my analysis. 
However, I will sometimes mention Turkey’s engagement with non-Arab states to better 
contextualize the Turkish democracy promotion in the Arab ME.  
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Methodology and Data Sources 
My research explores why and how Turkey promotes democracy in the ME. In 
order to answer these questions, I employed the neo-classical realist framework, asserting 
that in order to understand a particular foreign policy choice, a researcher needs to take 
into consideration domestic and international contexts in which that foreign policy decision 
is formulated. In addition, the neo-classical realists attract attention to the role of identity 
of the national security executive when formulating foreign policy decisions. Therefore, in 
the dissertation, I first examined the domestic and international contexts in which the AKP 
formulated its democracy promotion policy. Secondly, I explained how the AKP’s 
perception of Turkey as a regional power and its roots in political Islam influenced the 
specific articulation of its democracy promotion policy.  
In order to explain why and how Turkey promotes democracy in the ME, I 
employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. In my dissertation, I 
advanced my thesis of Turkey’s democracy promotion in the Arab ME through the 
examination of a number of its strategic interests, such as economy, security, and alliance 
formation, which are directly related to regional stability in the ME. The impact of 
Turkey’s economic interests on its democracy promotion policy was easy to quantify: I 
employed statistical data that indicated changes in Turkey’s GDP per capita, export to the 
ME, import from the ME, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), and changes in Turkey’s trade 
volume with the ME between 2002 and 2012. I easily found statistical data on these 
variables from official sources, such as the OECD’s and Turkish Statistical Institute’s 
webpages.  
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However, it was not always possible to explain Turkey’s democracy promotion 
solely on the basis of numerical data. For example, in the fourth chapter, in order to uncover 
the relationship between Turkey’s core strategic interests in the ME and its democracy 
promotion policy, I needed to explain why the AKP leaders thought that the developments 
in Iraq, after the US occupation, and Syria, in the process of the Arab Spring, undermined 
Turkey’s national security. Furthermore, while Turkey’s foreign aid to the elected political 
parties connected to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia provided me with 
numerical data to support my thesis, which asserted that the AKP backed political parties 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the process of the Arab Spring, the statistics 
did not explain why the AKP supported the Muslim Brotherhood over other groups in the 
Arab ME. In such situations, my elite interviews and secondary sources substantially 
helped me to fill the gaps.   
In line with this mixed approach, King, Keohane and Verba argues that “in the same 
research project, some data may be collected that is amenable to statistical analysis, while 
other significantly important information is not.” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994) In light 
of this view, I tried to address my research question in the best possible way, without 
discriminating among the type of data – numerical or qualitative.  
One way that I explained how the AKP formulated its democracy promotion policy 
was by examining domestic and international contexts (Chapter II and III) in which the 
AKP formulated this policy. I utilized a process tracing technique in these two chapters. 
However, process tracing does not mean the exclusion of the numbers from the empirical 
analysis. Collier argues that the goal of process tracing, which is generally used while 
conducting qualitative research, is to take advantage of numerical analysis if it helps 
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discover causal mechanisms between the dependent and the independent variables. 
Therefore, I used both direct quotes from my elite interviews, secondary sources, and 
numerical data to explain the process in which the AKP formulated its democracy 
promotion policy by examining the AKP’s interaction with systemic and domestic actors 
simultaneously.  
Before explaining my data sources, I would like to elaborate further on process 
tracing technique. Collier defines process tracing as: “process tracing examines diagnostic 
pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or 
phenomena—with the goal of achieving and refining causal inference.” (Collier 2011) 
George and McKeown further argue: “the process-tracing approach attempts to uncover 
what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to 
arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional 
arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of 
interest on attention, processing, and behavior.” (George and McKeown 1985)  
In this dissertation, semi-structured elite interviews occupy an important place. I 
conducted semi-structured, face-to-face interviews between Summer 2012 and Spring 
2014. My interviewees included opinion leaders, TIKA experts, ordinary people, MPs, 
diplomatic personnel, and CSO leaders. The interviews took place in Ankara, Istanbul, 
Gaziantep, Hatay, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale. Although most of the interviewees were 
from Turkey, I had the chance to talk to high ranking representatives from the US, Syria, 
Kosovo, Yemen, and Egypt. My interviewees consisted of both males and females above 
18 years of age. As I indicated previously, most of the interviewees are in leading positions 
in their countries. However, I also had the chance to talk to the common citizens in Turkey. 
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Because of cultural reasons specific to Turkey, I had to conduct unofficial interviews 
sometimes.21 I focused on four sets of questions during my interviews. The first set 
concerned the interviewees’ perception of Turkey; the second set of questions concerned 
the interviewees’ perception of the ME; the third set of questions was related to the 
interviewees’ opinion of the role Turkey could play in the ME. The fourth set of questions 
measured the interviewees’ perception of democracy, democracy promotion, 
authoritarianism, and regime change in the ME.    
The other sources of data for my qualitative analysis are the official web-archives 
of the Turkish state institutions, such as the Turkish Parliament and ministries, media, and 
secondary sources, such as empirical books and articles. Often, my interviews were not 
adequate for developing a cohesive argument. In such situations, I had to resort to either 
statistical data or secondary sources.   
The statistical data in this chapter is gathered from the web-sources of United 
Nations, World Bank, various Turkish ministries, Turkish Statistical Institute, OECD 
(Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development), Global Humanitarian 
Assistance, TIKA (Turkey’s Development and Cooperation Agency) Development 
Reports, and several public opinion research conducted by SETA (Foundation for Political, 
Economic, and Social Research).   
                                                            
21 In Turkey, high ranking officials were highly skeptical of me as a researcher for recording their voices. 
This skepticism also prevented them from speaking freely. Therefore, in many instances, in order to 
understand what was happening in the field, I kept the conversation informal. This way, my interviewees 
were much willing to reveal their real opinions.   
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The Plan of the Dissertation 
My dissertation consists of nine chapters, the first and the last being the introduction 
and conclusion. The second chapter examines the domestic context in which the AKP 
started to promote democracy in the Arab ME. The domestic context entails Turkey’s 
economic and political transformations under the AKP government.  
In the third chapter, I examine how Turkey’s relations with the West influenced its 
democracy promotion policy in the ME. I also explain the influences of the US and the EU 
on Turkey’s democracy promotion policy.  
In the fourth chapter, I explain Turkey’s economic and security interests and 
Turkey’s alliances in the context of Turkey’s democracy promotion in the ME. 
Furthermore, I examine the conditions under which Turkey applies military power to 
defend its substantial strategic interests in the region. This chapter is a hybrid chapter in 
the sense that it explains one of the important tools of democracy promotion, Turkey’s 
military power, and Turkey’s motivations for promoting democracy in the ME.   
In the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters, I document Turkey’s strategies of 
democracy promotion in the ME. The fifth chapter examines Turkey’s democracy 
promotion through Turkey’s Official Development Assistance (ODA). The sixth chapter 
explains Turkey’s democracy promotion through mentoring, normative pressure, 
demonstrative effect, conditionality, peace building, and enlargement. Finally, the seventh 
chapter focuses on the involvement of the Turkish civil society in Turkey’s democracy 
promotion in the ME.    
The eighth chapter examines the limitations, strengths, and the specificities of 
Turkey’s democracy promotion.   
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CHAPTER II: DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE EMERGENCE OF TURKEY AS A 
POWERHOUSE IN THE REGION UNDER THE AKP GOVERNMENT 
Neo-classical realism argues that statesmen make decisions by taking into 
consideration both domestic and international incentives and constraints. (Lobell, Ripsman 
and Taliaferro 2009) Therefore, the relevant domestic and external factors that impact the 
decisions of statesmen need to be taken into account while explaining states’ foreign 
policies. 22 In this chapter, I examine the domestic factors which have affected the AKP’s 
democracy promotion policy broadly. Furthermore, I argue that Turkey’s transformation 
into a more open society and economic powerhouse has provided the AKP with favorable 
conditions to exert Turkey’s regional power role more forcefully in the ME.  
This chapter explains the transformation of Turkey into a more confident 
democratic state under the AKP rule. When the AKP came to power in 2002, it was 
constrained by political (the Turkish military and the Republican People’s Party), 
economic (poverty and high inflation rate), and security problems (the PKK). Therefore, 
the AKP was not able to act independently.  
However, the AKP successfully changed the conditions in its own favor by 2007. 
The AKP managed to retain the support of the Turkish masses and the West. As a result, 
threats originating from the Kemalist status quo against elected political parties were being 
eliminated. The most important step taken in this regard was the establishment of the 
civilian control over the Turkish military. Also, by 2007, Turkey emerged as an economic 
powerhouse and a more open society. In this new environment, the AKP started to 
                                                            
22Rose, Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign policy, 1998; for why states promote democracy, see 
Schweller, US democracy promotion: Realist reflections, 2000.  
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formulate more independent foreign policy decisions. This resulted in Turkey’s self-
endorsement as a regional power in the ME more assertively. Although the Arab Spring, 
Gezi Park protests and the 17 December 2013 corruption scandal challenged the AKP’s 
authority, the AKP remains to be the most powerful party in Turkey. (Fuller 2014) In this 
chapter, I explain the process of this intricate domestic change through which Turkey has 
emerged as a powerful state that aspires to lead the ME.    
In this dissertation, my goal is to explain how and why Turkey promotes democracy 
in the ME. However, without understanding the aforementioned domestic political and 
economic transformations, as a result of which Turkey emerged as a powerhouse, it is 
impossible to fully comprehend Turkey’s democratic activism in the ME. Turkey did 
promote democracy before the Arab Spring. However, its promotion remained within the 
normative framework until 2007. Nevertheless, after the subordination of its political 
rivals, and Turkey’s accumulation of substantial wealth, the AKP started to promote 
democracy more forcefully in the ME.  
Turkey projected the power that it accumulated under the AKP rule particularly in 
the course of the Arab Spring by providing the Arab Spring countries and the protestors 
with foreign aid and military support. Interestingly, since 2004 Turkey’s democracy 
promotion has gained a more strategic orientation, reaching its peak in the process of the 
Arab Spring. In this chapter, I explain the process of Turkey’s economic and political 
transformation under the AKP rule in detail. However, before explaining the AKP’s 
impact, initially I would like to provide some preliminary information about the history of 
democratization in Turkey dating back to its Ottoman roots.  
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Democratization during the Ottoman Empire 
Turkey’s first democratization attempts are often traced back to November 3, 1839, 
which was the date of the Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat Declaration, which, for a time, 
transformed the empire into a constitutional monarchy.23 The main reasons for the reform 
were to stop the separatist groups motivated by nationalist movements, to prevent the 
outside intervention of the European powers in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, 
and to retain Western support in international issues. (Ozkan 2012)  
The reformation process was deepened by Islahat Declaration in 1856.24 The 
declaration improved minority rights, and further restricted the Sultan’s authority. (Ozkan 
2012) By the late 1800s, Russia had increased its support for the Slavic Balkan nations 
(which were still a part of the Ottoman Empire), and supported their separatist goals. As a 
result, the Ottoman Empire decided to share the power with the Ottoman citizens in order 
to prevent the partition of the Empire, resulting in the Mesrutiyet Declaration in 1876. By 
the Mesrutiyet declaration, the citizens of the Ottoman Empire, including Christians, were 
granted representation in the Ottoman Parliament. However, the parliament would only be 
responsible to the Sultan and function only as an advisory body. (Ozkan 2012)   
However, these reform movements did not produce the desired outcomes. As a 
result of nationalist movements, the Christian minorities in the Balkans, supported by the 
                                                            
23 For detailed info, see Cemil Birsel. Tanzimat’ın Harici Siyaseti. Tanzimat I, İstanbul: Millî Eğitim 
Bakanlığı. 661-722, 1999; Also see Gülnihâl Bozkurt, Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasî Gelişmelerin 
Işığı Altında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukukî Durumu (1839-1914), Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu. (1996). 
24 For Further information, see M. Tanju Akad. Islahat Fermanı. Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, 
Istanbul: Iz Yayini vol. 6, 1994; Also See Fatih Demirci. Islahat Fermanı ve Müsâvât Meselesi. Gazi 
Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 1999. 
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European powers, separated from the Empire. Eventually, the Young Turks, a group of 
well-organized and western educated Turkish intellectuals, revolted against the Ottoman 
Empire in 1908. (Ozkan 2012) The revolt resulted in the redistribution of power among the 
Ottoman’s political institutions. For instance, the responsibility for governing shifted from 
the Sultan to the parliament. However, these reforms were also short-lived due to the 
participation of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, followed by the War of 
Turkish Independence, which resulted in the establishment of the Modern Turkish 
Republic.   
Certainly, the reform process in the Empire was triggered by the desire to prevent 
the external intervention in domestic affairs. (Cansu 2006)  Another reason was to stop 
separatist movements of the Christian populations, such as Greeks, Serbians, and 
Bulgarians. (Gumus 2008) However, it also led to lively debates among influential 
Ottoman elites, such as scholars and governors, regarding the concept of democracy and 
its compatibility with Islam. There were three main lines of thinking: the first group argued 
that The Quran commanded that the ruler should be consulted before making decisions, 
and non-Muslims along with the Muslims could serve in such an advisory institution. The 
second group suggested that Islam only allowed the representation of Muslims in such an 
institution since non-Muslims could not be trusted. The last group declared that the nation 
was not mature enough to adapt a system that considered representation. (Tekin 2000) Most 
importantly, the idea of democracy was associated with freedoms and consultation, and 
faced with no significant opposition. 
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The Establishment of the Modern Turkish Republic 
In 1923, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Republic of Turkey was founded 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It was established on four core values: 
secularism, democracy, Turkishness, and Sunni-Islam. (Ergil 2000) Within this context, 
three groups were given minority status, Armenians, Jews, and Greeks. (Grigoriadis 2006) 
Although there were substantial ethnic and sectarian minorities among Muslims, their 
differences were not recognized by the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic. The 
foundation of the Turkish nation would be Islam. In 1920, when Ataturk opened the first 
national assembly of Turkish Republic, he reiterated that “the national assembly did not 
consist of Turks, Cerkes, Kurds, or Lazs, but instead consisted of Islam, that included all 
these components.”25 Paradoxically, as Ataturk was building a strictly secular state, he tried 
to consolidate national unity defined by religion. The institutionalization of Sunni Islam as 
the state religion has caused tensions among Sunni-Alevi and secular-religious citizens of 
Turkey ever since.  
The problem, however, was that the young Turkish state expected the Muslim 
minorities to meld within the Muslim (Sunni)-Turkish identity. (Yegen 1999) Therefore, 
the pillars on which the Turkish nation was being built also produced the cleavages around 
which the parties and the voters would organize. For example, the distinguishing principle 
among the Turkish political parties has been their religious-secular orientations (such as 
AKP vs. CHP), as well as their ethnic-national identities (such as BDP vs. MHP). Both 
                                                            
25 Ataturk delivered this speech during the opening ceremony of the first parliament of the modern 
Turkish Republic. In Turkish:  ''Bu Meclis sadece Türkler'in değildir, Kürtler'in de diğer anasır-ı 
İslam'ın da Meclisi'dir''. Meclis Haber (Parliament News), March 14 2014.   
http://www.meclishaber.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=124047  
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religious and nationalist parties are considered to be on the right wing in the Turkish 
context; whereas the secular and ethnic parties are considered to be rather on the left wing.  
The Turkish state remained as a one party system until 1946; nevertheless, it was 
compelled by the domestic and international developments to introduce the multi-party 
system. (Akcapar, et al. 2004) On the domestic front, Turkey had to answer its citizens’ 
demands for a political system established on pluralistic representation. On the 
international level, Turkey had to fulfill NATO’s membership criteria by transitioning to a 
multiparty system, which would serve the main goal of Kemalism—westernization of the 
country. However, beginning from 1960, Turkey’s democratization process was 
interrupted by the military several times. 
Table 1. Cleavages in Turkish Politics Rooted in its Foundation 
 
The May 27, 1960 military coup resulted in constitutional changes that introduced 
liberal political reforms as well as proportional representation. (Esmer 2002) According to 
Duverger, representation determined by “single member plurality district” produces a two-
party system, while “the double ballot majority system” and proportional representation 
Turkish Identity Kurdish Identity
Sunni Identity Versus Alawi Identity
Strict Secularism
Demand for Religious
Tolerance
 
Cleavages in Modern Turkish Politics, Rooted in its
Foundation
 
 
28 
produces a multiparty system.26 (Duverger 1972) The reconfiguration of the Turkish 
election system on the basis of proportional representation produced multiple competing 
groups, such as Islamists, nationalists, and leftists in the political arena. (Grigoriadis 2006) 
From that moment on, the Turkish political system has rarely experienced a single party 
government in power. (Esmer 2002)  
The constitution adopted after the 1980 military coup brought some political 
restrictions. For instance, it introduced a 10% national threshold to reduce the number of 
political parties to a more manageable level. (Özbudun 2000) Three other articles had a 
substantial impact on the way the Turkish society organized itself politically. Article 33 
prohibited associations from pursuing any kind of political goals, including, but not 
restricted to engaging in political activities, receiving support from political parties, and 
cooperating with public organizations and foundations. Article 81 prohibited the formation 
and operation of political parties defined by ethnic, racial, or religious lines. Article 58 
prohibited the use of any other languages except Turkish for political campaigning. Finally, 
the 1980 constitution also banned the use of Kurdish names. As a consequence, the Kurdish 
village names were replaced by the Turkish ones.27 
However, according to Martin Lipset, countries with political parties organized 
around deep cleavages have healthy democratic systems, (Lipset 2000) and as suggested 
by  Moshe Maor, in Europe, cleavages emerged as a result of the national (French) and 
industrial (British) revolutions. (Maor 1997)  Contrary to Lipset and Moar, the  ground for 
                                                            
26 Also, see Bill Park. Modern Turkey: People, State, and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. 
USA: New York, Routledge, 2012.    
27 Turkey’s constitution which was introduced after the 1980 military coup.  
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democracy in Turkey was unlike those in France and Britain. In Turkey, parties are 
organized around secular (left)-religious (right) and ethnic (left)-national (right) lines as a 
result of the definition of Turkey’s core values which were Turkishness, Sunni Islam, and 
secularism. Turkish military elites prohibited parties to organize around religious and 
ethnic lines, as exemplified in the 1980 constitution. (Tachau 2002) As a result, the existing 
deep cleavages within the society were exacerbated.  
The 1980 constitution, which restricted political rights and freedoms and 
introduced neo-liberal economic policies, had a complex impact on Turkish political life. 
Modernization indicators, such as urbanization, literacy and GDP rates dramatically 
increased (See Table 2). As a result, Turkey’s middle class grew substantially. Groups, 
emerging around the already existing cleavages, faced political restrictions in 1980s. Thus, 
while religious groups had to go underground, leftist Kurdish groups started to launch 
attacks against Turkish armed forces. Despite political openings and economic 
development, the leftist Kurdish groups still continue their militant struggles. There has 
been a deep divide between the Kurdish and Turkish nationalists and the secular and 
religious groups in Turkey.  
In the early 1990s, Turkey went through a political liberalization process once 
again. Political and cultural rights of the minority groups were improved. The educational 
levels of individuals significantly increased. The introduction of liberal economic policies 
produced new economically powerful classes in Turkey, such as the conservative 
bourgeoisie. (Taspinar 2012) In this process, globalization trends, the EU membership 
process, advancements in mass communication and economic and educational 
developments have greatly contributed to the formation of a pluralistic society in Turkey. 
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However, this era is also marked by the political instabilities caused by the coalition 
governments, resulting in mismanagement of economic, political, and social problems. 
(Coskun 2003) 
Table 2. Turkey’s Socio-Economic Development 
 
In 2001, Turkey experienced a severe economic crisis, triggered by a political crisis 
under the Democratic Left Party (the DTP) rule. Inflation rates dramatically increased. For 
example, in 1994, inflation rates went up to 120.21%, and remained around 70% until 2000. 
In 2002, when the AKP came to power, inflation rates decreased to 29.75%. In 2012, it 
was measured as 7.40%. (Worldwide Inflation Data 2014) In the 1990s, Turkey could 
hardly find an international institution to borrow from. Those that did stipulated high 
interest rates.28 Also, unemployment rates increased in this period. Furthermore, Istanbul 
was hit by a major earthquake in 1999, resulting in over 60,000 casualties and the 
destruction of massive cities like Istanbul and Balikesir. The casualties associated with the 
violent activities of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) exceeded 30,000. (Teymur and 
Smith 2008) The Turkish status-quo did not know how to deal with problems of this 
magnitude. The Kemalist establishment (military, Republican People Party (the CHP), and 
                                                            
28 For example, Public Debt Management Report (April 2003), prepared by the Turkish Treasury, indicates 
that between 1992 and 1999, the average interest rates in Turkey was 32 %.    
1980 43% 65% $1.56 
1990 53% 79% $2.78 
2000 64% 86% $4.19 
2013 72% 94% $15.30 
Year Literacy rates GDP % 
Capita 
 
* Source: Turkish Statistical Institute
Urbanization
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their allies in the other sectors of the society) continued to remain the de facto power. 
However, people started to lose their faith in the secular Kemalist elite. (Cagaptay 2011) 
All these developments also marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish politics.  
The AKP Era 
Under the AKP rule, Turkey went through substantial political and economic 
transformations. As a result, Turkey emerged as a powerful actor in the ME. The AKP 
promoted democracy similtenously inside and outside the country. However, until Arab 
Spring, Turkey promoted democracy through normative chanels in the ME, and until then 
Turkey’s democracy promotion policy was more idealist than realist. However, Turkey’s 
support for democratization in the ME became more strategically driven in the course of 
Arab Spring. Meanwhile, we witness the militarization of Turkey’s democracy promotion 
in the region. It is important to realize that Turkey would not have been able to play such 
an assertive role, if the Turkish military had not been taken under civilian control and if 
the Turkish economy had not grown at such  great extents (See Table 2).  
In the following part, I will examine the AKP’s impact on Turkey’s democratic 
transformation in three phases. The initial phase is characterized with the AKP’s promotion 
of liberal democracy, the second phase is associated with conservative democracy and the 
third phase is identitfied with authoritarianism and a deviation from universal democratic 
standards. In each consequtive phase, the AKP’s democracy promotion policy gains more 
strategic orientation. 
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The First Phase: Liberal Democracy 
As I indicated earlier, after obtaining power in the 2003 national elections, the AKP 
had to deal with problems in three main areas: economy (poverty, high inflation rates,  
unemployment, low growth rates, inefficient banking sector, and corruption); rights and 
freedoms (minority rights, religious rights, freedom of expression and association, and the 
strictly secular military that dominated the elected civilians); and security (fighting against 
terrorism emanating from the PKK and reforming the security sector to subordinate 
military to the civilians). The AKP’s domestic and international policies are driven by 
attempts to address these three sets of issues.  
Initially, the AKP needed to survive in an international and domestic environment 
un-friendly to Islamic groups. On the domestic front, the AKP declared its commitment to 
Turkey’s secular values and accepted westernization as the priority of its foreign policy. 
The AKP tried to address the concerns for the Islamization of the country by prioritizing 
the practical needs of people such as food, security, and justice in their party agenda. (Yakis 
2012) 
In order to survive in the crude political environment, which was unfriendly to the 
Islamic political groups, in Turkey, the AKP launched a strategy which had both 
international and domestic components. Internationally, the AKP took steps that reinforced 
its domestic moves: the AKP started Turkey’s EU accession process negotiations, which 
was initiated by the Helsinki process in 1999. The AKP declared strong interests in 
cooperating with the US to solve regional problems. (Erdogan 2003) As a result, the AKP 
was able to retain the support of the EU and the US. The AKP also successfully received 
the support of a large portion of Turkish citizens (See Table 3). Afterwards, the AKP 
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constantly increased its votes; consecutively, from 36% to 42%, from 42% to 47%, and 
from that to 50% in the following elections and referenda, which indicated people’s support 
of the AKP. (Yakis 2012) 
Table 3. Political Parties and Voters’ Profile on the basis of Voters’ Self-definition 
 
The EU’s impact on Turkey’s Democratization during the AKP Rule 
The AKP passed a series of harmonization packages to bring Turkey closer to the 
EU. Freedom of expression was extended; freedom of religion, association, assembly, and 
press were improved. Furthermore, the death penalty was removed from the penal code 
and the right to a free trial was improved. Some other improvements were made regarding 
the equality of the sexes, making the closure of political parties by the constitutional court 
more difficult, civil-military relations, and cultural and lingual rights. (Park 2012) For 
instance, the MGK (National Security Council), which was previously dominated by the 
Military, was assigned a civilian chair, and its function was reduced to an advisory 
institution. (Park 2012) The MGK used to be an institution over which the military 
The RP
The MHP 
 
* This table is drawn on the basis of A&G (2008) Public Opinion Poll.
No idea (36.2%), Democrat (34%), Religious (14.9 %), Nationalist (10%)
(Very low educational and economic status)
The Political Parties  The Voters Profile on the basis of Voters’ Self-Definition 
The AKP
Religious (42%), Conservative (34%), Nationalist (35.7%), and Kemalist
(24.3%) (A lower middle class party; a lower economic and educational 
status comparing to the RP)
Kemalist (85%), Social Democrat (42.6%), nationalist (28.9%), Democrat
(26.3%) (An upper class party; the highest economic and educational 
status)
Nationalist (84.3%), Kemalist (52.9%), Religious (23.5%), Conservative
(18.6%)
The DTP
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exercised control over the civilian authorities. Its reorganization on the basis of democratic 
principles helped civilian authorities to have greater control over the military. Moreover, 
restrictions on Kurdish language and cultural rights were removed. Moreover, a TV 
channel broadcasting in Kurdish, TRT6, was established for the first time, and restrictions 
over the associations, which were introduced by the 1980 constitution, were removed. (Park 
2012)  
Consequently, the EU accession process had a significant impact over 
democratization of Turkey under the AKP rule. Furthermore, the democratization reforms 
that were carried out in the AKP’s initial term were liberal in nature. However, this would 
slowly change towards conservative reforms after the AKP’s second electoral victory. 
Before explaining the second term of the AKP rule, I would like to introduce the impact of 
the US on domestic politics of Turkey under the AKP rule.  
Eliminating the domestic threats with the support from the US 
The AKP’s initial support for Turkey’s democratization was a matter of its survival 
given the domestic and international constraints at the time. (Casier, Jongerden and Walker 
2013) At home, constraints included demands for greater rights and freedoms, security 
problems stemming from the PKK, and economic problems. Whichever of these was to be 
dealt with, the AKP had to either obtain the approval of the military or had to confront its 
objections. As it had been recorded before, almost all the previously elected governments 
were able to deal with such issues as much as and in the way that was permitted by the 
Military. Indeed, a party like the AKP, which has roots in political Islam, had to be extra 
cautious about the military, which disliked the Islamic political groups. 
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           Needless to say, the international political conditions were both fruitful for 
objectives of the AKP and the USA. The USA was after the idea of promoting democracy 
in the ME so as to prevent the spread of radicalism.29 Also, the AKP was after exerting its 
conservative democratic ideals in an environment where the biggest opponent was thought 
to be the Military. The new US approach to the ME led the US to support the election of a 
moderate party with deep roots in Turkish political Islam. (Aydogan 2012) An important 
element of the US’ BMENA (Broader Middle East and North Africa) project required the 
inclusion of Islamist groups in the political system to moderate them. (Dalacoura 2010) 
Turkey presented a fertile ground for the implementation of the BMENA project. (Aydogan 
2012) The AKP transformed into a pro-western democratic party. Therefore, the US helped 
the AKP obtain power. However, this does not mean that there were negotiations and direct 
US assistance to bring the AKP to power. The US just adopted a supportive attitude 
towards the AKP before and after it was being elected. Nursel Aydogan, the BDP MP, 
reiterated that: 
The US wanted to redesign the ME on the basis of its BMENA 
project, which was being discussed before the AKP obtained 
power in Turkey. BMENA requires the establishment of the 
moderate Islam in the region. In this regard, the US helped the 
moderate Islamists, the AKP, obtain power in Turkey… The 
actor that helped the AKP obtain power is also the actor that is 
                                                            
29 For further details, see Dalacoura, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: 
Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Recommendations, 2010; Also, see Bagci and Sinkaya, Greater Middle 
East Initiative and Turkey: AK Parti’s Perspective, 2006; Furthermore, see Akcapar, Akgun, Altunisik, and 
Kadioglu, The Debate on Democratization in the Broader Middle East and North Africa: A Civic 
Assessment from Turkey, 2004. 
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trying to redesign the ME. The US is now presenting the AKP to 
the ME as the representatives of the moderate Islam. Also, 
regionalization is an important component of globalization. By 
bringing the AKP to power, the US also got rid of the ethnic 
nationalist Ergenokon group (Turkey’s deep state). As the strong 
opponent of Kurds and Arabs, Ergenekon would prevent the 
regionalization in the ME. Regionalization was an important 
element of the BMENA project. (Aydogan 2012) 
However, the AKP still needed to prove to the US that it could become a credible 
partner. The AKP’s commitments to the westernization of Turkey and to Turkey’s possible 
EU membership played a crucial role in creation of an environment of trust between the 
Islamic AKP and the US. Also, the AKP got involved in a number of beneficial cooperation 
with the US, such as helping the US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Carol 2002) The 
AKP’s cooperative attitude towards the US fostered the US idea that if the military did not 
constrain the AKP, the AKP could become a much useful partner for the US. (J. Barkey 
2005)  Soon, the military would be taken under the civilian rule. Aydogan would suggest 
that “Think about that, the AKP imprisoned the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey, 
incarcerated 50 top military officials, and put the top Ergenekon leaders into the jail. And 
the AKP is claiming that it did all these by itself. I do not believe in this. It is unbelievable. 
I think the US provided a substantial help to the AKP in this process.” (Aydogan 2012)   
The AKP’s pro-democracy, pro-secularism, and pro-neoliberalism, which combine 
to generate pro-Westernism, calmed the initial concerns about its Islamist background. The 
AKP’s commitment to the EU process reinforced the pro-western AKP perception of the 
West. Domestically, the threats from the Kemalist establishment, which had strong ties 
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with the US and Europe, was being eliminated. Then, the AKP would only be bound by 
subsequent elections, rather than extralegal mechanisms, such as military coup d’états. 
Furthermore, western support created advantages for the AKP in the Muslim world, since 
for the first time an elected Islamist government had good ties with the West. The Western 
support contributed substantially to the AKP’s pursuit of its goals in the ME.  
On the other hand, the AKP balanced the secular economic elites by allying with 
conservative economic groups. The emerging Anatolian—religious—bourgeois in 
Gaziantep, Kayseri, Malatya, and Sivas (called Anatolian tigers) provided strong support 
for the AKP. (Taspinar 2012) TUMSIAD (Whole Industrialists and Businessmen 
Association) and TUSKON (Turkey’s Industrialists and Businessmen Confederation) are 
two conservative major business associations that backed the AKP. Thanks to these two 
establishments, the AKP reached an equilibrium with the TUSIAD (the secular economic 
elite).  
On the other hand, TUSIAD did not act quite in line with the BMENA project30 of 
the US that aimed to democratize the ME.  As reported by an American diplomat, “Union 
of Turkish Chambers of Commerce (TOBB) with which Sak is affiliated, has been actively 
seeking to encourage trade with the Middle Eastern countries. He contrasted this interest 
with TUSIAD (which represents the large, Istanbul- based conglomerates) which has not 
participated in fora like BMENA. Sak finds TUSIAD myopically focused on the EU, 
missing the point that a Turkey with stable, developed economic ties to its Middle Eastern 
neighbors is a more attractive candidate for EU membership.” (Wikileaks 2014) This might 
                                                            
30 See Chapter III for detailed information about the BMENA initiative.  
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be one reason due to which the AKP obtained western support despite the opposition of 
TUSIAD and other forces of the Kemalist status quo. 
The AKP’s cooperative attitude with the West strengthened the AKP’s role in 
domestic and international politics. The AKP reoriented itself as a promoter of human 
rights, open markets, and democracy. “This ensured that the AKP gained international 
legitimacy. Building coalitions internally as well as externally – with liberals at home and 
the Western powers on the international stage – was a way for the AKP to gain power and 
secure its hold on it.” (Ozpek 2014) However, it would be naïve not to see the AKP’s initial 
idealism for promoting human rights in the region as well.  
After the AKP’s second election in 2007, the domestic rivals were already 
subordinated, and the trust of the western powers was already secured. By the end of the 
AKP’s first term in office in 2007, Turkey had already reached substantial levels of 
economic development, and had transformed into a more open society. Therefore, the AKP 
was able to formulate more independent domestic and foreign policies within this newly 
emerging environment of freedom. Furthermore, the substantial growth of Turkey’s 
economy would provide the AKP with capability needed to play a more assertive role in 
the ME. In the following part, I will be explaining the second term of AKP in power, 
associated with an environment of freedom and increased conservatism.   
The Second Phase: Conservative Democracy  
The second phase of the AKP rule, 2008-2011, is associated with conservative 
policy initiatives. It began with victory in the parliamentary elections in July 22, 2007 and 
continued in August in the presidential elections, which were won by Abdullah Gul, a key 
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AKP leader. The elimination of threats from status quo forces allowed the AKP to govern 
with more confidence. In July 2008, the AKP faced a closure case in the Supreme Court 
on the basis of the complaint that the AKP was incrementally Islamizing the secular 
Turkish state. The AKP was accused of increasingly becoming the center of anti-secular 
acts, such as freeing the turban.31 (ntvmsnbc 2008) However, 5 out of 11 members of the 
constitutional court voted against the closure of the AKP. As a result of the absence of the 
support of a qualified majority, the case resulted in non-closure of the AKP.  
The failure to close the AKP started a new era for the AKP’s political orientation. 
After the closure case, there was neither a military, nor a Supreme Court threat that could 
confine the AKP. The checks which once existed in the Turkish system were no longer as 
big of a threat. The Republican Party had been turned into a small opposition force, and 
the military had returned to its barracks. Furthermore, the AKP reorganized the 
constitutional court on the basis of the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU membership. By the 
2010 referendum, the closure of the political parties was banned by law. (Secim Haber 
2014) 
Under these new circumstances, the AKP started to enact socially conservative 
policies. The AKP’s initiative for tightening up abortion procedures32 and the regulations 
                                                            
31 Turban is a head covering made from a long piece of cloth that is wrapped around the head as defined by 
the Cambridge online dictionary. 
32 You can find further information on abortion debate in this link http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/kurtajda-
10-haftayi-dusurme-calismasi/gundem/gundemdetay/30.05.2012/1546745/default.htm  you can also find 
The AKP’s policies concerning  women from this link: 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/Women_Of_Turkey_Steps_Of_Home.pdf  
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for the sale and use of alcohol33 were the most significant conservative policy drafts.  Both 
of these restrictions contributed greatly to the emergence of Gezi Park protests in Summer, 
2013. After Gezi Park protests, the AKP would continue to pursue conservative policies, 
such as expressing interest in monitoring male-female mixed student houses.34  
Although, the conservative policy drafts were few in number, when combined with 
Erdogan’s ambitious conservative speeches, they managed to further alienate seculars and 
liberals, as well as a small group within the conservative class considering such actions to 
be harmful for Turkey’s ongoing democratic development. The fact that Gezi Park 
Protestors consisted of mainly leftist, liberal, and a small group of conservatives protestors 
is evident for the groups feeling strained by the AKP policies.35 According to a survey 
conducted on Gezi Park protestors, only around 4% claimed that they protested for 
environmentalist cause; the rest felt that their liberties were under threat. (Ozpek 2014) 
This clearly indicated that Gezi Park protests symbolized the difficulties of the new 
democratic Turkey that the AKP had to deal with. 
                                                            
33 You can find detailed information about regulating the use and sell of alcohol from this link: 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23250986.asp  
34 You can listen to Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarding his opinions on male-female mixed student houses 
from this Youtube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z68UIyy_6ac  
35 For further Information, see http://democracyandsecurity.weebly.com/security.html; I visited the areas 
Istanbul’s Gezi Park in Taxim during the demonstrations in Summer 2013.  I investigated the groups that 
participated in the protests by taking pictures of their signs and the name of their organizations. The 
outcome indicated that there was a liberal, socialist, Marxist, and Leninist, (leftist) coalition in Gezi Park 
(in Turkey religious parties are considered to be rightist and secular parties are considered as leftists). Also, 
Alevis, some Leninists Kurdish groups, a small group of conservative Muslims, calling themselves anti-
capitalist Muslims, were also present in Gezi Park. In terms of media, the secular media, such as the 
Hurriyet and the Radical, and conservative media, such as the Today’s Zaman (center right), criticized the 
AKP government, and released stories more empathetic to the protestors. While the protests started as an 
environmentalist cause, it turned into anti-capitalist, anti-Western, and anti-AKP demonstrations after its 
initial stages.    
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Furthermore, there are international consequences of the political and economic 
transformation of Turkey under the AKP. For example, the US and the EU would step back 
from promoting democracy in the ME when the Islamic groups gained power in 2005 and 
2006 region-wide. (Tocci 2011) In contrast to the West, Turkey provided a robust support 
to the elected Islamist parties in the region. As a result, Turkey, under the AKP, 
strengthened its alliance with Islamic parties in the ME. On the other hand, the new 
geopolitics that was emerging with the Arab Spring in the ME compelled the US, the EU, 
and Turkey to work together more closely, at least until each actor made a cost benefit 
calculation of their possible moves. Therefore, until Gezi Park movement, Turkish-US and 
Turkish-EU relations continued to improve despite some set-backs. However, Gezi Park 
protests initiated a new era in the Turkish-Western relations. In the following section, I will 
explain how the AKP started to deviate from the universal democratic principles at home 
as a result of challenges in the process of Arab Spring.      
The Third Phase: Increased Authoritarianism  
The third phase of the AKP rule started when the Arab Spring hit Syria and the 
AKP sided with (and aided) the opposition. However, when the conflict in Syria continued 
longer than the AKP expected, the AKP started to feel insecure. Yasar Yakis declared that 
“In foreign policy, you never put all of [your] eggs in one basket. Turkey had bet that Assad 
would fall in no time and that it would be the first to reap the rewards… The way things 
stand now, if Turkey continues to insist on a Syria without Assad it will be left isolated.” 
(Yakis 2014) 
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There were several reasons for the AKP’s insecure feelings. Firstly, the conflicts 
near Turkey’s borders caused the deaths of several Turkish citizens living in villages near 
Syria, not to mention hundreds of thousands of deaths in Syria, causing a societal unrest in 
Turkey. Secondly, Turkish Alawis started to indicate their wrath to over interference of the 
AKP in Syria, which they found as a Sunni response to an Alawi government out of hatred 
as a result of secterian differences. Thirdly, the Gezi Park protests started as an 
environmentalist protests, but it turned into an anti-AKP movement later on. Six Alawi 
citizens of Turkey lost their lives during the protests. The death of Alawi youths created 
the fear that some hidden forces were trying to pull Turkey into the Alawi-Sunni conflict 
which had already been present in the region.36  
Fourthly, counter-movements against Islamists in Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, 
created substantial suspicions in Turkey. The AKP administration started to think that some 
secret coalitions, consisting of domestic opposition forces in the Muslim countries and 
international capital owners, collaborating with western ambassadors and media were 
planning to dismantle the AKP rule.37 Fifthly, all the allies of Turkey abondened Turkey 
                                                            
36 Interestingly, all individuals that lost their lives during the Gezi Park Protests were of Alevi background: 
Abdullah Comert, is an Alevi, and was killed in Antakya; Ethem Sarisulluk was killed in Ankara; Mehmet 
Ayvalitas died in Istanbul; Mustafa Sari was killed in Adana; Irfan Tuna was killed in Ankara; Ali Ismail 
Korkmaz was killed in Istanbul.  http://www.haberself.com/h/1914/  
37 Yenisafak, Faiz Lobisini Cildirtan Iki Rakam (Two numbers that make the interest lobby go crazy), 15 
June 2013.  http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem-haber/faiz-lobisini-cildirtan-iki-rakam-16.06.2013-533055; 
Ibrahim Karagul, Asil Hesaplasma Secimden Sonra (The Real confrontation is after the Elections), Yeni 
Safak, 11 March 2014.  http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/IbrahimKaragul/asil-hesaplasma-secim-
sonrasinda/50736; AKP friendly Presses, such as the Star, and the TV channels, such as the Kanal A, also 
have published OPED and stories in the same line.     
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in its support for a regime change in Syria,38 and these created a hostile and economically 
burdensome environment for Turkey.   
For many political analysts and the national and global audience, the attitude of the 
AKP was quite lenient towards the abusive police and highly disappointing for the Gezi 
Park protestors. Both for the  analysts and the national and global audience, this signified 
a new type of authoritarianism in Turkey, in the wake of Kemalist status quo.  
The AKP’s authoritarianism which was actually triggered by the Syrian conflict 
gained a new momentum with the Gezi Park protests. After the begining of the Syrian 
conflict, the AKP increasingly based its actions on the notion that some western capital 
owners, which has been called interest rates lobby by Recep T, Erdogan, and their local 
accomplices39 were scheming to overthrow the AKP.40 During the AKP administration, 
Turkish interests rates decreased substantially, which caused a decline in the revenue of 
interest rate lobby (big banks and financial institutions), which had long enjoyed high rates 
                                                            
38 For further information, see Abdulbari Atvan. Turkiye Suriye Krizinde Yanlizlasti (Turkey has become 
lonely during the Syrian Conflict). BBC Turkce, 10 October 2013.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/10/131010_abdulbari_atvan_suriye_turkiye.shtml; Cumali 
Onal, Erdoganin Sert Soylemleri, Turkiyeyi Ortadoguda Yanlizlastirdi (The Harsh Rhetoric of Erdogan 
Pushed Turkey into Loneliness in the ME). Zaman Gazetesi, 2 February 2014. 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_erdoganin-dis-politikadaki-sert-soylemleri-turkiyeyi-ortadoguda-
yalnizlastirdi_2197036.html.; Nick Tattersal, Analysis: Turkey's 'worthy solitude' sidelines Erdogan in 
Middle East. Reuters, 18 September 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/us-turkey-isolation-
idUSBRE98H0K620130918       
39 Although Erdogan included the Gulen Group and the Turkish status quo in “local accomplices” group, he 
has never clarified how these groups were related to each other. I only try to explain why the AKP behaves 
authoritarian since the beginning of conflict in Syria. I assert that the AKP has become more authoritarian 
because of their perception of the aforementioned conspiracy.   
40 See John Perkins, Youtube Video, 16 February 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zi0-
MFZFaNM.; Suleyman Yasar. Nedir Faiz Lobisi: Erdogan Neden Lobiyi Isaret Etti (What is interest rates 
lobby and why Erdogan highlighted it?). Sabah Gazetesi, 10 June 2013. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/yasar/2013/06/10/nedir-faiz-lobisi-erdogan-niye-lobiyi-isaret-etti. 
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of return and a prestigious status. (ntv-msnbc 2013) The local groups, unsatisfied with the 
AKP, coalesced with the interest rates lobby according to this theory.41 From that time 
onward, the AKP would read any development that challenged its authority through this 
conspiracy lenses.  
There were several developments that strenghtened the AKP’s stance; firstly, the 
Gezi Park movements, secondly, the removal of Islamist Mursi from power by a bloody 
military coup in Egypt, thirdly, the murder of the nationalist leader in Tunusia which 
caused serious political turmoil and almost created a civilian coup d’état against the ruling 
Islamist Al-Nahda Party, fourthly, the ongoing Syrian internal conflict, which has 
detrimental impact over the societal cohesion of Turkey due to high numbers of Turkey’s 
Alawi and Kurdish citizens, and finally the 17 November, 2013 corruption scandals in 
which four ministers of the current ruling the AKP are involved. The AKP perceived these 
developments to be the consecutive steps to remove the AKP from power, not by elections, 
but by the other coercive means. Recep T. Erdogan perceives the 17 December 2013 
corruption scandal in Turkey as the  latest episode of a larger scenario to remove the AKP 
from power. According to Recep T. Erdogan, dismantaling the AKP by operations, such 
as the Gezi Park protests and the 17 December 2013 corruption scandal, was a part of 
replacing political parties with Islamic traditions in power with the secular and Western-
friendlier ones region wide in the ME. 
                                                            
41 According to John Perkins, Koc Group in Turkey called IMF in, after the Gezi Park Protests and 17 
December Corruption Scandal; this means that Koc group is the Turkish branch of corporate (Perkins call it 
Corporatracy) network that tries to control the world. John Perkins, Youtube Video, 16 February 2014. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zi0-MFZFaNM.  
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Finally, it is important to put the AKP’s approach to democracy in the right context. 
First of all, the AKP has conceptually and practically supported democratization of 
Turkey.42 However, as Recep T. Erdogan suggested, there were two processes of 
democratization for Turkey: introducing democratic rules and their enforcement. In 
enacting rules, evidently the AKP has become highly successful in itroducing democratic 
reforms, as I explaned in the section on the AKP’s liberal era. However, the implementation 
phase needs time, as the AKP itself needs to learn how to act within a liberal democracy 
during times of crisis. The 17 December 2013 corruption scandal that ended up with the 
arbitrary dismissal of hundreds of police officers and reassignment of thousands of police 
staff by governmental decree is a good example of the problems with democratic 
internalization and implementation of Turkish institutions. However, Turkish civil society 
that has gained substantial power, and rule of law, which has become more democratic, 
under the AKP rule, could constrain some of the AKP’s anti-democratic tendencies.43  
Gezi Park Protests has been an important tiping point for the AKP’s approach to 
democratization in the region. These protests have created deep suspicions in the AKP 
circles about the real intentions of the West in Turkey. These suspicions have deeply 
impacted the AKP’s behaviors both domestically and internationally. In the following 
section, I would like to explain the Gezi Park Protests in more detail. 
                                                            
42 For further Information for the AKP’s conception of democracy, see Justice and Development Party, Ileri 
Demokrasi Yolculugu (Advanced Democracy Journey): AKP Iktidarinda Turkiyenin Demokratik Degisimi 
ve Gelisimi (Turkey’s Democratic Change and Development under The AKP Rule), 2002-2012. Justice and 
Development Party, 2012.   
43 For the role of civil society in democratic consolidation, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation, 1996.  
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The Gezi Park Protests 
I believe those who have started these protests and are giving them direction/leading them 
are aiming to overthrow the government and remove it from office. But the security services 
and the cautious approach by the government have prevented those harbouring this aim 
from achieving it. I don’t believe they will attempt to engage in such action anymore.   
Former Minister of Justice Mehmet from the AKP, Ali Şahin, 2013   
The rhetoric of “the internal collaborators of an international capital group” was 
initially used by the AKP during the Gezi Park Protests. The protests started on May 28, 
2013. That day some protestors went to the Gezi Park in Taxim, Istanbul to show their 
reaction to the damage given to the green areas in the park. They installed their tents there 
and waited for a night in a peaceful manner. Next day, police used water and pepper-gas 
excessivelly to end the protests. When the police brutality against the protestors became 
national news, many people gave a negative reaction to excessive use of force by the police 
and went to the area to support the protestors. Then, people who were disturbed by the 
government’s perceived authoritarian approach after 2007 national election also joined the 
Gezi Park protestors.  
When the protests grew, political parties and groups started to join in, either to make 
their voices heard or to take advantage of the protests. Among such groups, there were the 
Republican People’s Party, Turkish Socialists, Marxists, and the PKK (Kurdish Workers 
Party).44 Furthermore, some Alawi groups also joined the protests because of their 
                                                            
44 I visited Gezi Park during the advanced stages of the protests. I had interviews with several participants. I 
investigated the participant groups. I photographed the signs and slogans they used to understand their 
social and political backgrounds. Most of them disclosed their identities as they carried signs that indicated 
the name of their associations. Some others used slogans, which could easily reveal their ideologies. My 
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disapproval of the name of a bridge (Yavuz Sultan Selim, who Alawis believed scattered 
their ancestors during Otto-Persian war) to be build on the Bosphorus. Therefore, while 
initially the protests had started for apparantly an environmentalist cause by a small 
environmentalist group, after the over-use of force by police, the nature and the 
combination of the protests changed and it turned into an anti-AKP, anti-neo-liberalist, and 
anti-capitalist movement.45  
The demands of the protestors ranged from liberty to Kurds, to a socialist order, 
and to  respect for the secular life-style. However, it was obvious that there was a leftist 
coalition in the area, unsatisfied with Erdogan’s harsh rethorics as well as policies 
signalling increasing authoritarianism in the country. (Ciplak 2013) 
However, Erdogan defined the Gezi Park protests as an attempt by the internal 
coloborators of an international socio-economic and socio-political establishment to end 
the AKP rule in Turkey and to take Turkey to the  bad old days. According to Erdogan,  
It (Gezi Park protests) was prepared very professionally... Social 
media was prepared for this, made equipped. The strongest 
advertising companies of our country, certain capital groups, the 
interest rate lobby, organizations on the inside and outside, hubs, 
they were ready, equipped for this. (Hurriyet Daily News 2013) 
For Recep T. Erdogan, the Gezi Park protestors wanted to remove the 
democratically elected AKP government from power forcibly. While in Tunisia, 
                                                            
goal was to understand what the protestors wanted, who the protestors were, and whether they were 
accurately being represented in media or not. 
45 You can find more information about the anatomy of Gezi Park Protests and the groups that were 
involved in the protests from this link: http://democracyandsecurity.weebly.com/security.html  
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addressing the Gezi Park protests, Recep T. Erdogan reiterated that “the majority dicta over 
the minorities is unacceptable; however, no one should expect us to accept the minority 
dicta over the majority either.” (Euractive 2013) This was an obvious indication of 
Erdogan’s perception that a conspiracy was being carried out to shift power from the 
majority to the minority in Turkey.   
At the end of the protests, hundreds of journalists and activists were detained and 
imprisoned. “By 24 June, there had been roughly 4,900 detentions in relation to the Gezi 
Park protests across Turkey.” (Amnesty International 2013) In terms of media workers, in 
July 22, Turkey’s Journalists Union reported that 59 journalists lost their jobs, and 34 were 
detained. (Amnesty International 2013) Among them, there were very well-known 
journalists, such as Yavuz Baydar (The co-founder of P24, the Platform for Independent 
Media) and Can Dundar (A columnist of the Cumhuriyet Newspaper). Not to mention, the 
terrorization of those who attended the protests or who supported the protestors by 
providing them with materials, such as medicine and food.  
Shortly after the Gezi Park Protests, this time, the AKP’s authority was challenged 
by the December 17, 2013 corruption scandals. This also had detrimental effects over the 
AKP. The corruption scandal reinforced the idea that some hidden forces were trying to 
dismantle the elected government via undemocratic means within the AKP circles. This 
idea also found wide acceptance within the Turkish society. The AKP received 45% of the 
votes in March 30, 2014 local election. Therefore, it is important to give a detailed 
explanation about the 17 December 2013 corruption scandal. 
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The 17 December 2013 Corruption scandal 
On December 17, 2013, financial crime unit of the Turkish police detained at least 
52 people according to Todays Zaman. Among them, there were the sons of Interior 
Minister Muammer Güler, Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan, and Environment and Urban 
Planning Minister Erdoğan Bayraktar. Detainees also included Istanbul’s Fatih district 
Mayor Mustafa Demir, Iranian- businessman Reza Zarrab, Turkish construction mogul Ali 
Ağaoğlu, Halkbank General Manager Süleyman Aslan, Emlak Konut General Director 
Murat Kurum, and many bureaucrats from the Environment and Economy ministries. 
The bribe investigation was carried out by Zekeria Oz, “the prosecutor who 
launched the investigations into Ergenekon, a clandestine criminal network accused of 
working to overthrow the government.“ (Todays Zaman 2013) The suspects were “accused 
of rigging state tenders, accepting and facilitating bribes for some major urbanization 
projects, obtaining construction permits for protected areas in exchange for Money.” 
(Todays Zaman 2013) This particular investigation concerned Agaoglu, the well-known 
businessman, and the bureaucrats that played a role in giving the permit for the urbanization 
projects on protected areas, illegal to build, and rigging state tenders. The accusations also 
included “helping foreigners to obtain Turkish citizenship through falsified documents, 
involvement in export fraud, forgery of documents and gold smuggling.” (Todays Zaman 
2013) Investigation for this particular accusation concerned the Iranian businessman Reza 
Zerrab, the interior affairs minister, and the related bureaucrats. “There are also claims that 
the suspects illegally sold historic artifacts that were unearthed during excavations of the 
Marmaray project, which connects Europe and Asia with a railway tube under the 
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Bosphorus.” (Todays Zaman 2013) The final investigation concerned the Mayor of Fatih-
Istanbul, and the other related bureaucrats.  
One of the AKP’s central promises for coming to power was to fight against 
corruption in the country. Therefore, the corruption scandal created a major unease within 
the AKP as the corruption accusations could be the very reason to end the AKP rule in 
Turkey. In Recep T. Erdogan’s conception, the global establishment was behind the 17 
December 2013 corruption scandal: they tried to remove the AKP from power by the Gezi 
Park protests, but they failed; afterwards, they tried to dismantle the AKP by the corruption 
scandal. Erdogan attracted attention to the timing of the emergence of the corruption 
scandal by pointing out the nearing local elections.  
Recep T. Erdogan reiterated that in terms of the graft and corruption operations, 
they were in the realm of justice, and it would be resolved within that realm. (Haberler 
2013) However, he also attracted attention to the international aspect of the graft operation. 
According to RTE, an international coalition had been built against the AKP, and some 
local media and capital owners, and some groups cooperated with it as their local 
collaborator.46 Recep T. Erdogan reiterated that:   
Pay attention to the TVs, newspapers, and capital owners and 
organizations. Pay attention to those well-known groups inside 
and outside the country. They could never come together in the 
past. These establishment and groups are acting together against 
the government, national will, and democracy. The alliance that 
                                                            
46  For further information, check ntvmsnbc, Erdogan: Faiz lobisinin neferi oldular (Erdogan: They 
became the soldiers of interest rate lobby), 23 June 2013; John Perkins, Youtube Video, 16 February 2014. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zi0-MFZFaNM.; Suleyman Yasar. Nedir Faiz Lobisi: Erdogan Neden 
Lobiyi Isaret Etti (What is interest rates lobby and why Erdogan highlighted it?). Sabah Gazetesi, 10 June 
2013. http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/yasar/2013/06/10/nedir-faiz-lobisi-erdogan-niye-lobiyi-isaret-etti.   
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was being established only during the military coups d’états have 
again been established. (Haber 3 2013)             
Furthermore, for Erdogan, the goal of this international coalition was creating chaos 
by dispowering the AKP in the upcoming local election, which would result by the demise 
of the AKP rule in Turkey. From this point of view, the graft probe, which involved four 
AKP ministers, was perceived as a military coup-like operation orchestrated by a 
cooperating group of international and domestic forces against the AKP government. The 
end result of such a situation would be a chaos, as Turkey would turn back to coalition 
governments, unable to govern Turkey in the present complex international environment. 
(BBC Turkish 2013) 
Some dirty hands cannot create chaos in my beautiful country. 
No matter which organization they use, no matter which tong, 
which agent, and which betrayer they use. This nation, for its 
future, knows how to give the needed answer to these 
international establishments. Everybody should know their 
limits. These (acts) are left behind in May 27, September 12, and 
February 28.47 This nation has been awakened and empowered. 
No one can subdue this nation, this country. (BBC Turkish 2013)    
Covered under the graft dress, completely illegal, (it is) an 
extremely dirty, dark ambush. The goal of this conspiracy, which 
was put forth last week, is clear: to ruin peace and stability. We 
will overcome this trick played on Turkey. (The Wall Street 
Journal 2013)   
                                                            
47 These are the military coup d’états carried out in 27 May, 1960, September 12, 1980 and February 28, 
1997. By mentioning these, Erdogan tried to say that the last corruption operation against the three 
ministers in the government were a result of a dirty campaign carried out by a ruling international coalition.   
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As during the last corruption scandal, any recent international or internal 
development, which touches the AKP one way or another, has been met with serious 
suspicions by its leaders, and have been responded very harshly. In this tense psychological 
environment, the AKP sometimes has taken anti-democratic steps: a good example of this 
anti-democratic step is the shifts and dismissals of the police chiefs and staff who were 
working on the graft and bribe operation until it came to the media attention, from their 
posts. From  the beginning of the graft probe operations in 17 December 2013 until 23 
December 2013, hundreds of police chiefs were dismissed from their posts for being a part 
of the so-called gang that initiated graft probe operation and thousands of police staffs’ and 
prosecutors’ work places have been shifted.  
For Recep T. Erdogan, all these officers were related to Fethullah Gulen48 and acted 
on the basis of his orders. Therefore, their loyalty was to Gulen rather than to the Turkish 
State. In Erdogan’s conception then this was a problem for the state, as the state does not 
and could not recognize any parallel authority. The end product was the dismissal of 
hundreds of police officers from their positions. According to Recep T. Erdogan, the Gulen 
group was in coalition with the local forces, such as Republican People’s Party, Nationalist 
Movement Party, and the Peace and Democracy Party, (Haber 3 2013) and an international 
interest lobby, which included some foreign mission representatives, such as American 
Ambassador Frances Ricciardone, and some international capital and media owners. (The 
Wall Street Journal 2013) However, Gulen did not accept the accusations, yet he pointed 
out that the issue of corruption cannot be undermined by such accusations.  
                                                            
48 Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish Imam, preacher, and Islamic scholar, as well as the leader of a major civil 
society movement, is residing in Pennsylvania, the US at the present.  
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In conclusion, until 1945, Turkey’s transition to a multiparty system, it was ruled 
as a one party dictatorial regime. Afterwards, Turkey experienced several military coups 
with an approximate frequency of one in a decade. In addition to military coups, Turkey 
had to fight a war against the PKK, which caused the loss of over 30,000 lives, substantial 
resources, and economic stagnation. Nevertheless, Turkish democracy has been able to 
survive, and under the AKP rule, Turkey emerged as a more open society and a stronger 
economy. In this regard, I have described three phases of the AKP. In the first phase, the 
AKP tried to ensure its survival in the unfriendly domestic environment dominated by the 
Kemalist status quo. The AKP did so by retaining a greater societal support and 
strengthening its relations with the West. As a result, the AKP successfully subordinated 
the military to the civilian control as a part of its broader democratization agenda.  
In its second phase, which started after the 2007 presidential election, the AKP 
started to engage with the ME more forcefully. Due to the subordination of the status quo 
forces, the AKP started to formulate more independent foreign policy decisions. Under the 
AKP rule, Turkey became the largest economy in the ME, the 6th largest in the EU zone, 
and 16th largest in global level.49 The improved economic power of Turkey enabled the 
AKP with capabilities to realize its regional goals. It is in the intersection of these two 
developments that the AKP started to promote democracy more forcefully in the region.  
In the third phase, which started with the escalation of conflict in Syria in the course 
of Arab Spring, the AKP was bothered by developments in Arab Spring countries, such as 
the military coup d’état in Egypt, Gezi Park protests and the 17 December corruption 
                                                            
49 For Further information on Turkey’s economic indicators, see CIA World Facts Book 
54 
scandals in Turkey. The AKP perceives these developments as a part of a broader global 
agenda to replace the Islamic governments with secular ones region-wide, including the 
AKP in Turkey. Just as in its first term in office, the AKP again feels the threat of its own 
survival, and therefore, acts on the basis of the preservation of its rule in Turkey. This has 
direct relation with the AKP’s democracy promotion policy in the ME. Turkey’s 
democracy promotion policy in the region has become more and more strategically driven 
since 2004. Under the present circumstances, particularly in Syria, Turkey’s democracy 
promotion is no more than a realist endeavor. (This will be explained broadly in the 
following chapters)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: TURKEY, THE WEST, AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
Turkish foreign policy is guided by both our democratic values and our interests. … Turkey 
has always been encouraging the administrations to address the legitimate expectations of 
55 
their people and undertake the necessary reforms. However, now, given the home-grown 
and irreversible march toward more democracy in the region, Turkey has stepped up its 
efforts to support this process. 
Ahmet Davutoglu, 2012 
Neo-classical realism argues that statesmen make decisions by taking into 
consideration both domestic and international incentives and constraints. (Lobell, Ripsman 
and Taliaferro 2009) Therefore, the relevant domestic and external factors that impact the 
decisions of statesmen need to be taken into account while explaining states’ foreign 
policies. I explained the domestic political context in which the AKP developed its 
democracy promotion policy in the previous chapter. This chapter examines the external 
factors that influence Turkey’s democracy promotion.  
My main argument is that the US grand strategy to fight radicalization in the 
Muslim world after the 9-11 attacks is the origin of the official Turkish democracy 
promotion policy in the ME. In order to fight radicalization, the US designed a two-legged 
strategy: liberal interventionism in Iraq and Afghanistan and the BMENA Initiative. As a 
result of the convergence of the Turkish and American Interests in the ME in the early 
2000s, Turkey became an active participant of the BMENA initiative. The EU on the other 
hand had an indirect impact on Turkish democracy promotion policy by transforming the 
Turkish state structure into a more democratic one.   
In the present chapter, I will initially explain the origins and the development of the 
US approach to democratization in the ME after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Next, I will 
examine the Turkish reaction to the American approach to democratization in the ME. 
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Finally, I will focus on the EU’s reaction to the US’ BMENA Initiative and the EU’s impact 
on the Turkish democracy promotion policy. 
In the present chapter, my goal is to explain the systemic influences on Turkey’s 
democracy promotion policy. I consider the US and the EU as two relevant systemic actors 
that need special attention. However, the main focus of this chapter is not the US’ and the 
EU’s approaches to democracy promotion in the ME or elsewhere. As I am primarily 
interested in Turkey, I will explain the US’ and the EU’s policies to the extent they help 
me understand the Turkish democracy promotion policy in the ME.   
The American Democracy Promotion after 9-11  
In the post-cold war environment, the US and its allies emerged as the winners. The 
EU, previously a common market, started to turn into a political union to further expand. 
The number of democracies as well as the quality of democracy in transitional democratic 
countries considerably increased. However, the Middle East was still characterized by 
poverty, dictatorship, and the worst of all, lack of prospects for change. In this environment, 
some groups started to resort to violence, resulting in tragedies, such as the 9-11 terrorist 
attacks.  
 On the verge of the collapse of the Soviet Union, some prominent American 
scholars as well as policy-makers debated the new challenges that awaited Western 
civilization. They pointed at Islam as a major obstacle and source of conflict. For example, 
Bernard Lewis’s, in his work, The Roots of Muslim Rage, which was published in the 
Atlantic Monthly in 1990, argued that Muslims were being defeated in three stages. 
Initially, they lost the battle to the West in the world domination, then they were defeated 
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in their own countries as a result of the flow of Western ideas and culture, and finally their 
authority was being challenged even in their own house by their emancipated women and 
children. All these have made a confrontation between Muslims and the West inevitable. 
Samuel Huntington, borrowing the concept of Clash of Civilizations from Lewis argued 
that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological 
or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and dominating source of 
conflict will be cultural.” (Huntington 1993) According to Huntington, while language, 
ethnicity, and traditions would matter, religion would be the main determinant of these 
civilizational divisions.50 Although the claims of conflict of civilization received 
substantial opposition from scholars,51 after the 9-11 terrorist attacks, such civilizational 
arguments gained a new momentum. For example, New York Times declared Clash of 
Civilization as the best seller shortly after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. (Kashefi 2013) The 
line of thinking resembled in the Clash of Civilizations was also being reinterpreted into 
popular culture by Hollywood and mass media outlets.  
 Huntington’s theory was a response to Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History. 
Fukuyama believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the history as 
no significant ideology was left to challenge the Western liberalism. Fukuyama argued that 
“what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a 
                                                            
50 For more information about the reactions to Huntington’s thesis of the Clash of Civilizations, see Pippa 
Norris and Ronald Inglehart. Islam & the West:  Testing the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis. John F. Kenefy 
School of Government, 2002. Also see Gabriele Marranci. Multiculturalism, Islam, and the Clash of 
Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia. Culture and Religion 5 (1), 2004.     
51 For example, see Salim Rashid . The Clash of Civilizations? Asian Responses. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997; Also see Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal’s. A Response to Huntington, 
Journal of Peace Research, 37(5): 611-612, 2000; Also See Jonathan Fox, Two Civilizations and Ethnic 
Conflict: Islam and the West, Journal of Peace Research 38(4): 459-472, 2001. 
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particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point 
of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy 
as the final form of human government.” (Fukuyama 1992) To Fukuyama, the end product 
would be the victory of liberal democratic values, deeply rooted in Western civilization.  
However, few scholars and commentators expected that the new challenge would 
actually come from radical religious groups. In 2001, the US went through the tragic 9-11 
terrorist attacks. A group of extremists from the Middle East carried out suicide attacks 
against World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon near Washington DC. The 
results were 3000 casualties. These attacks demonstrated the magnitude of radicalization 
in the ME. If the US did not provide the ME with the necessary attention, this radicalization 
could threaten the American interests globally for decades to come. In this psychological 
context, the American elites (politicians, scholars, and analysts) situated lack of freedom 
and economic development as the root cause of terrorism and radicalism in the ME. 
(Taspinar 2003) “The so-called ‘participation-moderation’ thesis - that the inclusion of 
Islamists in a democratic process would encourage them to move away from extremism 
and terrorism towards a more moderate interpretation of Islam – now served as a 
foundation” (Dalacoura 2010) for the US policy towards the ME. Considering that the new 
security challenges to the US at its own soil came from non-state actors, the idea of 
democratization in the ME gained more credibility.  
The 9-11 tragedy occurred at a time when the US policy circles and academics 
declared that the US had attained world-wide hegemony after subordinating the Soviet 
Union. (Dalacoura 2010) After the September-11 attacks, Nathalie Tocci suggested, 
neoliberals and neo-conservatives would try to reconcile the tension between pessimistic, 
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as resembled by Lewis and Huntington, and optimistic views, represented by Fukuyama, 
by promoting democracy through one-size-fits-all institutional design and through the 
cultivation of pro-American elites in the Middle East. (Tocci 2011) Dalacoura, on the other 
hand, suggested that the victory of democracy over the communist world motivated the US 
to promote democratization in the ME as well, and the 9-11 tragedy enforced the view that 
lack of democracy was the main cause of radicalization in the Muslim world. (Dalacoura 
2010) 
Within the post-9-11 ideational context, to fight radicalization, the US designed a 
two-legged strategy within the framework of its Middle Eastern policy under George W. 
Bush Administration in January 20, 2001. (Dalacoura 2010) Initially, the US would use 
coercion to deter the states sponsoring terrorists. The obvious manifestation of this policy 
was intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. By intervention, the US would also try to install 
democracies in these countries. Democracy promotion by military intervention is called 
liberal interventionism. The second of the two-legged strategy stressed democracy 
promotion, to resolve radicalization in the Muslim world. In this new context, the US policy 
circles redefined the Muslim world as the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
(BMENA). The BMENA included the whole Arabic peninsula, Arabic speaking North 
African states, and non-Arab states, such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  
The US administration started to give the first official sign of its new approach to 
the BMENA by launching the Middle East Partnership Initiative in December, 2002. The 
Middle East Partnership Initiative would be followed by the 2004 BMENA Initiative in 
order to address the need for democratization of the region in a well-structured and well-
disciplined manner. In May 2004, the US invited the countries in the ME, members of the 
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NATO, the G8, and the EU to discuss the future of the ME, on the Sea Island. The 
conference was called the Broader Middle East and North African (BMENA) Initiative. 
(Akcapar, et al. 2004) 
The BMENA Initiative had three particular goals regarding the region. The first 
one was that democratization —good governance, respect for human rights, free exchange 
of ideas, and the participation of society in decision making, and the rule of law—
necessitated reforming political sphere of the states. The second goal was to promote 
freedom of expression, educational opportunities for all, and gender equality in the social 
sphere. The final goal of the initiative was to create jobs, promote entrepreneurship, expand 
trade and investment through intra-regional trade, increase access to capital, and to provide 
support for financial reform in the economic sphere. (G8 Research Group 2005) As a result, 
an official document, “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Broader 
Middle East and North African Region,” was released to express commitment of the G8 
countries to pursue cooperation with regional governments, businessmen and civil society 
in the ME to realize the goal of democratization. (BMENA Initiative 2004) However, 
because of objections of the Europeans, the participants excluded Pakistan and Afghanistan 
from the list of BMENA countries. 
The DAD (Democracy Assistance Dialog), a project under the “Forum for the 
Future,” was designed to provide a platform for the Middle Eastern scholars, politicians, 
journalists, and activists to exchange opinions on political, social, and economic matters. 
(Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) The DAD also aimed to facilitate dialog between the countries 
in the region and CSOs, to promote women’s rights and electoral assistance in the ME. 
These practices, if repeated, would turn the civil-society and government interaction into a 
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routine, crucial practice for democratic reforms. Thus, panels, conferences, lectures, and 
workshops were organized to discuss the ways to strengthen human rights, good 
governance, and transparency in the Middle East. The participants included the Middle 
Eastern and Western civil society organizations (CSOs) and government representatives. 
For example, Doha, Sana, Alexandria, and Istanbul conferences in 2004 were good 
practices of CSO-government opinion exchanges. The DAD program placed a special 
emphasis on the improvement of the role of women in the political, economic, and social 
sectors of their societies in the ME. (DAD 2005-2006) 
When the BMENA Initiative caught the attention of the Middle Eastern media, it 
attracted substantial criticisms from the political elites in the region. For example, Al-
Hayat, an Arabic newspaper in the UK, revealed to its readers the Western plans to promote 
democracy in the BMENA. This was followed by an outcry of the governments in the ME. 
They considered Western democracy promotion as the imposition of Western values over 
the Muslims and intervention of the West in the domestic affairs of the Muslim states. (G8 
2004)  
On the other hand, debates on the need for reform in the ME, led by the US, and 
the subsequent initiatives, produced a greater space for political freedoms in the BMENA 
region. For example, the Egyptian government gave greater freedoms to the activities of 
the political and civil society organizations. In this context, the Kifaya movement would 
organize a demonstration bringing together the Islamist and secular groups in Egypt for the 
first time. (Dalacoura 2010) Furthermore, Mubarak amended Article 76 of the Egyptian 
Constitution to allow multi-party presidential elections in Egypt. (Schemm 2005) 
Similarly, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States decided to hold elections to form various 
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councils and assemblies. (Dalacoura 2010) Although these reforms were considered to be 
too little to make a meaningful change and to be acts intended to appease the US on 
minimal terms, such small steps set an important cornerstone for the mobilization of people 
that led to the Arab Spring afterwards. Such movements were organized as a result of 
pressure from the hegemon and encouraged ordinary people to struggle for their freedoms, 
and frightened the dictators in the region.    
Despite such positive developments, by 2006 the US withdrew its support from 
promoting democracy in the ME. The election of Hamas (the Islamic Resistance 
Movement) in Palestine in January 2006, the relative success of Hezbollah in Lebanon’s 
elections, the strong comeback of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s elections winning 
88 seats in the Egyptian parliament in 2005, and the election of the radical sectarian parties 
in Iraq in 2005, which had ties with suicide bombers, were seen as counter-productive for 
Western interests. According to the West, democratization only benefitted the Western-
unfriendly groups in the ME. As a consequence, the West removed its support from the 
promotion of democracy in the region. (Youngs and Wittes 2009) An official from the 
Turkish foreign mission pointing at the Israeli factor reiterated that: 
One of the major reasons that the US removed its support from 
democratization of the ME, which left Turkey alone in this 
endeavor, was the isolation of Israel in the ME and its 
encirclement by the Muslim Brotherhood from Turkey to 
Tunisia. The US means Israel and Israel means the US. It would 
be naïve to expect the US to remain silent during a Western-
unfriendly, so Israel-unfriendly, geo-political formation. 
(Interview with a diplomat from Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2014)       
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There were some other factors that clearly indicated the withdrawal of the US 
support from promoting democracy in the ME. The first was an increased amount of aid to 
the militaries in the region. (Youngs and Wittes 2009) The non-recognition of the Hamas 
government by the US after the popular elections in Palestine and the provision of an 
increased amount of aid to the Egyptian military were the other indicators of the US policy 
change in the region. Barack Obama, during his Cairo Address after his election in 2009, 
clearly accepted the US backtracking from supporting democracy under the George W. 
Bush administration.  
I know there has been controversy about the promotion of 
democracy in recent years, and much of this controversy is 
connected to the war in Iraq. So let me be clear: no system of 
government can or should be imposed upon one nation by any 
other. That does not lessen my commitment, however, to 
governments that reflect the will of the people. (Obama 2009) 
Although Obama tried to indicate the US support for democratic transformation in 
the ME again, the US was still concerned about its strategic interests. Therefore, the US 
would continue to work on finding a more balanced approach on the promotion of 
democracy and maintaining strategic interests in the ME. (Ozel and Ozcan 2011) 
The US Interest in Turkish Model 
The history of Turkey’s presentation as a model by the US precedes the BMENA 
Initiative. Turkey was initially presented to the post-Soviet Central Asian Republics as a 
model in 1990s. In this regard, Turkey started to engage with the Central Asian Turkik 
Republics politically. However, this did not create the desired impact due to Turkey’s 
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domestic problems, such as economic stagnation and human rights abuses. (Ozel and 
Ozcan 2011) Therefore, this initial Turkish political activism was often dismissed as 
hypocrisy by the target states. (Ozel and Ozcan 2011) 
Turkey had been promoted as a model by the US for a second time after the 9-11 
tragedy; but this time to the Arab ME. In 2002, when the “Forum for the Future” was being 
introduced, George W. Bush reiterated that “Turkey provided Muslims around the world 
with a hopeful model of a modern and secular democracy.” (Peterson 2009) Also, 
Condoleezza Rice stated that “Turkey represents an excellent model: a 98% Muslim 
country that has a great importance as an alternative to radical Islam.” (Peterson 2009) In 
2004, the US invited Turkey to become one of the co-chairs along with the US.  
Similarly, Graham Fuller, in Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities, 
claimed that Turkey’s progressing democracy and accommodating political system makes 
Turkey an attractive model for the Muslim world. According to Fuller, Turkey was 
emerging as “a genuine model that finally offers[ed] a degree of genuine appeal to the 
region.” (Fuller, 2014) Fuller argued that Turkey has recently emerged both as a Western 
and Eastern power simultaneously: Turkey exercises greater sovereignty supported by its 
citizens, progresses in resolving its substantial problems, such as the Kurdish issue, is more 
confident in taking independent foreign policy decisions, and is more willing to engage 
and solve regional problems. To Fuller, this Turkey could finally play the desired role in 
the ME. (Fuller, 2014) 
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On the other hand, some scholars and policymakers pointed out some features of 
Turkey that could actually weaken the Turkish role in the ME. According to Taspinar52, a 
Turkish role might not be accepted so readily by the religious Arab public as a result of 
Turkey’s historical experience as a colonial power, its negative experience with its staunch 
secularism, and its warm relations with Israel, disliked in the ME. He warned the American 
policy makers to be conscious of these factors. Similarly, Steven Everts, in “An Asset but 
not a Model: Turkey, the EU and the Wider Middle East,” argued that Turkey could be a 
source of inspiration for the region, but could not be a model. (Everts 2004) He presented 
three main reasons for that. First, historically Turkey has enjoyed strong ties with the West. 
Furthermore, Turkey’s secular system guarantees the peaceful change of power between 
different groups, pointing out the AKP as a case in reality. Lastly, the EU membership 
accession process strengthens Turkey’s democracy. According to Everts, these three 
conditions were absent in the ME. Thus, the Turkish model could not be emulated by the 
wider ME. Yet Turkey could become a source of inspiration for them.  
Regardless of the debates over the specificities of the Turkish model, there was a 
general consensus in the US that Turkey should play an important role in the ME. However, 
Turkey had to resolve some of its domestic problems to become a credible model in the 
region. Therefore, the US would provide Turkey with substantial assistance in its 
democratization process under the AKP. Madeline Albright (Federal News Service 2012) 
                                                            
52 Taspinar’s article provides a good framework for understanding the role that was attributed to Turkey in 
democratization of the ME, by the West. (Omer Taspinar, An Uneven Fit, the Turkish Model and the Arab 
World. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brooking Institution, Analysis Paper Number 5, 
2003) 
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successfully summarizes what Turkey means for the US, what kind of problems it has, and 
what it can do in the ME: 
I think stability in the Middle East is obviously one of the big 
ones, and in terms of relationships with Europe, I think issues 
also on -- energy issues.  They are sitting in a geographically 
amazing place, in terms of various connections of pipelines, 
discoveries of new fossil fuel, a variety of different aspects, and 
then also, I think, on a variety of political relationships as a 
country that has a Muslim majority party, I think, and a secular 
one -- that it has a role to play in terms of how it operates within 
the Arab Awakening. And I also think, in terms of looking at 
more global outreach, I believe, that the United States is better 
off if we are operating in partnership with other countries… And 
in terms of the areas that are important -- of how to deal with 
terrorism, how to deal with nuclear proliferation, how to deal 
with that growing gap between the rich and the poor, energy and 
environment -- those are all areas in which I think we can have a 
good relationship with Turkey. (Federal News Service 2012) 
So we think that actually, Turkey's participation with us can help 
us be more effective in places like the Middle East, and the kind 
of new partnership we're talking about can help Turkey be more 
effective in its diplomacy so its confidence can, in some sense, 
become -- it can start punching at its weight in the future.  That's 
the potential of the new partnership we talk about. (Federal News 
Service 2012) 
Obviously, Turkey occupied a prominent place in the American democracy 
promotion initiatives in the region, mainly because of its identity as a pro-Western, 
democratic Muslim nation. Nevertheless, in 2006, the US backtracked from promoting 
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democracy in the ME. Since then they have been working on formulating a more balanced 
approach between supporting democratization and advancing its strategic interests in the 
region. The process of Arab Spring has made this even more difficult for the US. However, 
Turkey continued to support democratization in the region. Disagreements over supporting 
Islamic groups in the Arab ME have sometimes brought Turkey at loggerheads with the 
US. In the following section, I will provide a detailed examination of Turkish reactions to 
the American approach to democratization in the ME, during the AKP rule.    
Turkey’s Reactions to the American Democracy Promotion in the ME 
Initial Talks between Turkey and the US  
Turkish official democracy promotion policy in the ME starts with the American 
BMENA initiative. However, it is crucial to address the interaction between the US and 
the Turkish officials before the BMENA initiative in order to fully comprehend the Turkish 
role in the process. The AKP discussed the democratization of the ME with American 
policy makers long before the 2004 BMENA meeting in Sea Island. Before coming to 
power, Erdogan traveled to the US, and delivered a speech in Harvard, Kennedy School of 
Government on January 30, 2003, shortly before the US intervention in Iraq on March 19, 
2003. Meanwhile, Erdogan had not become the prime minister yet. As he was imprisoned 
for reciting a religious poem, considered to be a threat to Turkey’s secular rule by the status 
quo, his party had to make some legal changes to provide him with the legal space he 
needed to become the PM. He finally became the prime minister on March 14, 2003. 
Therefore, this early speech had a symbolic importance for the US as it would indicate 
Erdogan’s conception of democracy, open markets, and globalization. Erdogan’s clear 
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emphasis on cooperating with the West, supporting an open market economy, and 
promoting democratic governance in the ME was in line with the US interests.  
However, during his Harvard Address, Erdogan raised some objections over the 
method of promotion of democracy in the ME. For example, Erdogan clearly declared that 
democratization in the ME had to happen incrementally as an internally driven process. 
Recep T. Erdogan opposed the US liberal interventionism in the region. According to 
Erdogan, the West, namely the US and the EU, had the responsibility to provide a 
supportive environment to the democratization of the region by only encouraging the Arab 
governments to reform. By this Erdogan indicated his opposition to the imposition of 
Western values over the ME. Finally, Erdogan strongly opposed the US’ one-size-fits all 
approach. According to Erdogan, if these factors were taken into consideration, democracy 
promotion in the Muslim world would not be perceived as a neo-crusade against Muslims. 
According to Erdogan, if the process was rightly managed, the region could finally enter 
the process of modernization. Erdogan argued:    
I believe determined and consistent yet gradual processes will 
enhance the chances of success in democratization. The 
foundations of democratic transition should be laid in accordance 
with a sincere and committed strategy that is supported by 
various policy tools, and implemented wisely. And, the 
governments in the region must be made aware that this is 
necessary and thus be encouraged. (Erdogan 2003) 
According to Erdogan, “democratization in the Middle East is an outcome that must 
be attained.” (Erdogan 2003) Therefore, for him, the question was not whether such 
democratization was possible, “but instead how to meet the yearning of the masses in the 
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Middle East for democracy; in other words, how to achieve democratization in the Middle 
East.” (Erdogan 2003) In Erdogan’s views, “there exists[ed] an unmistakable demand in 
the Middle East and in the wider Muslim world for democratization.” (Erdogan 2003) 
However, Erdogan focused attention on different historical and political conditions of the 
states in the ME. For Erdogan, democracy promoters needed to take into consideration 
such country-specific reasons to initiate and maintain a successful democratization process 
in the region. Erdogan argued: 
The purpose cannot be creating self-styled democracies, but 
rather encouraging steps that are conducive to establishing 
democratic rule at universal standards. Obviously, this would be 
a formidable journey… I take the debate on the method of 
promoting of democracy seriously. (Erdogan 2004) 
Despite his strong support for the democratization of the ME, Erdogan disagreed 
with the way the US approached the issue of democratization towards the region. Erdogan 
believed that the US was stuck between democratization and the stability of the ME, crucial 
for its interests. By this, Erdogan simply pointed out the US traditional support to the anti-
democratic regimes in the ME, such as Mubarak in Egypt. Erdogan noted that 
democratization emerges in a stable (not chaotic) environment. According to him 
democracy and stability could go hand in hand incrementally as an internally driven 
process. Erdogan pointed out, 
I am aware of the thesis that the United States has long since 
invested exclusively in stability and this has obviated democratic 
transformation in the Middle East. The theory that expects 
healthy democratization to emerge out of an environment of 
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instability could not be substituted as a wholesome policy. 
(Erdogan 2003) 
However, Erdogan had another good reason to oppose the approach that gave 
priority to stability over democratization. The US strategy that ignored the strong demand 
of people in the region for democratization to keep the so-called stability created deep 
suspicions towards the US involvement in the regional issues. In the people’s view, the so-
called American democratization mission was only another way to exploit their resources, 
reinforcing American domination in the region. (Dalacoura 2010) Erdogan suggested that 
this skepticism of Western intentions has always been problematic for the Western 
promotion of democracy, and more so in the ME. Furthermore, the suspicions towards the 
US have fed the radical elements in the region. According to Erdogan,  
A confidence problem exists on the part of the people of the 
region who desire democratic rule in principle, but remain 
suspicious of both the fashion with which democratization is 
presented and the purposes of the democratic world. Therefore, 
the observation must be explicitly made: In the Middle East and 
in the Muslim world, suspicions linger concerning the objectives 
of the West and notably the US. These suspicions exist both at 
the level of states, and more importantly at the level of societies 
and individuals. This creates a resistance in the region and feeds 
radical elements and their abuse of the issue of religion. (Erdogan 
2003) 
The Turkish government opposed the unilateral approach of the US government in 
the regional issues from the beginning. According to Ahmet Davutoglu, the current Foreign 
Affairs Minister of Turkey, the problems of the ME were so complex that they could not 
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be resolved without the contribution of the local actors. Therefore, Erdogan stressed the 
importance of a multilateral process of decision making. Multilateralism for Turkey meant 
that the governments, CSOs, and intellectuals had to participate in the democratization 
process of their countries. In this regard, Turkey stressed a process of democratization 
through regional ownership, gradual change, consistency, multilateralism, and Western 
support without the imposition of Western values over the Muslim nations in the region. 
(Akcapar, et al. 2004) 
After Erdogan’s Harvard Address, Turkey promoted democracy more forcefully in 
subsequent regional summits. For example, on May 12, 2003, soon after the speech of 
George Bush at Bulgaria’s Bourgas Free University, Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister at 
the time and the current President, invited all parties concerned with the ME to carefully 
think about democratization of the region. This is known as the first Turkish attempt to 
support democratization in the Middle East. (Akcapar, et al. 2004) On May 28, 2003, 
during the summit of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Tehran, Gul declared 
that “first we need to put our own house into order” to the Muslim leaders, pointing out the 
necessity of democratic transformation in the ME. (Akcapar, et al. 2004) Also, Gul 
expanded his ideas on democratic transformation of the region during a conference 
organized by Economic Research Foundation (Iktisadi Arastirmalar vakfi) in Istanbul, and 
during the World Economic Forum in Jordan on June 22, 2003. (Akcapar, et al. 2004) 
Further, during the Istanbul Summit (June14-18, 2003), ministers of the OIC member states 
discussed the need for reform in the Muslim World. As a result, it was decided that 
democratic representation and implementations in the member states should be 
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strengthened. For the first time, the secretary of the OIC was popularly elected, and the 
member states supported the idea of domestic dialog for democratization among the 
member states rather than external demand for democratization from the West. (Akcapar, 
et al. 2004)  
Turkey’s Response to the BMENA Initiative 
When the US presented its plans to promote democracy in the BMENA region 
within the context of the BMENA Initiative, Turkey fiercely supported it. Initially, there 
was a convergence between Turkish and the American interests in the Middle East in 
seeing a stable region, buying inexpensive energy, combatting radicalization, supporting 
entrepreneurship, and promoting an environment of freedom. (Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) 
Secondly, Turkey wanted to repair its weakened ties with the US as a result of the rejection 
of the famous legislation, which became famous as the March-1 Bill, by the Turkish 
parliament that did not allow the US to use Turkish territories, air space, and harbors to 
occupy Iraq. (Aydogan 2012) Thirdly, the BMENA Initiative provided Turkey with a 
chance to discuss the security threats, such as spill-over effect of ethnic and sectarian 
violence, emanating from the American occupation of Iraq on Turkey’s national security. 
(Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) Finally, the AKP, which perceives Turkey as a regional power, 
has aspired to adopt a proactive role in shaping the future of the ME. The US Grand 
Strategy to combat radicalism in the region created an opportunity for the Turkish 
government to realize its regional goals. 
Turkey was willing to contribute to political, economic, and social change in the 
ME. However, not only as a model which does not have any agency, but also as an actor 
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that has substantial interests in democratic transformation of the ME. Therefore, Turkey 
became one of the co-chairs of the BMENA along with the US. Also, Turkey, along with 
Italy and Yemen, held the co-chair position of “Democracy Assistance Dialog” (DAD). 
(Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) “The Governments of Italy, Turkey and Yemen, as Government 
Sponsors of the DAD, have undertaken a consultation process with their NGO 
counterparts, which led to the presentation of a DAD program at the Forum for the Future 
meeting held in Rabat in December 2004. The DAD partner CSOs are the Human Rights 
Information and Training Centre (HRITC, Yemen), No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ, 
Italy), and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV, Turkey).” (DAD 
2005-2006) Turkey appointed Ambassador Omur Orhun as the head of BMENA Initiative 
to represent Turkey.  
According to TESEV (Akcapar, et al. 2004), Turkey could play an important role 
in some particular areas in the ME. TESEV urged Turkey to play the role of a moderator 
in the solution of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which necessitated mediation between Syria 
and Israel as well, to help build a democratic, fully sovereign, and territorially intact Iraq 
to promote the idea of benchmarking as Turkey could help set the criteria for a Muslim 
democracy, and to help create a security environment on the basis of regional ownership 
and cooperation, which would result in further regionalization of the ME. All these 
premises were completely in line with the premises of “Partnership for Progress and a 
Common Future with the Broader Middle East and North African Region.” The 
suggestions of TESEV were important as the history indicates that Turkey has tried to 
fulfill all the aforementioned tasks in the last 10 years under the AKP administration.   
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The involvement of Turkey in BMENA caused controversies in Turkey. The AKP 
government was harshly criticized by the opposition. The deputy president of the 
Nationalist Movement Party, Tugrul Turkes perceived BMENA as another project that 
aimed at the American domination in the ME. According to Turkes, “the AKP assertively 
got involved in the project to capture a role in the ME.” (Turkes 2012) He further argued 
that “if the US was sincere in democratization of the ME, it should have started with its 
closest ally in the region, Saudi Arabia; why does the US not tell them to democratize. 
Why does the US not use its influence to convince its closest ally in the region? This is just 
ironic.” (Turkes 2012) He further suggested, “Turkey should not intervene in the domestic 
affairs of other countries; if you intervene in their domestic affairs, they will intervene in 
yours.” (Turkes 2012) Turkes further asserted that such an intervention could lead to 
political disasters in the region, including Turkey. Therefore, for Turkes, the AKP made a 
strategic mistake by partaking in the BMENA initiative.      
Turkey’s Response to the Backtracking of the US 
The backtracking of the US from supporting democratization in the ME generated 
a negative reaction in Turkey.  According to the AKP administration, the US treatment of 
devoted Muslim politicians in the ME was both unfair and irrational. The AKP strongly 
believed that if the West was sincere in promoting democracy in the ME, then it needed to 
be more inclusive. In this context, democratization in the region had to be carried out by 
the involvement of all the relevant actors in the process (the AKP’s multilateralism 
principle). The Islamic political groups were important actors that always influenced the 
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political processes of their countries. Therefore, Turkey opposed the West when it stopped 
supporting democratization in the region. 
Also, withdrawal of US support from democratization in the ME created a 
substantial level of mistrust against the US in the AKP administration. The AKP started to 
question the real intentions of the US in the region. In the same process, Turkey adopted a 
more independent (from the US) foreign policy in the ME. In this regard, the AKP’s warm 
relations with Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah in 2006-2009 would anger the US, to the 
extent of questioning the Turkish membership in NATO. Emrullah Isler, the AKP’s MP 
and the advisor of the Erdogan on the ME, indicated his disappointment with the removal 
of the US’ support for democratization of the region: 
When this project was first introduced, I came to believe that 
democracy will come to and spread in the region. However, then, 
we witnessed that this project was not being realized or could not 
be realized. Perhaps, the reason behind the non-implementation 
of this project was the negative reaction of the dictators to it in the 
region… They (the West) actually, also saw that these dicta 
regimes would not continue this way. Therefore, this project 
underlined some matters regarding democratization of the region. 
We, then, became really hopeful. However, our hope was broken 
by the abandonment of this project. (Interview with Emrullah 
Isler 2012) 
Turkish decision makers believed in the sincerity of the US in the promotion of 
democracy. Believing in the strategic value and moral superiority of democracy, Turks in 
coordination with Western policymakers started to promote human rights and democratic 
opening in the region more forcefully. Isler revealed this point as: 
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Yes. This region needed human rights and democracy. Women 
rights, cultural rights, educational rights. We accepted this project 
(BMENA) as we thought it would contribute to the economic 
development and growth of the region. However, who stepped 
back from this project later on? Again those who came up with 
this project. What is now? This time, people revealed their wills, 
(it’s implicit meaning was that) only we decide on our future and 
on what is good for us. They indicated that they did not want such 
(dictatorial) regimes (in the Arab World), by putting their free 
wills forward by the Arab Spring. (Interview with Emrullah Isler 
2012) 
Althouh the US withdrew its support from the promotion of democracy in 2006, 
Turkey continued to provide a strong support for the challenging democratic forces in the 
Arab ME. Therefore, Turkey developed substantial relations with groups, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. This issue is disscussed in more detail in the fourth 
chapter.     
Turkey’s Reaction to the US Interest in the Turkish Model 
As indicated in the previous section, the US had a strong interest in the presentation 
of Turkey as a model. (O’Sullivan 2003) Turkey provided Washington with the opportunity 
to showcase a successful example of a secular democracy in the ME. (Taspinar 2003) What 
was more important was that, Turkey was also willing to play this role under the AKP 
administration. For example, shortly after Erdogan’s Harvard Address, during his 
Washington trip, Murat Mercan, the deputy governor of the AKP, stated that Turkey could 
provide the ME with a great model of the cohabitation of democracy and secularism in a 
Muslim nation. Furthermore, Mercan believed that Turkey could contribute to the solution 
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of security problems in the region through the promotion of democracy. According to 
Mercan,  
Turkey can inspire some Arab countries in terms of democracy. 
One of the cornerstones of the Turkish democracy is laicism, and 
religion has no place in the state system. If the elements, such as 
democracy, laicism, and open market economy, could be 
established in the region (Middle East), the security risks that 
emerge in the region and threaten the whole world can largely be 
resolved. Turkey can contribute to this process significantly. 
(Mercan 2003) 
Furthermore, Turkey’s self-promotion as a model state was being reflected into the 
work of influential Turkish scholars. For example, Sinan Ulgen tried to clarify what the 
Turkish Model actually was in his work From Inspiration to Aspiration, which could also 
be called the Turkish model from the Turkish perspective. Ulgen broke the Turkish 
political model into various categories, such as Turkish political party and security systems, 
housing and private sectors, regional economic integration, and financial institutions. He 
argued that the Arab states could learn from the Turkish experience in these particular 
areas. (Ulgen 2011) His goal was to provide the Middle Eastern countries with concrete 
answers on how the Turks conducted their business. Similarly, Kemal Kirisci, in his work 
Turkey’s Demonstrative Effect and Transformation of the Middle East, argued that 
Turkey’s rapidly growing economy, progressing democracy, and proactive foreign policy 
could be the areas in which the ME could learn from Turkey. However, he also argued that 
the Turkish model was already being processed into the Arabic societies because of the 
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substantial levels of interaction between Turkey and its neighbors under the AKP rule. 
(Kirisci 2011) 
The self-promotion of a moderate Muslim democracy by a political party rooted in 
political Islam in Turkey had significant importance for the US. The AKP’s transformation 
from an anti-Western to Western-friendly Islamic political force increased the hope in the 
West towards the transformation of similar political movements in the same direction in 
the wider Muslim world. As the US generally supports the American-friendly groups, 
(McFaul 2007) such a transformation would strongly benefit the US. Under the AKP rule, 
the Turkish model continued to gain credibility both in the West and the Muslim world. 
This credibility was a product of the AKP’s initial peaceful foreign policy, economic 
success over time, and its ability to perform in a secular democratic framework, strongly 
impacted by the AKP’s commitment to the EU membership process. (Akgun and Gundogar 
2013-2014) 
Turkey also wanted to play a regional power role that maintained and controlled 
the transformation in the ME. Therefore, in the coming years, Turkey would turn into a 
safe haven for panels, conferences, and meetings where CSOs, intellectuals, journalists, 
and governmental officials exchanged ideas to promote democracy in the ME. On the other 
hand, the EU played a great role in strengthening the Turkish role by turning Turkey into 
a center of attraction, increasing Turkey’s international credibility.53 However, the AKP 
                                                            
53 See John O’Sullivan. Turkiye Demokrasi Icin Iyi Bir Model (Turkey is a good model for democracy). 
Zaman Gazetesi, 13 November  2003. http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/11/13/yorumlar/yorum3.htm ; Bagci 
and Sinkaya, Greater Middle East Initiative and Turkey: AK Parti’s Perspective, 2006; Akcapar, Akgun, 
Altunisik, and Kadioglu, The Debate on Democratization in the Broader Middle East and North Africa: A 
Civic Assessment from Turkey, 2004.  
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still needed to resolve its domestic political problems, such as the Kurdish issue, to play 
that regional role.54 
As a part of the promotion of the Turkish model, the US increasingly started to refer 
to Turkey as a “moderate Muslim country.” However, this labeling by the US received 
negative reactions from Turkish political elites. Erdogan (RTE) declared that “these 
descriptions are very ugly; it is offensive, and it is an insult to our religion. There is no 
moderate or immoderate Islam. Islam is Islam and that’s it.” (Milliyet 2007) In many other 
instances, Erdogan would stress that “Islam is the religion of peace.” (Time Turk 2011) On 
the other hand, Turkish secular elites considered the redefinition of Turkey on the basis of 
moderate Islam as problematic and harmful for Turkey’s secular identity, which is formed 
over centuries of struggle and for which Turkey has been singled out as a distinct country. 
(Turkes 2012) Due to these reactions, the US had to revisit its definition of Turkey, calling 
Turkey a source of inspiration for the region from that point on. (Migdalowitz 2002)  
In the following section, I will initially explain the EU’s reaction to the BMENA 
Initiative and then I will examine the EU’s indirect impact on Turkish democracy 
promotion policy.   
The EU’s Impact on Turkey’s Democracy Promotion 
The EU and the BMENA Initiative 
The present section is written for those who wonder whether the EU had any impact 
over Turkey, and if it did, what kind of influence it had. The EU’s role on Turkey’s 
                                                            
54 A number of deputies who I interviewed confirmed this point.  
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democracy promotion is not direct and not as important as the role of the US. Therefore, I 
will only explain the areas where the EU impacted Turkey, by mostly relying on secondary 
sources.    
After September 11, 2001, similar to the US, the EU started a democracy promotion 
initiative, called “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.” This policy was a continuation of the 
1995 Barcelona Process. By Barcelona Process, the EU wanted to promote democracy in 
the Mediterranean area. Like the US, the EU believed that lack of democracy in the ME 
was the primary cause of radicalization in the Muslim world, and that this has progressively 
harmed Western security. In this regard, Western interests could better be served by 
democratic transformation in the ME. (Youngs and Wittes 2009) 
On the other hand, the EU and the US had some different opinions regarding the 
promotion of democracy in the ME.55 For example, Europeans considered the American 
way of promoting democracy as ineffective as a consequence of its instant and instrumental 
nature. It was instant because the US believed that democratic transformation in the ME 
could happen in a very short period of time. It was instrumental as the US promoted 
democracy in the ME only to advance its security interests. Furthermore, Europeans 
criticized the US for making decisions unilaterally. The EU argued that Arab-Israeli 
conflict was an equally important source of radicalization for the Muslims, in addition to 
lack of democracy in the region. Thus, the EU suggested that promotion of democracy and 
the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict had to happen at the same time. The EU also 
suggested an incremental and consistent process of long term democratization via 
                                                            
55 Richard Youngs and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Europe, the US, and Middle Eastern Democracy: Repairing 
the Breach, Saban Center Paper Series,1, 2009.   
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participation of the governments in the region and their CSOs. (Interview with an American 
Diplomat 2013) According to the EU, the BMENA as a region was too wide. Therefore, 
the EU demanded the exclusion of Afghanistan and Pakistan from the list to implement a 
more effective democracy promotion policy in the BMENA region. This resulted in the 
exclusion of these two countries from the BMENA.  
However, there seems to be a parallel relationship between the US and the EU 
democracy promotion policies in the ME, regardless of the aforementioned differences. 
Like the US, the EU shifted its support away from the democratization of the ME when the 
Islamic groups gained power during the elections in 2005 and 2006 due to their highly 
critical stances towards the roles of Israel and the West in the region. In the following 
section, I would like to explain the EU’s impact over Turkey’s democracy promotion 
policy in the ME.  
The EU’s Influence over Turkey 
Turkey-EU relations have a different pattern than the Turkish-US relations. 
Turkey’s relations with the EU have been driven by its membership process, which has 
deeply shaped its institutional and normative structures. On the other hand, Turkey’s 
relations with the US have been motivated by its geostrategic interests. Turkey took part in 
the BMENA initiative as a European and Middle Eastern power at the same time. It was 
also involved as a country whose democracy was in the making and which could contribute 
to democratization in the ME substantially. While Turkey partook in the initiative, it was 
still receiving substantial assistance from the EU to improve its own democratic standards. 
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Yet at the same time, Turkey started to provide support for democratization in the ME by 
participating in the BMENA Initiative.  
For the sake of parsimony, I will examine the EU’s impact on Turkey through four 
significant stages. Firstly, the EU helped Turkey to institutionalize democratic norms. 
Secondly, Turkey has learned a great deal about how the EU conducted its business through 
its membership in EU institutions. Thirdly, the EU contributed to the growth and influence 
of the Turkish CSOs. Finally, the EU membership process increased the credibility of 
Turkey in the Muslim World. 
The EU and Institutionalization of Democratic Norms in Turkey 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Turkey started on its path to democracy long 
before the establishment of the modern Turkish republic. However, the two significant 
external sources of the institutionalization of democratic values have been the NATO 
membership and the EU accession process. In this section, I will examine the particular 
impact of the EU on democratic transformation of Turkey, which directly impacted 
Turkey’s foreign policy formulations.  
 EU-Turkey relations in the last five decades have had a substantial influence on 
Turkey’s democratization. In 1963, Turkey was granted the Associate Member Status to 
the European Economic Commission (EEC). Turkey became a member of the European 
Customs Union in 1995. In 1999, Turkey was offered the accession status during Bulent 
Ecevit’s coalition government. In 2001, a 1000-page National Program was prepared by 
the government to bring Turkey in line with the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU 
membership. In 2004, the AKP started accession negotiations with the EU. And in 2005, 
83 
the AKP passed several EU harmonization reform packages in Turkey. (Park 2012) Each 
stage helped deepening democracy in Turkey.  
Countries in the process of EU membership experience a Europeanization in their 
domestic systems and international affairs. This Europeanization is identified with the 
civilian control over the military, an increased role of CSOs in the political decision 
making, and the utilization of diplomacy rather than hard power in the realization of foreign 
policy goals. (Terzi 2010) Turkey has gone through this transformation in the EU accession 
process under the AKP rule. The Turkish military was taken under the civilian control; the 
Turkish political parties have become more democratic; the Turkish government started to 
follow a diplomacy-intensive foreign policy; and finally the Turkish CSOs became more 
involved in Turkey’s decision making processes. (Terzi 2010) This process has resulted in 
an increased confidence in the Turkish government, leading to a more assertive Turkish 
role in the international realm.  
Turkey’s Learning from the Regionalization in the West 
One way the EU has impacted the orientation of the Turkish foreign policy is 
through Turkey’s membership in European institutions. Turkey has gained substantial 
experience by getting involved in Western institutions, such as the European Commission, 
the European Common Market, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), and NATO. Turkey’s membership to the OSCE has provided Turkey with 
invaluable experience in the areas of political economy of regional integration and the 
importance of human rights for long terms stability in a region. (Turkey Foreign Affairs 
Ministery Website 2013) Turkey has been a part of the OSCE since 1975. During its 
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involvement, Turkey learned a great deal about how modern Western states conducted their 
businesses. Emrullah Isler clearly pointed out the role of positive example of the EU in the 
formation of Shamgen, which is a free-trade-zone between Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Syria:  
Real-politic necessitates the existence of the states which are in 
strong solidarity and cooperation and the states which are in 
regional cooperation. Like in the EU, we (Turkey) have laid the 
foundations of this. We have removed the visa requirements 
between Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. This initiative would 
spread wave by wave... When governments elected via elections 
come to power in the region… Regional integration in the ME 
will become much easier. (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) 
Taking into consideration that Turkey has had stable interaction with the West for 
almost a century, it will be clearly seen that through this interaction, Turkey actually 
transferred the experience that it gained from the West to the ME. This automatically 
benefited the West as Turkey was involved in transferring the values that the West wanted 
to promote in the region for a long period of time. Yet, when the Islamic parties came to 
power in 2005 and 2006 region-wide, the West backtracked from promoting democracy in 
the region. This also put Turkey in a difficult position when Turkey continued to support 
democratization after the election of the Islamic groups in the region.  
The EU’s Impact on the Turkish CSOs  
The democratic institutionalization on the basis of European harmonization 
packages provided the Turkish civil society with a fertile ground to flourish both in number 
and in influence. The CSOs grew by 44% between 2001 and 2011. (Saglam 2011) The 
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rapid increase in the number of CSOs is related to three factors: the transfer of the 
supervision of the CSOs from police to local governments, being able to receive funds from 
foreign donors without governmental approval, (Zenn 2011) and the overall increase in 
educational and economic indicators of Turkey in the process of the EU membership since 
2004. The major foreign donors that contribute to the budget of the Turkish CSOs are the 
EU and its members.   
In the course of the EU membership, CSOs acted much more independently, rapidly 
growing in their performances and influence. Furthermore, partnership with the EU 
provided Turkey with further credibility, and Turkish CSOs were well-received wherever 
they operated in the ME.  Although the EU is the largest donor of foreign aid for the Turkish 
CSOs, the Islamic CSOs that have done the most regarding humanitarian work are not 
ecstatic with this source of aid. The reason behind this is the notion that “the Western aid 
is conditional: if they give you financial aid, then they ask you something in return, and we 
do not want to be bounded by that.” (Unsal 2012) The EU and the US are not very keen to 
support Islamic groups unless they are seen as moderate. (Youngs and Wittes 2009) 
Secular, women, youth, and LGBT CSOs are the predominant recipients of aid from the 
EU. However, these secular CSOs do not perform humanitarian activities in the ME.  
The EU’s impact over Turkey’s Soft Power  
In the 1990s, Turkey often “reflected the predominance of hard power in the pursuit 
of foreign policy goals.” (Terzi 2010) Nevertheless, diplomacy has gained a prominent 
place in Turkish foreign policy in the last 10 years, transforming Turkey toward utilization 
of soft power. (Terzi 2010) The main reason behind this change was the reconfiguration of 
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the Turkish political system on the basis of democratic norms and the strategic calculations 
of the AKP within this new political framework. Abdullah Gul indicated on several 
occasions that the EU membership process created a very positive image of Turkey in the 
ME. It is this positive image that actually facilitates the diffusion of Turkey’s democratic 
values in the ME as people in the Middle East wanted to live in a system similar to that of 
Turkey afterwards. In this regard, Turkey provides the ME with a positive role model as a 
secular, democratic, and economically powerful Muslim nation. (Kirisci 2012)  
The level of social, cultural, economic, and political interaction with the ME clearly 
indicate the increased soft power of Turkey under the AKP administration. For example, 
the numbers of Arab tourists that have visited Turkey substantially increased.56 The number 
of students that have come to continue their education in Turkey, the number of regional 
conferences being held in Istanbul, and the number of Turkish schools and cultural centers 
all around the world, including the ME, drastically rose.57 Furthermore, the dramatic 
increase in Turkish Airlines’ flights to all regions in the world, substantial development of 
the Turkish economy, substantial increase in Turkish humanitarian aid recognized by the 
UN, watchers of Turkish TV series that could be indicated by hundred millions (Kirisci 
2012) and finally the respect that the Turkish leadership gets from the region are all 
important indicators of Turkey’s increased soft power. Due to the increased interaction 
with Turkey through the aforementioned channels, people in the ME gradually wanted their 
country to be like Turkey.  
                                                            
56 For detailed information see Chapter VII’s Demonstrative Effect section.  
57 For detailed information see Chapter VI and Chapter VII. 
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Hitherto I have explained the impact of the complex interaction between the US-
Turkey and the EU-Turkey on Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the ME. 
Nonetheless, this chapter will remain incomplete, if I do not explain their stances in the 
course of Arab Spring. In the following part, I would like to explain briefly how these 
actors responded to the emergence of the Arab Spring.  
The Arab Spring  
“Some people think the Arab Spring is a conspiracy: like someone pressed the 
button from some hidden places. This is not correct. People decided that it was enough, 
and they wanted to make their own decision. People risked their lives for this, they crossed 
the wall of fear of dictators, and this is why this transformation and evolution is happening 
in the ME… However, great powers could manipulate this process by shaping the 
developments in favor of their own interests in the course of the Arab Spring,” said 
Emrullah Isler, the advisor of Erdogan on the ME. As this clearly indicates, both Turkey 
and the West were caught unprepared by the Arab Spring. Isler would later suggest that 
“ordinary people took over the task of democratizing the ME when the great powers 
backtracked. While the democratization of the ME was decided top-down (pointing out 
BMENA), it happened bottom-up later on.” (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) 
Turkey considered the Arab Spring to be a part of the larger picture, - the global 
demand for democracy, the open market economy, and the rule of law. (Interview with 
Emrullah Isler 2012) The AKP administration thought that as the demand for the 
aforementioned factors was global, the wave of democratization could not be stopped in 
the region. According to the Turkish administration, the advancement of mass 
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communication, such as social media and more traditional global media networks played a 
crucial role in this regard, by bringing the positive political, social, and economic 
conditions of the developed world to the attention of ordinary young people living in the 
impoverished and authoritarian ME. Furthermore, an AKP MPs suggested that Turkey, as 
a rapidly developing Muslim democracy, provided the Muslim societies around the world 
with a good example of what a Muslim nation could become, if properly governed. In this 
respect, he argued, “If Turkey’s good example was not there, Arab Spring would not be 
happening today, it would happen, but may be ten years later.” (Interview with Emrullah 
Isler 2012) 
By the time Arab Spring started, Turkey had consolidated its status as a regional 
power. (Alessandri and Altunisik 2013) Turkey developed strong relations with Syria, Iran, 
Russia, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood prior to the Arab Spring. Turkey’s 
warm relations with the aforementioned actors angered the West, accusing Turkey of 
betraying its Western allies. Turkey had also become a center of attraction for the Arab 
people as a result of its EU membership process stemming from its rapidly growing 
economy, and most importantly its political approach that loudly voiced the opinions of 
people of the ME in global and regional summits.  
More importantly, the role of Erdogan in this process cannot be underestimated. 
For example, A Syrian doctoral student reiterated that “Erdogan is more Arab than the 
Arab leaders, so we wish Erdogan was our leader,” (Interview with A Young Syrian 
Scholar in Miami 2012) indicating that finally a Muslim leader voiced the opinions of 
people of the region in a powerful yet peaceful manner. Many other individuals that I had 
the chance to discuss from the Arab ME expressed similar thoughts. In the same line, Isler 
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also reiterated that “as Arab streets did not see the leadership that Erdogan displayed in 
their own leaders, they accepted Erdogan as one of their own. Erdogan displayed a 
leadership that was missed and looked for in the region for a long time.” (Interview with 
Emrullah Isler 2012) However, the popularity of Erdogan, the democratically elected 
Turkish leader, would anger the authoritarian Arab leaders at the same time.  
When the Arab Spring started, Turkey was compelled to take a side. In the Turkish 
psyche, democratization was good for the region as ordinary people would finally have the 
chance to create a system where they were being truly represented. Democratization of the 
region was good for Turkey as well due to democratic system’s compatibility for long term 
business transactions and sustainable political cooperation. Democratization of the region 
would also facilitate the reintegration of the Middle Eastern nations that share a common 
history, religion, culture, and geography. Ahmet Davutoglu58 referred to the uprisings as 
“the normalization of history in the ME.” Although the AKP supported democratization, it 
wanted the transition to democracy to happen in a peaceful way, without chaos, 
provocations, and instabilities. (Alessandri and Altunisik 2013) Thus, Erdogan would call 
on Mubarak to step down: 
Mubarak, we are human beings. We are not immortal… When 
we die the imam will not pray for the prime minister or for the 
president, but he will pray for a human being. It is up to you to 
deserve good prayers or curses. You should listen to the demands 
of the people and be conscious of the people and their rightful 
demands. (Today's Zaman 2011) 
                                                            
58 Ahmet Davutoglu is Turkey’s foreign affairs minister.  
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Most importantly, Turkey’s early reaction to the uprisings in the Arab world was 
motivated by its humanitarian concerns and strategic interests in a democratic ME. 
However, when the spring arrived to the next door, Syria, and when the Islamic parties 
came to power one by one in the Arab Spring states, Turkish motivation for supporting the 
opposition turned into a more strategically driven endeavor. The Arab Spring indicated the 
limits of Turkish power. Turkey understood that it was not capable of determining the 
future of the ME alone.   
The Arab Spring also reshaped alliances in the ME. Due to its support of the rebels 
in Syria, Turkey has been at loggerheads with Iran and Hezbollah in the region. Although 
this position brought Turkey closer to the US and the EU in their approach to the ME 
initially, when the conflict escalated in Syria, the Turkish and Western policies towards the 
ME started to diverge. The West was scared of the empowerment of the radical religious 
groups; therefore, did not provide full support to the opposition in Syria. Furthermore, the 
victory of the Islamic parties after the Arab Spring compelled the US and the EU, which 
tried to balance their short term strategic interests with their desire for the democratization 
of the ME, to work with them reluctantly.  
The Arab Spring worked against Israel’s interests: Israel was forced into isolation, 
losing its closest Muslim ally, Turkey, as a result of its harsh reaction to the Mavi-Marmara 
that ended with the death of nineteen human rights activists, and also losing its closest Arab 
ally Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood party was elected in the course of the Arab 
Spring. Furthermore, the Islamic administrations in Turkey, Egypt, Palestine, and Tunisia 
started to cooperate more forcefully, favoring Palestine against Israel. This substantially 
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changed the attitude of the US towards the democratization of the region as the Israeli 
security has been one of the crucial strategic interests of the US in the region.  
Initially, the US tried to influence the newly elected parties in Egypt and Tunisia 
towards adopting a liberal democratic approach, not-hostile to the West and Israel. The US 
wanted the Arab Spring countries to organize their political systems on the basis of 
secularism, similar to that of Turkey. The US, the EU, and Israel constantly pointed at 
Turkey as a role model that could and should be emulated. However, Turkish model was 
being diminished to the AKP model actually. When the political parties tied to the Muslim 
Brotherhood obtained power in the post-Spring Arab states, the West hoped that they 
would adopt a political stance similar to that of the Turkish AKP, such as being open to 
cooperation with the West, being willing to operate within a secular framework in their 
native countries, and supporting the institutionalization of liberal democratic norms.  
While the Muslim Brotherhood indicated their admiration for the success of the 
AKP within the secular framework of Turkey, they suggested that Arab states had different 
conditions from those of Turkey. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood said that Turkey 
could not be emulated as a role model in its fullest extent. However, they argued, some 
experiences of Turkey could surely be emulated. In comparison, in Tunisia, Ganushi’s 
elected Al-Nahda party was more willing to emulate the AKP model.  
It is fair to argue that at some level, Egypt under Morsi’s leadership aimed to 
establish itself as an alternative model to Turkey. For example, when Erdogan visited Egypt 
after the Arab Spring, the Deputy President of Egypt’s Justice and Freedom Party reiterated 
that “we welcome Turkey and we welcome Erdogan as a prominent leader, but we do not 
think that he or his country alone should be leading the region or drawing up its future.” 
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(Reuters 2011) Similarly, one of my interviewees, a top administrator in the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, argued that “Morsi could not take Turkey as a role model completely. 
(Interview with a Top Representative of the Muslim Brotherhood 2012) He further stated 
that “Egyptian people do not want a secular state; they want Islam to be combined in the 
Egyptian civil law. In Egypt, even Communists go to mosque and pray. A person might be 
Communist in ideology, but when it comes to worshiping, we all worship in the same line 
together. And this is the difference between Turkey and Egypt; Turkish communists don’t 
pray.” (Interview with a Top Representative of the Muslim Brotherhood 2012) He further 
argued that the new political leadership in Egypt wanted to build the economic system of 
Egypt following Islamic values that excluded interest rates. When I asked whether they 
had human capital to build such a complex economic system that needed to be successful 
to solve urgent economic problems of Egypt, he said “yes.”  
The West did not get the answers it expected, particularly from Egypt. Considering 
the backtracking of the US and the EU from democracy promotion, when the Islamic forces 
gained power in the ME in 2005 and 2006, their subsequent reactions to the demands of 
the Egyptian Islamists could easily be predicted. When the military coup d’état occurred 
in Egypt, the West remained silent, and did not refer to it as coup d’état. The West only 
raised its voice when the Egyptian military employed extreme violence against protestors, 
which resulted in several deaths. Similarly, the US administration did not provide the Morsi 
government with substantial support. Only one month before the military coup, the US 
approved 1.5 billion dollars aid to the Egyptian military, (Stanly, 2013) which was 
considered as financing military coup d’état of July 3, 2013 in Egypt.  
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The military coup in Egypt could also be interpreted as the Western attempt to 
compel the Egyptian Islamists to go through the same experiences that the Turkish 
Islamists went through before the 2002 national election in Turkey. After the 1999 
postmodern military coup d’état in Turkey, the AKP, separating from the Turkish Islamist 
party, emerged as a pro-West, pro-democratic, and pro-secular political force, playing a 
constructive role in the international politics. The military coup in Egypt might be an 
attempt to get similar results, transforming the Egyptian Islamists into a moderate party 
like the AKP.   
In conclusion, Turkey has traditionally been regarded as a trusted ally of the US. 
After the AKP came to power, Turkey was initially projected as the model of democracy 
and secularism for the Muslim world by the West. In this regard, the AKP, which had deep 
roots in political Islam, was attributed an important role initially by the West as it provided 
a litmus test for the cohabitation of secularism and Islam, increasing the hope for the 
transformation of the Islamic political forces into Western friendly, democratic, and secular 
political movements that supported globalization. However, this projection has not been 
consistent. Turkey itself attracted substantial criticisms when it approached the regional 
and global powers that the West perceived to be its rivals. 
Turkey had substantial interests in promoting democracy in the ME. Initially, 
Turkey’s support of the Western democracy promotion brought Turkey’s foreign policy in 
line with that of the EU and the US. Turkey’s emphasis on democracy in its foreign policy 
towards the ME empowered Turkey’s domestic and international roles, and eliminated the 
possible opposition of these two great powers against its political activism in the ME. 
Moreover, the US and Turkey had convergence of interests in interacting with a politically 
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stable region, buying inexpensive energy, combatting radicalization, supporting 
entrepreneurship, and promoting an environment of freedom in the ME. As Turkey shared 
a common population, geography, religion, and culture with the ME, the developments 
directly impacted the Turkish strategic interests.   
Despite Turkey’s considerable support for the American initiatives, launched to 
promote democratization in the ME, the AKP raised some objections. The AKP supported 
an internally driven, long-term, and consistent democratization process in the ME. In this 
regard, the AKP opposed the liberal interventionism and one-size-fits-all methods of the 
American democracy promotion. The AKP stressed that the West had to confine its role 
with the provision of a supportive international environment for democratic transformation 
in the ME.  
Although the EU did not have a direct impact on Turkey’s democracy promotion 
policy, it has had profound impacts over the Turkish state structure by democratizing it. 
Turkey has learned a great deal about how the modern West conducted its business from 
the EU. Turkey’s EU process transformed it into a soft power that the ME started to watch 
with admiration. In the new liberal environment, fostered by the membership process, the 
Turkish Islamic CSOs acted more independently. As a result, some of major humanitarian 
and democratic projects of Turkey have been carried out by Turkish Islamic CSOs in the 
ME.   
Turkey started 2007 as an economically and politically more powerful country. It 
also started as a country which developed substantial ties and alliances with the actors in 
the region. These alliances were in line with the BMENA Initiative premises, which 
stressed the socialization of Turkey with the other states in the region. However, when the 
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AKP upgraded its relations with Hamas, Iran, and Syria, the West strongly criticized 
Turkey, as they found this move of Turkey as a departure from its Western orientation.  As 
the West already backtracked from promoting democracy in the ME, they also started to 
oppose the previously set roadmap for the promotion of democracy in the region. 
Therefore, they wanted Turkey to backtrack from supporting democracy in the region as 
well, instead of respecting its agency. However, this did not happen, at least willingly for 
Turkey. As a response, Turkey accused the West of not doing what it preached; respecting 
the democratic choice of people.   
The Arab Spring caught the world unprepared. Turkey, the EU, and the US were 
compelled to take stances. In this regard, Turkey welcomed the process of Arab Spring, 
and called on the authoritarian leaders in the ME to introduce changes regarding the rightful 
demand of the protestors. On the other hand, while the US wanted the region to go through 
political change, it also has tried to shape the developments to create a more conducive 
environment for its strategic interests. The EU’s stance has been very similar to that of the 
US. 
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CHAPTER IV: TURKEY’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 
TURKEY’S APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER  
The ME has been largelly ignored by the Turkish governments since the inception 
of the modern Turkish Republic in 1920 despite Turkey’s cultural affinity and geographic 
proximity with the region and its vested strategic interests there. Turkey, which claims a 
regional power role in the ME, is linked to the region by shared culture, populations, 
religion, history, and geography. Also, the ME abounds in natural resources, such as oil 
and natural gas; it contains substantial Kurdish and Alevi populations, which could threaten 
Turkey’s territorial integrity during crisis times. Moreover, the ME is a great potential 
market for the Turkish industrial products. Despite so many favorable variables, Turkey 
failed to develop meaningful relations with its southern neighbors until the AKP came to 
power. The AKP does not only consider Turkey as a Middle Eastern country, but due to 
the aforementioned connectednesses, it defines Turkey’s role as a regional power which 
aspires to lead the region.  
As I argued in the previous chapters, Turkey started its official democracy 
promotion policy in the ME by  BMENA  Initiative of  the USA in 2004. The AKP has 
both a normative claim to, and strategic interest in, the promotion of democracy in the ME. 
Turkey has interests in a politically stable region, buying cheaper energy, deradicalization, 
supporting entrepreneurship, and promoting an environment of freedom in the ME. (Bagci 
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and Sinkaya 2006) Examining each of these variables, it is obvious that Turkey under the 
AKP rule promotes democracy for at least three substantial reasons:59 Firstly and most 
importantly, to promote its own security and economic interests; secondly,  for the benefit 
of the people (human rights, decreasing inequalities, etc.) in the target states; and thirdly,  
for the benefit of the region (f.e., inter-state trade) as a whole, in which the AKP considers 
Turkey as a leader.  
The guiding premise of this chapter is that the primary concerns of  states  are  their 
strategic interests, (Morgenthau 1962) and strategic interests dominate the values when 
they are being threatened.60 Yet, these strategic interests are being articulated within 
respective cultural environmens of the leading actors. 61 Therefore, the strategic choices 
between states might differ. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that states do promote 
democracy to help the target states. It means that states could have humanitarian agendas. 
However, when their immediate interests are threatened, states become preoccupied with 
                                                            
59 See, for example, Bagci and Sinkaya, Greater Middle East Initiative and Turkey: AK Party's Perspective, 
2006. 
60 See, also, Wolff and Wurm, Theorization of External Democracy Promotion: A Proposal for Theoretical 
Classification, 2011; Schweller, US democracy promotion: Realist reflections, 2000, p 43; Also, see Graye 
.R. Olsen, Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post-Cold War Africa: How Serious is Europe and 
for What Reason?, African Affairs, 97/388: 366, 1998. 
61 Overall, the interviewees had a negative image of the ME. The MPs as well as the administrators of the 
Islamic CSOs associated the ME with wars, conflicts, bloodshed, pains, dictatorial regimes, lack of human 
rights, lack of freedoms, Israeli aggression over the Palestinians, oil, imperialism, oppression, and the 
center of radicalism. Also, some of the interviewees identified the ME with positive factors, such as being 
the foundation of religions and the origins of human civilizational developments. On the other hand, 
Turkey was associated with Ottoman legacy, Europe, pains of democratization, strong secularism, the 
leader of Muslim world, economic growth, and sometimes negative issues, such as the conflict with 
Kurdish citizens. In this regard, in the Turkish self-perception, Turkey is better than the ME, and at some 
point, Turkish decision makers think that Turkey has a historical responsibility towards the ME. However, 
this line of thinking is especially dominant among the AKP MPs. The CSOs, on the other hand, claimed 
that considering the human resources of Turkey, Turkey should only play a humble role in the ME. In 
regards with democracy and secularism, my interviewees found the democratic and secular identities of 
Turkey as an asset.  
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defending their immediate interests.62 However, this does not mean that they abonden their 
ideals.  
It should be noted that Turkey’s initial engagement with the ME is not as 
strategically oriented as the later stages of Turkish democracy promotion, which began 
around 2007. Between 2003 and 2007, Turkey’s democracy promotion in the Arab ME 
remained as a principled stance, except in Iraq where Turkey had to engage with advancing 
its national security interests. However, by 2007 Turkey had established tight economic 
relations and firm alliances in the ME. When the Arab Spring started, Turkey had vested 
economic and strategic interests in the ME. As a result, Turkey has forcefully tried to 
eliminate the challanges against its own security and economic interests by promoting 
democracy through the utilization of diverse power instruments since the begining of the 
Arab Spring.  
There are many soft and hard power tools avalibale to Turkey while promoting 
democracy in the ME. However, Turkey’s preffered way for promoting democracy in the 
ME has been soft power instruments, such as diplomacy and foreign aid (See the following 
chapter for details). When Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the region is examined, 
it is seen that Turkey started to utilize hard power in the process of the Arab Spring when 
its substantial economic and security interests are threatened. During the years before the 
Arab Spring, the AKP stuck to soft power tools to promote democracy in the ME. Even at  
                                                            
62 For example, see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 1999; also, see McFaul, Ukraine 
Imports Democracy, 2007; furthermore, see Dalacoura, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion in 
the Middle East, 2010; Moreover, see Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, 2014; also, see Karakas, 
Democracy Promotion or Demotion, 2010; Moreover, see Ozer and Ozcan , Do New Democracies Support 
Democratization, 2011.   
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present, the bulk of the AKP’s democracy promotion is carried out with a diverse set of 
soft power tools.   
When Turkey’s interests are being hurt, application of  hard power tools to promote 
democracy is not automatic. Turkey often tries very hard to abstain from the utilization of 
hard power in the region. However, as it will be shown in this chapter, Turkey is being 
engulfed into and compelled to use hard power to eliminate the emerging threats towards 
its interests in the process of change in the ME. In this regard, in the following section, I 
would like to give an account of under what conditions Turkey applies military power to 
eliminate these challanges, and when Turkey abstains from the utilization of military 
power, even when its substantial interests are being threatened. In this regard, I examine 
the cases of Iraq, Syria, and Libya to explain this complex situation.   
However, before disscussing these specific cases, I would like to explain how the 
AKP relates democratization of the region to its strategic interests. First of all, the AKP 
thinks that stability in the region is the precondition for the establishment of sustainable 
economic and political ties in the ME with which Turkey wanted to establish firm relations 
after the AKP came to power. However, lack of freedoms and substantial human rights 
abuses are the crucial impediments against the regional stability. (Interview with Ali Sahin 
2012) To state it more clearly, people whose rights are constantly being violated, whose 
opinions are not being respected, whose grievences are not being heard, and who do not 
have a source of income could apply and have applied violent means of self-expression in 
the region. (Erdogan 2003) In this regard,  shortages of freedom and economic 
oppurtunities in the region have caused radicalization. Invasion of Iraq in the wake of the 
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9-11 tragedy, which has had destabilizing impacts over the whole region is a good example 
for that. 
Moreover, democratization in the region would result in the election of like-minded 
governments which make better partners in trade and politics due to the shared democratic 
processes and mechanisms. When human rights violations decline and when  power 
changes hand peacefully, the system becomes more legitimate, and legitimacy brings more 
stability. (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) Democratization of the region will also help 
escape from the post imperial regional order, established on the basis of artificial borders 
between states and nations, paving the way for a greater integration in the ME. (Interview 
with Ali Sahin 2012)         
In the following section, I would like to disscuss how the AKP conceptualizes 
Turkey’s democracy promotion in the ME. Then, I will start to explain the cases in which 
Turkey’s democracy promotion becomes more strategically driven and militarized.    
Problematizing the Promotion of Democracy 
 Turkish policymakers and officials have a different understanding of Turkish 
democracy in the ME. The MPs of the opposition parties, such as Turkish nationalist MHP 
and Kurdish nationalist BDP strongly oppose the idea that Turkey, under the AKP 
administration, supports democratization in the region. According to the members of the 
opposition parties, Turkish democracy is not mature yet; and therefore, the AKP 
administration is not in any position to promote democracy elswhere. However, as 
indicated in the previous chapter, by participating in BMENA Initiative, the AKP’s 
involvement in promoting democracy in the ME became official. (Kirisci 2011)  
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The deputies representing the AKP do not perceive their acts as democracy 
promotion in the ME. According to the AKP deputies, they have no intention whatsoever 
to bring democracy to or to change the regimes in the region. The AKP MPs pointed out 
that promoting democracy would mean the intervention in domestic affairs of brotherly 
nations; and they argued that this was not in any way what the AKP intended to do. 
(Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) Furthermore, they argued that while Turkey still had 
problems with its own democratization, such as its problems with its Kurdish citizens, how 
could it claim a democratizer mission elsewhere. For the AKP MPs, what they did was to 
provide help to the friendly nations when it was demanded. (Interview with Ali Sahin 2012) 
They also indicated that they only warned the non-democratic Arab states about what could 
happen if they did not transit to democratic system, when the Arab Spring started. In this 
regard, an AKP deputy (2012) suggested, what we are doing is to maintain stability in the 
region in the long run, which serves the interests of the people in the region. Without 
stability, there cannot be development and progress. The wave of Arab Spring is 
threatening the stability in the region, and the only way to deal with this is to give people 
what they want.63 
However, the paradox was that, often, in their speeches they explained how they 
helped the Middle Eastern states to develop their political and economic systems by sharing 
Turkey’s experiences, and how they trained the political parties in Egypt and Tunusia to 
maintain effective political campaigns. These acts were “de facto” promotion of 
democracy. I could not interpret this as unconscious promotion of democracy as the AKP 
                                                            
63 A number of AKP deputies that I interviewed between 2012 and 2014 also conformed this point.   
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leadership provided a substantial support to the 2004 BMENA Initiative to democratize the 
ME. However, for the interviewees, these were the attempts to create a fertile ground for 
developing long term fruitful political and economic relations.  
Islamic CSOs in Turkey opposed the idea that Turkey promotes democracy in the 
ME. According to some of the top officals I interviewed, Turkey still had substantial 
problems with its own democratic, social, and economic developments. (Interview with 
CSO members in Ankara 2012) Considering these shortcomings of Turkish democracy, 
Turkey was not in any position to promote democracy in the ME. However, they added 
that it was true that the AKP administration had the ambition to play a major role in the 
region.  
The CSO reresentatives provided a more rational framework for what Turkey could 
do. According to them, simply Turkey’s human capital and economic power was not 
sufficient to play the role that the AKP administration wanted it to play. (Interview with 
CSO members in Ankara 2012) Therefore, they argued that Turkey should only try to make 
humble contributions to the sollution of the problems in the region through diplomacy and 
humanitarian aid. If not, Turkey could risk its national security. They  both opposed the 
neo-ottoman tendencies of the AKP administration and suggested that Turkey should 
approach the people in the region as equals. (Interview with CSO members in Ankara 2012) 
Nevertheless, the CSO representatives also accepted the self-criticism that, they often  
acted as if they were superior in their interractions with partners in the region.    
The CSOs ideas about the extent of Turkish role was also shared by TIKA (Turkish 
Developmental Agency) experts who worked on the field to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the needy areas in different parts of the world, such as Asia, Africa, and 
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Europe. They often criticized the AKP administration for exaggerating the Turkish role. 
According to them, the way Turkey provided aid did not have a long-term strategy. They 
argued that when the Turkish aid was provided this way, it did not benefit the Turkish 
interests in the long run, as the provider and the benefits it provided were  forgotten after a 
while. (Interview with TIKA experts in Ankara 2013) One of the intervieewes argued that 
“when we deliver aid to people, people have no clue about who did it. When the West does 
it, it uses tools such as signs and boards that indicate the identity of the provider, they 
organize opening ceremonies and parties to celebrate it. Also, we as the Turkish state do 
not still know how to turn this aid into strategic benefits.” (Interview with TIKA experts in 
Ankara 2013)   
However, what cannot be ignored is the fact that Turkey has been involved in a 
modest act of promoting democracy in the ME. Turkey did support democratization in the 
region in principle and through a number of intergovernmental initiatives. Yet, Turkey does 
not call what it does as the promotion of democracy. For Turkish officials, the term 
promotion of democracy means an intentional effort to alter regimes, and Turkey does not 
have any intention to change the regimes in the ME.64  (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) 
Instead of promoting democracy which would mean  intending to change the regimes and  
which  would basically refer to interfering with  the  affairs of ME, what they attempt to 
do is to share experience to create positive change and to maintain stability in the region as 
they want the region to prosper as a whole.65 (Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) They 
                                                            
64 The author’s interview with a number of AKP MPs, Grand National Assembly of Turkey, June 2013. 
65 The author’s interview with a number of AKP MPs, Grand National Assembly of Turkey, June 2013. 
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argue that they do not try to change the regimes in the ME, nor does Turkey have the 
capability to do it. Nevertheless, Turkish officials have difficulty in explaining Turkey’s 
participation to the BMENA, which is an initiative designed to democratize the ME.  
There are a number of reasons for this confusion. One of the most important is that  
Turkish democracy is still in the making, so is the Turkish democracy promotion policy. 
Therefore, Turks find it difficult to accept the case of democracy promotion by a 
democracy in transition, like Turkey. Also, the term “bringing democracy” contains some 
sort of cynicsm in the Turkish psyche as the Turks associate this concept with the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the poor countries by the Western states. Moreover, 
Turkey lacks a well designed institution or structure, formed for the purpose of promoting 
democracy. (Kirisci 2011) The West has been trying to change the regimes elsewhere for 
a long period of time; therefore, Western nations are experienced in this whereas Turkey 
is quite inexperienced. 
Hitherto, I argued that Turkey has both strategic and idealist reasons to promote 
democracy in the ME. In this regard, Turkey’s  promotion of democracy is mainly geared 
to the  advancement of its strategic interests. However, democratization also will improve 
the conditions of people in the region in terms of factors, such as human rights and 
inequalities. Finally, democratization is good for the region as a whole in terms of creating 
conditions for sustainable economic and political ties beytween the states in the region. 
(Interview with Emrullah Isler 2012) In this context, Turkey does promote the interests of 
the people that it feels close to. However, when Turkey’s strategic interests are threatened, 
its concerns for its immediate strategic interests dominates its ideals towards the region. At 
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this point, Turkey’s democracy promotion itself becomes an instrument to eliminate the 
challanges towards its interests.   
Therefore, in the following section, I would like to give a detailed account of how 
Turkey behaves when its immediate security and economic interests are being threatened. 
I detected three substantial strategic interests for Turkey in the course of Arab Spring, 
which are survival, economy, and alliances. I indicate that when these interests are being 
threatened, Turkey applies a combination of hard and soft power tools to eliminate the 
challanges towards itself. In this regard, sometimes Turkey is compelled by its allies to 
apply military power to fix the problems emaneting in the proces of change in the region.      
Survival 
Under the AKP administration, Turkey has faced two developments that threatened 
its national security. The first one was the American occupation of Iraq in 2003 under the 
George W. Bush Administration. The second development is the escalation of conflict in 
Syria in the course of Arab Spring. In both cases, Turkey’s democracy promotion gained a 
highly strategic orientation. Democracy promotion itself became a tool to ensure the 
national security.  
Turkey’s national security dominates its democracy promotion agenda particularly 
when it deals with its immediate neighbors, such as Syria and Iraq. There are a number of 
reasons for that. Turkey shares a long border with Syria and a long and mountainous border 
with Iraq. There is a substantial drug trafficking that follows the Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, 
and Turkey routes, which then connects to Europe as a final destination point. Moreover 
Turkey has problems with its Kurds. Iraq, Syria, and Iran also contain large Kurdish 
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populations. These three countries also include different confessional groups in Islam. In 
this regard, substantial political developments in these countries directly impact Turkey’s 
national security. (Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry 2014)  As a result, Turkey tries to 
engage with surrounding countries to diminish the security risks originating from political 
developments.  
In the following section, I would like to introduce the cases of Iraq, Syria, and Libya 
in more detail. Iraq and Syria are discussed within the framework of threats against 
Turkey’s survival or territorial integrity. Libya is discussed within the framework of threats 
against Turkey’s economic interests. I argue that due to the presence of the US in Iraq, 
Turkey was not able to utilize its military power to reduce the security risks emerging in 
Iraq. In the case of Syria, Turkey supports democratization, but it avoids the overt 
utilization of the military power due to its fear of being associated with the radical groups 
and due to the possibility of direct military confrontation with the Assad regime. In Libya, 
Although Turkey promoted NATO intervention against France’s unilateral intervention, it 
tried to avoid becoming a part of a militarized solution in Libya. However, Turkey was 
compelled to partake in the military intervention against Gaddafi by the US when the 
operations in NATO lasted longer than expected.  
A-Iraq 
After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the US designed a two-legged strategy to fight 
radicalization in the ME. The first leg suggested military intervention in countries like Iraq 
and Afghanistan to deter the terrorists. The second leg suggested the launching of the 
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BMENA initiative to promote democracy in the ME. As a result, the US invaded Iraq on 
March, 2003. 
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, Turkey opposed the thesis of liberal 
interventionism clearly, when Erdogan visited the US in January 30, 2003. The Iraq 
intervention in March 19, 2003 indicated that Turkey’s opposition to the US liberal 
interventionism did not matter. Furthermore, the unilaterality of the US decision for the 
intervention in Iraq caused dissatisfactions among its European allies, (Youngs and Wittes 
2009) including Turkey that constantly stressed the importance of multilateralism.  
Before the military campaign, the US was hopeful that the Turkish parliament 
would pass a bill that enabled Turkey to become a part of the coalition forces in Iraq led 
by the US. This bill would also enable the US to use Turkish harbors, airbases, and land as 
an initial entrance point to Iraq. However, the March 1, 2003 bill was disapproved by 250 
against 260. This was a shock for the US. However, this did not mean that the AKP 
administration did not support the idea of being a part of the coalition. Actually, the opinion 
of the top officials in the newly formed AKP was quite supportive of approving the March-
1 Bill. Fatma Sahin, the former AKP minister, reiterated that: 
Right after we were being elected as MPs, they brought the 
March-1 Bill in front of us. They were asking us to make a 
decision regarding an issue, crucial for Turkey’s and the region’s 
future. We were new and unexperienced. We did not even know 
what our responsibilities were then. Some MPs approved of the 
bill and some others disapproved. But all of us were shaking, as 
we were inexperienced MPs, yet voting for such a crucial 
decision. The outcome was the disapproval of the bill. Thanks 
god it was not approved. Its disapproval caused the creation of a 
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very welcoming international environment for the AKP 
government, in those inexperienced days. (Fatma Sahin 2014) 
There were two particular reasons for the AKP’s support for joining the coalition 
that intervened in Iraq. The first was that if there was a new regional formation or 
development in the ME, Turkey had to partake in them to protect its interests or to depict 
an image as such to calm the public; and the second was that the AKP feared that that the 
US would remove the financial and diplomatic support of Turkey at home and 
internationally. (Sol Portal 2012)  At the beginning of this matter, the US had offered 
Turkey USD 6 billion conditioned on the approval of the bill. (Sol Portal 2012)  
However, despite all the efforts of the AKP to get the bill approved, the parliament 
opposed the March-1 Bill, causing a cold shower effect in the Bush Administration and 
negatively impacting the Turkish-American relations. Fatma Sahin reiterated that “we 
needed that money so much. It (the stipulated US aid) was crucial for the new AKP 
administration. Turkey has gone through substantial economic growth under the AKP, and 
looking at those old days, we really need to be quite happy about our current economic 
situation.” (Fatma Sahin 2014) Turkish financial sector was also upset about the 
disapproval of the March-1 Bill. (Sol Portal 2012)  
As a natural extension of the aforementioned concerns, the parliament approved of 
the second bill which allowed the US to use its Incirlik military base, located in Adana 
province of Turkey, for the US air force operations in Iraq. The second bill was approved 
of to save the alliance with the US, as it was considered quite beneficial strategically. As 
the rejection of the first bill dominated the public discussions globally, the approval of the 
second bill did not attract much attention.  
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Therefore, the disapproval of the March-1 Bill caused a warm welcome to the AKP 
administration in the region. The opinions, previously constructed by being the “puppet of 
the West” were replaced by an anti-war and peaceful Turkey that was independent enough 
to oppose the US, which was its close ally. Turkey was perceived as more confident. 
However, many attributed the Turkish rejection of the bill to the Islamic orientation of the 
AKP, although in reality the AKP’s key figures worked very hard to pass the March-1 Bill.  
The war in Iraq had detrimental effects on the regional security in the ME, which 
was one of the principle reasons that Turkey opposed it. Iraq turned into a platform where 
the terrorists were being trained. Every other day, suicide bombers would explode 
themselves in the crowded centers of the Iraqi cities, turning them into a living hell. 
Ironically the US involvement in Iraq ignited more terrorism. Furthermore, an autonomous 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was established. This created substantial fears in the 
ME. This fear was the fear of destabilization of the surrounding countries which contained 
substantial Kurdish populations and the fear of re-formation of the ME on the basis of 
Alevi-Sunni sectarian lines.  
Although the American intervention in Iraq was a nightmare for Turkey, Turkey 
had to work to protect its strategic interests in Iraq. Significant Turkish interests in Iraq 
included preventing the division of Iraq on the basis of ethnic or sectarian lines that could 
lead to the formation of an independent Kurdish state in oil-rich northern regions. Such a 
formation could  motivate the Turkish Kurds to separate from Turkey; protecting the small 
Turkish-speaking Turkmen minority living in northern Iraq; preventing the establishment 
of “a potentially hostile nondemocratic fundamentalist Iraqi state; finally, preventing the 
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violent activities of the PKK, the Kurdish rebels, which  had been using northeastern Iraq 
as a training camp. (Barkey 2005)  
As the Iraqi state was controlled by the US after the invasion, Turkey did not have 
much choice to work towards realization of its security goals except supporting the 
establishment of democratic mechanisms in Iraq, a project designed by the US within its 
grand strategy to fight radicalism in the ME. However, Turkey was also aware that 
considering the conditions of the time, only a functioning democratic state would be able 
to keep all different ethnic and confessional groups together. Kurds would not accept the 
superiority of any other group any more, particularly at a time when they had substantial 
gains as a result of their cooperation with the US during the Iraq war. 
Turkey had to engage in Iraq’s domestic affairs in order to influence the 
developments in Iraq in its own favor. Turkey decided to support democratic mechanisms 
in Iraq to help establish an Iraqi state that could survive and that could control its borders. 
Turkey tried to mitigate the aforementioned negative outcomes of war by establishing 
multilateral institutions, such as “Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Process”, founded in 2003 
in the eve of Iraq war. (Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry 2014) The purpose of this 
organization was to develop a supportive international environment to reintegrate Iraq to 
the neighborhood. This has been a useful process for the peace, prosperity, and 
development in Iraq and security and economic interests of its neighbors. 
As a part of its agenda to influence the developments in Iraq in its own favor, 
Turkey paid special attention to the 2005 Iraqi national elections. Before the elections, 
Turkey tried to convince Sunnis, who had previously decided to protest the elections, to 
participate. The statistics indicated that 70% of Iraqis went to vote, and Sunnis secured 19 
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seats as a result of Turkey’s activism. Shias formed the majority in Iraq, and Jalal Talabani, 
a politician of Kurdish origin, became the president. This was good news for Turkey, as 
the participation of such diverse Iraqi groups provided a certain level of legitimacy to the 
new Iraqi government. Before the 2010 national elections, Sunnis confessed that they made 
a strategic mistake by protesting the elections in 2005, as a result of which the Shias gained 
most of the seats in the Iraqi parliament. Ambassador Celikol suggested that: 
We want an Iraq that is in peace with its neighbors and its 
citizens, as well as a pluralist, democratic Iraq. In order to 
establish this Iraq, we, as Turkey, are doing whatever we can 
contribute. Some positive developments are happening in Iraq 
nowadays. First of all, an administrative law is being accepted in 
Iraq. Elections were held in January and November in Iraq. 
However, as a result of the nonparticipation of the Sunnis in 
January elections in Iraq, the Iraqi parliament had problems in 
terms of representing the Iraqi people as a whole. Therefore, we 
tried to convince the Sunnis to participate in November elections. 
This way we wanted the new parliament to be representative of 
the whole Iraq. In our meeting with the Sunnis, we stressed that 
they certainly had to participate in the new political process. The 
Iraqi parliament that will gather in the upcoming days has gained 
a way more representative nature than before. (Celikol 2006)        
In addition, Turkey mentored the Iraqi state in setting its legal economic 
framework. For example, Turkey helped the Iraqi state in creating the new democratic Iraqi 
constitution and laws. (TUSIAD 2012) After the war, Turkey started to share technical 
know-how and experience with Iraq. For example, Turkish economic associations, such as 
TUSIAD, helped Iraq substantially in drafting a framework for its economy. (TUSIAD 
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2012) Turkey also tried to create multilateral institutions to reduce the security risk 
emanating from Iraq to the region to minimum levels.   
In the process of engagement with Iraq, trade ties between the two countries 
considerably improved. At the present, Iraq is one of Turkey’s biggest trading partners. By 
2012, Iraq had become the second largest destination for Turkish industrial export 
products.  In 2008, High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) between Turkey 
and Iraq was founded. This framework was created to strengthen the trade ties between the 
two countries by the participation and coordination of relevant ministers and bureaucrats. 
(Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014)  
To sum up, Turkey had no chance except promoting democracy through soft power 
tools in Iraq under the American occupation. Turkey promoted democracy through 
engaging with different groups and through mentoring the Iraqi authorities. Turkey did so 
to ensure Iraq’s territorial integrity. If Iraqi state fell apart, its divisions on the basis of 
ethnic and sectarian lines could have impacted the Kurds and Alevis in Turkey. Therefore, 
by promoting democracy in Iraq, Turkey tried to ensure its own security. Turkey rarely 
applied the military power to deter KRG from supporting the PKK, which was using North 
Iraq as a training base. In the following section, I will explain how Turkey dealt with 
developments in Syria.   
B-Syria 
Turkey and Syria had antagonistic relations before 1998 for a number of reasons, 
and the most crucial of which being Syria’s claims over Hatay, Syria’s support to PKK, 
and disputes over the share of water between Syria and Turkey. However, Turkey and Syria 
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signed the Adana Agreement in October 20, 1998, after Syria expelled Abdullah Ocalan, 
the leader of the PKK, from its borders. From this point on, Turkish Syrian relations 
substantially developed in a number of areas, such as politics, economy, and culture. 
(Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014) (See Table 5 and Table 6)  
However, the Arab Spring created a destabilizing impact over the ME, including 
Syria and Turkey. Turkey was threatened by four particular factors. These are the Syrian 
refugees crossing the Turkish border, the new Kurdish formation in Rojava, sectarian 
unease, and the new radical religious formation (ISID). Therefore, Erdogan declared: "We 
do not see Syria as a foreign problem, Syria is our domestic problem because we have a 
850 kilometer border with this country, we have historical and cultural ties, we have 
kinship." (The AKP 2014) 
The very first challenge to Turkey came from the Syrian refugees. After the conflict 
escalated in Syria, over a million Syrians sought refuge in Turkey. “There are more than 
400 thousand refugees in the region of Gaziantep alone” (Zander 2013) and over 1 million 
refugees in Turkey.66 Some Syrians crossed the Turkish borders with a valid passport, but 
most of them did not possess a passport. While Turkey turned a blind eye to the entrance 
of most of the Syrian refugees into Turkey, due to the difficulty of controlling the border, 
many other entered without Turkey’s consent. While Turkey found it unacceptable to close 
its borders to innocent Syrian civilians, Turkey was also frustrated as suicide bombers and 
the spies of the antagonistic Syrian regime could enter Turkey.  An example of this was 
when a car full of explosive materials exploded in Reyhanli town of Hatay, leaving 52 
                                                            
66 The official data on the number of Syrians in Turkey is unreliable, as most of the Syrians cross the 
Turkish borders without the approval of the Turkish authorities.   
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deaths and 155 injured behind.67 Not to mention the fear that it created in the public. The 
attackers (Nasir Eskiocak and Ergin Ordek) confessed that they met with Assad and his 
high ranking officials before the attacks several times to plan the attacks. (Mehmet Sahin 
2014) An interviewee from Reyhanli reiterated that Assad promised large amount of 
money to some of his distant relatives in a village near Reyhanli to explode a car in the city 
center of Ankara, which was changed to Reyhanli later on when the Turkish Intelligence 
Service (MIT) became aware of their plans.  
The second threat to Turkey came from the Kurdish Formation in Rojava, Syria. A 
large group of Kurds in Syria, which had structural ties with the PKK, wanted to create an 
autonomous government, similar to that of Iraq. This threatened Turkey in two ways: 
firstly, this formation could encourage the Turkish Kurds to do the same; and, secondly, as 
the Rojava Kurds had close ties with the PKK, this formation would strengthen the PKK, 
an organization that had caused the lives of around 40 thousand in Turkey. 
The third threat to Turkey came from the Alawi-Sunni conflict in Syria. Syria is 
governed by the Alawi minority, and in Turkey, there is a substantial group of Alevis that 
identify themselves with Alawis in Syria. It means that Turkey has been supporting the 
opposition against the Alawi Assad regime. Turkish Alevi minority reads this attitude of 
Turkey from sectarian lenses as they see it as a Sunni act against Alawis as a group. Similar 
to the Turkish Alevis, 54% of the Syrians think that Turkish policies towards Syria are 
sectarian. (SETA 2013) The death of six individuals with Alevi backgrounds during the 
Gezi Park protests further strained the Alevi population in Turkey as they started to think 
                                                            
67 Some of the people that I talked and who live in Reyhanli told me that the number of deaths and injured 
was way greater than what the officials revealed. 
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that there was an intentional violent campaign against the Alevis in Turkey. However, this 
frustrated the Turkish state as well. The Turkish officials started to think that some hidden 
forces tried to pull Turkey into sectarian conflicts in the ME. As a result, the sectarian 
conflict in Syria started to affect the relations between different sectarian groups in Turkey 
negatively.   
The fourth factor that poses a threat to Turkey’s national security is the radical 
religious formations in Syria. In February 3, 2014, the media, using the Turkish intelligence 
services as their sources of information, revealed that 20 suicide bombers, who were the 
members of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISID), crossed the Turkish borders to 
explode themselves in three major cities of Turkey, namely Ankara, Istanbul, and Hatay. 
(Taraf 2014) In addition to the violent campaigns carried out by the Kurdish rebels crossing 
the borders, this time Turkey had to deal with the threats posed by the Assad regime as 
well as the members of the ISID, angered by Turkish policies towards them. All these 
brought the difficulties of controlling the southern borders of Turkey and the AKP’s overly 
relaxed border control policy into question.  
Turkey’s support for democratization turned into backing the opposition at all costs 
against the Assad regime when the conflict in Syria started to harm Turkish national 
security. Thus, supporting anti-Assad groups had become a tool of engagement in Syria to 
eliminate the threats towards the national security. Turkey’s initial idea was that the 
immediate removal of Assad would provide stability in its southern borders after a short 
term of political unease. However, the Turkish administration had finally understood the 
complicacies in Syria. Yasar Yakis, the former foreign affairs minister of Turkey, was quite 
critical about Turkey’s Syrian policy and reiterated that:       
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In foreign policy, you never put all of [your] eggs in one basket. 
Turkey had bet that Assad would fall in no time and that it would 
be the first to reap the rewards… The way things stand now, if 
Turkey continues to insist on a Syria without Assad it will be left 
isolated. (Yakis 2014) 
To sum up, when the Arab Spring arrived to Syria, Turkey had to make a decision, 
whether to support Assad or support the opposition. Initially, Turkey tried diplomacy to 
push Assad to introduce some reforms demanded by his people for seven months. When 
Assad resisted, Turkey started to support the opposition. There were a few important 
reasons for this. Firstly, Turkey’s pro-democratic stance during the protests in Tunisia, 
Libya, and Egypt created an expectation that Turkey should react similarly in Syria as well. 
Secondly, Turkish CSOs pressured the government to oppose the Syrian government’s 
violent campaigns against the protestors. Most importantly, Turkey thought that if it 
supported the opposition, Assad would fall in no time, and Turkey would reap the rewards 
when the new government came to power in Syria.  
However, when the conflicts continued longer than the AKP imagined, it resulted 
in security risks for Turkey. Consequently, Turkey started to support the Syrian opposition 
in many ways. For example, first, Turkey let the Syrian opposition to organize in Istanbul. 
Secondly, Turkey opened its doors to the Syrian refugees whose numbers have exceeded 
1 million until at the present. Thirdly, when the Syrian Kurds indicated their will for the 
formation of an autonomous Kurdish region and when the radical ISID formation emerged, 
Turkey started to provide military assistance to the Free Syrian Army that worked for a 
democratic and territorially intact Syria. Turkey trained the Free Syrian Army in Reyhanli 
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Refugee Camp, (Kemal 2012). However, there is no official data about the extent and type 
of Turkey’s military assistance to the Syrian Sunni opposition.  
Finally, Turkey has been providing substantial humanitarian assistance in the form 
of food and shelter to the Syrians within Syria. The official data from AFAD indicates that 
Turkey has already spent USD 2.5 billion on Syrian refugees in the form of humanitarian 
assistance since the conflict escalated. (See the following chapter) Regardless, the Turkish 
democracy promotion policy has partly been militarized at the present as Turkey is being 
threatened by the aforementioned developments in Syria.    
Turkey has become more and more isolated due to its emphasis on a Syria without 
Assad. Turkey’s Western allies do not share this opinion with Turkey. Considering the 
radical elements in Syria and Iraq, which are busy establishing the ISID, the US and the 
EU finds the Assad regime as less frightening. On the other hand, the Assad regime has 
obtained Russian and Iranian support in material terms, and Chinese diplomatic support. 
Therefore, Syria has empowered its position against the Syrian opposition and countries, 
such as Turkey, Saudis, Qatar, and the West, that supported the oppoition. Although 
Turkey wants to redesign its Syrian policy, it seems that Turkey does not have much option 
left. 
In the following section, Turkey’s economic interests as another reason for 
Turkey’s democracy promotion will be explained. I also demonstrate how Turkey’s 
democracy promotion is militarized in Libya to protect its economic interests.   
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Economic Interests  
Once trade relations between countries reach a meaningful level, they start to 
concern themselves with the safety and stability of their economic interests in the 
corresponding states. Democracy promoter states often think that democracies make better 
trade partners. (Russet 1993) There are three particular reasons for this: Firstly, 
democracies have legal mechanisms to channel the grievances of their people. This 
prevents the occurrences of radical movements harmful for investment and security in that 
country. (Aviles 2012) Thus, respecting human rights means long term stability in the 
markets. Secondly, enforcement of a clear rule of law in democratic systems provides a 
greater security for the investors in terms of protection of their capital and business 
transactions. Finally, in order to facilitate its economic interaction with others, states try to 
harmonize their market rules and regulations with the other states’ regulations. The EU 
enlargement process is the best example for this. Therefore, I argue that Turkey’s 
democracy promotion helps to create sustainable markets for its investments by 
harmonizing the targets’ economic and legal frameworks with those of its own. When 
Turkey’s economic interests are being threatened, Turkey tries to eliminate these threats 
by utilizing a diverse set of foreign policy tools, such as coercion and diplomacy.    
Turkey’s rapidly growing economic relations with the ME is a considerable factor 
that motivates Turkey to support the institutionalization of the democratic norms and 
values in the ME. (Turkey Ministry of Economy 2014) Turkey’s industry has displayed a 
substantial improvement in the last twelve years under the AKP rule. The increased 
industrial production necessitated finding stable markets for the Turkish products. 
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(Kulaklikaya and Nurdun 2010) As the West was going through financial crisis, the ME 
seemed to be a life-saving market for the rapidly growing Turkish industry. 
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that Turkey’s export to the ME increased along with 
economic development at home. While in 2002, Turkey’s export to the ME was USD 4.44 
billion and its import was USD 3,09 billion, in 2012 its export increased to 33,25 and its 
import to 17,64 billion dollars. As the statistics indicate the main beneficiary of the 
increased trade volume between Turkey and the ME has been Turkey. 
Table 4. Turkey’s Economic Indicators 
 
*Source for Table 4: the Turkish Statistical Institute Website 
 
Table 4 indicates that in 2002, when the AKP came to power, Turkey’s overall 
GDP was 232 billion dollars; and it went up to 1125 billion dollars under the AKP rule. 
This meant that Turkey displayed high levels of economic growth in the last decade. If we 
Column1 GDP Growth Rates GDP %  Capita GINI index
in Billion Dollars ($)  (% ) in (thousands)
1990 150 9.2 2,7 -
1995 169 7.8 2,8 -
2000 266 6.7 4,1 -
2001 196 -5.6 3,0 -
2002 232 6.1 3,5 42.7
2003 303 5.2 4,5 43.4
2004 392 9.3 5,8 42.6
2005 483 8.4 7,1 42.5
2006 531 6.8 7,6 40.3
2007 647 4.6 9,2 39.2
2008 730 0.6 10,2 38.9
2009 615 -4.8 8,5 -
2010 731 9.1 10 -
2011 775 8.5 10,5 -
2012 1125 - - -
Turkey’s Economic Indicators 
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do not consider the decline in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis, the 
average for Turkey’s economic growth under the AKP rule has been 6.44% between 2002 
and 2012. The overall export of Turkey went from 39,3 billion dollars in 2003 to 152,6 
billion dollars in 2012.68 On the other hand, “Turkey’s general imports have increased from 
a 55,6 billion dollars in 2003 to 236,5 billion dollars in 2012.”69 Most importantly, 
Turkey’s improving trade ties with the ME is an important part of Turkey’s economic 
growth.  
Table 5. Turkish-Middle Eastern Trade Relations 1999-2012 
 
*Source for Table 5: the World Bank Website70 
                                                            
68 Republic of Turkey, Ministery of Economy, Countries & Regions: Middle East, 02/17/2014. 
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&region=4 
69 Republic of Turkey, Ministery of Economy, Countries & Regions: Middle East, 02/17/2014. 
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&region=4 
70 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx# 
Years Export to the ME 
($)
Import from 
the ME ($)
ME Tourists 
visiting Turkey
1999 3.676.894 3.416.675 -
2000 3.359.010 5.462.082 762.226
2001 4.079.652 5.027.569 764.133
2002 4.448.081 3.095.397 780.431
2003 6.675.410 4.203.113 880.935
2004 9.677.673 5.250.389 1.031.226
2005 12.229.495 7.475.826 1.288.538
2006 13.528.786 10.065.346 1.285.507
2007 17.683.329 12.503.176 1.617.553
2008 28.907.378 16.386.510 1.917.329
2009 24.842.752 9.568.391 1.955.402
2010 28.508.171 16.318.007 2.192.773
2011 31.968.565 24.082.631 2.438.206
2012 33.252.927 17.647.838 -
Turkish-Middle Eastern Relations 1999-2012 
Value: Billion Dollars
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Turkey’s main export items to the ME include “stones and precious metals, iron 
and steel, electrical machinery and equipment, vehicles, machinery and mechanical 
appliances, mineral fuels and oils.” (Turkey Ministry of Economy 2014) Turkey mainly 
imports raw materials, such as fuels and minerals, “pearls, stones and precious metals, 
plastics and articles thereof, organic chemicals, aluminum and articles thereof.”71 
Furthermore, as stated by the Turkish Ministry of Trade, “the total value of projects 
undertaken by Turkish contractors in Middle East countries exceeded 65,8 billion dollars 
by the end of 2012. When we take into consideration the figures for projects undertaken in 
2012, which was about 11 billion dollars, the importance of Turkey’s achievements will be 
more visible. Prestigious projects such as construction of new airports, undergrounds, 
refineries and other facilities for petrochemical industries are also among the projects 
undertaken by Turkish contractors in these countries.” (Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014) 
Moreover, the growing economic relations resulted in Turkey’s will to create a 
predictable rule of law to facilitate and sustain this interaction. The AKP has supported the 
creation of a predictable trading environment in the region in principle since the early days 
of its administration. Turkey’s Ministry of Trade clearly stresses the importance of a 
predictable trading environment by revealing that “the Middle East has been an important 
export destination for Turkey and Turkey attaches great importance to the bilateral and 
regional initiatives for facilitating trade and for creating a fair and predictable trading 
environment in the Middle East.” (Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014) One of the main 
concerns of the Turkish businessmen and investors regarding the ME was the safety of 
                                                            
71 Approximately 65 percent of Turkey’s imports from the region are concentrated on mineral fuels & oils. 
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their capital transaction. In this context, enforcement of an understandable rule of law that 
would ensure justice when the conflicts arise regarding their business transactions was 
crucial. Precondition for a working rule of law was of course the political stability in the 
Middle Eastern markets. According to Ikenberry, “democracies are able to develop 
relations based on the rule of law rather than political expediency, and this facilitates stable 
and mutually beneficial dealings.” (Ikenberry 2000) 
A large portion of the Turkish democracy promotion in this regard has been through 
mentoring. Turkey helped redesign the economic policies of a number of Middle Eastern 
countries on the basis of neoliberal reforms. For example, Syria demanded Turkish help to 
redesign its economy to integrate Syria to the Western markets. (Interview with Ali Sahin 
2012) The AKP shared its experience about economic policies and reforms with Syria. 
Considering that the AKP redesigned the Turkish economic system on the basis of the 
Copenhagen Criteria required for membership, the nature of reforms Syria implemented 
could easily be understood. This way, Syrian market underwent a substantial process of 
economic liberalization.  
However, when the Arab Spring started, Turkey’s economic interests were being 
threatened in the ME. The Libyan case is particularly important in terms of indicating the 
relationship between the extent of Turkey’s economic interaction in a country and what 
Turkey could do to protect its economic interests when they are being threatened. 
Therefore, I would like to give a detailed account of how Turkey was being progressively 
engulfed into a military intervention against Gaddafi rule in Libya in the course of Arab 
Spring, despite Turkey’s insistence on diplomatic means of conflict resolution there. 
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Libya  
Turkey developed strong economic relations with Libya under Gaddafi rule. Before 
the Arab Spring (and still), Turkey was among Libya’s greatest trade partners, along with 
Italy, Germany, the UK, and South Korea. (Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014) Turkey’s 
export to Libya totaled to USD 2 billion, and its import totaled to USD 500 million. 
Turkey’s investment in Libya’s construction sector was particularly important in this 
regard. In 2011, Turkish construction firms operated in 100 construction sites in Libya to 
implement 214 major construction projects. Around 25 thousand Turkish employees 
worked for these companies. The value of these projects totaled to USD 15 billion. (A. 
Koray 2013)  
To provide some detailed information about these construction projects, for 
example, SEGA was building the whole infrastructure of Libya’s Al Qaryah ash Sharqiyah 
city in Jabal al-Gharbi district. Cevahir Group was building the Benghazi Mall in Benghazi. 
Çeltikoğulu implemented the Wadi El Mejaneen sewer system project of the city of Tripoli. 
(Sabah Gazetesi 2011) Turkish construction companies were also involved in many other 
projects, such as constructing railways, hotels, malls, schools, and hospitals. (Sabah 
Gazetesi 2011) It would not be an exaggeration to argue that Libya was being built by the 
Turkish construction companies. Therefore, Turkey had concentrated interest in Libya’s 
construction sector. When the Arab Spring hit Libya, Turkey started to preoccupy with the 
future of its economic interests there. Turkey tried to take a stance that would not harm its 
economic interests in Libya.  
The protests in Libya began in the first week of February, 2011. Because of the 
significant Turkish presence there, Turkey was not able to develop a coherent policy 
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throughout the process. Turkey was simply trying to understand the situation in Libya to 
make the right decisions, which would not risk its economic interests there. (Dursunoglu 
2011) Turkey established firm relations with Gaddafi before the Arab Spring. Therefore, 
Gaddafi rule provided Turkey with some kind of warranty for its investment in Libya. On 
the other hand, Turkey was not able to predict whether Gaddafi would fall or not when the 
protests started. In this regard, initially Turkey remained unresponsive to the demands of 
the protestors in Libya. Next, Turkey claimed the role of a mediator when the conflicts 
grew. Finally, Turkey joined the opposition camp after realizing the impossibility of the 
survival of Gaddafi regime. (Dursunoglu 2011)  
In February 21, 2011, Ibrahim Dabbasi, the Libyan deputy permanent 
representative, to the UN called the UN to impose a no-fly-zone over Libya. The next day, 
Nikolas Sarkozi, the French President, called on the EU to impose sanctions against 
Gaddafi, and started to provide a robust support to the protestors in Benghazi. Same day, 
Turkey’s ambassador to Libya, Levent Şahinkaya claimed that the protests in Libya were 
not as big of a threat as they were being depicted in the global media. Furthermore, he 
fingered at the ongoing pro-Gaddafi protests in Tripoli to indicate the extent of the societal 
support for Gaddafi. (Kaya 2011) Turkey claimed that the views that suggest a no-fly-zone 
over the Libyan skies were unintelligible considering the current circumstances.  
Nevertheless, the protests would continue to grow. In February 27, 2011, Mustafa 
Abdul Jalil, who was the former justice minister of Gaddafi, established National 
Transitional Council. In March 15, 2011, Lebanon’s ambassador to the UN, Nawaf Salam, 
proposed the UN to pass a resolution on no-fly-zone in Libya. France and the UK, who had 
already voiced similar ideas, provided a robust support to this proposal. On March 17, 
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2011, the UN passed the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. After the 1973 
resolution, France organized military campaigns against Gaddafi. On March 21, 2011, 
France organized a conference in Paris to discuss the crisis in Libya, and Turkey was not 
invited.  
Turkey perceived France’s premature intervention in Libya as France was trying to 
advance its energy interests in Libya by bringing a new French-friendly government to 
power. France was buying 15% of the Libyan oil before the Arab Spring. (Regan 2011) In 
this sense, France was the second largest costumer of the Libyan oil, after Italy (28%).72 
Mustafa Abdul Jalil’s claim that the new Libyan government would give the priority to the 
countries that helped Libya the most in its reconstruction process (in the process of the 
removal of Gaddafi from power)” would reinforce Turkey’s opinions about France’s 
motivations about Libya. (S. Koray 2011) This was worrying for Turkey, as it had a great 
stake in Libya’s construction sector. If Turkey provided full support to Gaddafi, and if the 
opposition won instead, the future of the Turkish economic activities in Libya would be 
under a great risk. (Dursunoglu 2011) 
When the Libyan crisis became internationalized, Turkey was still insisting on that 
the protests in Libya were not very big and was portraying a pro-Gaddafi image. In 
February 22, 2011, Turkish officials indicated that they were negotiating compensation 
from Gaddafi for their losses during the protests. (Dursunoglu 2011) In February 28, 2011, 
Turkey strongly opposed the NATO intervention in Libya. In March 3, 2011, Ahmet 
Davutoglu reiterated that “No group in Libya wants an external intervention. External 
                                                            
72 Also, see Julian Borger and Terry Macalister, The Race is on for Libya's oil, with Britain and France 
both Staking a Claim, theguardian, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/01/libya-oil 
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intervention would make the situation worse.” Davutoglu added that they shared their 
opinions that “We don’t want Libya to become the second Iraq,” with Clinton and Obama. 
(Dursunoglu 2011) 
However, beginning from March 14, 2011, Turkey would progressively adopt a 
mediator role to resolve the conflict without a military intervention. (S. Koray 2011) As a 
result, Turkey started to call on Gaddafi to introduce reforms to address the rightful 
demands of the protestors. Moreover, non-invitation of Turkey to the Paris Conference 
made Turkey fear that it was being treated as an outsider by France. (Dursunoglu 2011) On 
the other hand, in April 6, 2011, due to Turkey’s claim for mediation role, the protestors, 
supported by France, accused Turkey for supporting Gaddafi. (Dursunoglu 2011) Turkey 
started to realize that the balance of power changed in favor of the opposition in Libya, and 
Turkey was being excluded from the process if it did not take the right decisions. 
After France’s military attacks against Gaddafi on March 22, 2011, Turkey started 
to promote NATO’s involvement in the Libyan crisis on the basis of the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973. Turkey’s goal was to prevent France’s sole leadership in this 
process. Turkey as a NATO member would have more power in influencing the decision 
making. (Dursunoglu 2011) Turkey’s promotion of NATO succeeded. NATO decided to 
partake in Libyan crisis. On March 23, 2011, NATO started to monitor the arm embargo 
against Gaddafi, which was previously being carried out by France, UK, and the US. 
NATO took charge of the mission on March 31, 2011. The Turkish parliament would allow 
Turkey to participate in the military intervention in Libya on March 24, 2011, including 
the enforcement of no-fly-zone. However, the way Turkey acted was in direct contrast with 
what it had promoted until a few weeks before.  
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Turkey would continue its mediation role until April 9, 2011. Despite NATO’s 
involvement, Turkey would insist that the crisis in Libya should be resolved by Libyans 
alone. Similarly, Turkey declared that Turkey’s role as a NATO member state would be 
restricted to the provision of humanitarian assistance to the crisis-hit Libya and evacuation 
of civilians from Libya. Turkey would also take part in inspecting the arm embargo against 
Gaddafi. (McGreal, Sherwood and Milne 2011) Furthermore, Turkey promoted the 
inclusion of the Arab states within the NATO forces to enlarge the basis of the intervention 
against Gaddafi, which Turkey thought would bring more legitimacy to this intervention. 
(Dursunoglu 2011) The US supported this idea, and invited the Arab League states to 
partake in the limited air strike against Gaddafi. As a result, the goal was accomplished; no 
individual country would determine Libya’s future on its own, including France; and 
Turkey would not be one of the countries that attacked Libya.  
Meanwhile, on May 23, 2011, Turkish officials held a meeting with Mustafa Abdul 
Jalil in Turkey, and indicated that National Transitional Council was the legitimate 
representative of the Libyan people. ( The Tripoli Post 2011) This signified that Turkey 
stopped claiming a mediator role, and started to support the opposition. Furthermore, 
Turkey decided to provide the Libyan opposition with financial assistance which totaled to 
USD 300 million. (Watson 2011) The USD 100 million was provided to the Libyan 
opposition in the form of cash donation to buy food and pay salaries. The second portion, 
USD 100 million, would be delivered in the form of credit donation; and the third part of 
the assistance would be provided in the form of credit loans to the National Transitional 
Council. Turkey started to provide the Libyan opposition with financial assistance in July, 
2011. This had happened shortly before the opposition entered Tripoli. (Watson 2011)     
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Turkey was compelled to partake in military intervention later on; when the 
Gaddafi regime survived longer than it was expected, some countries started to indicate 
their discontent with the duration of the military intervention under the NATO leadership. 
(Dursunoglu 2011) For example, on May 23, 2011, Norway called back its planes, and 
Italy called upon the NATO to stop the operations. When the coalition started to break, the 
US strongly criticized the countries, including Turkey, for not providing military support. 
As a result, Turkey participated in the military intervention by providing the alliance with 
six F-16 Fighting Falcons. Before that, Turkey had provided the alliance with five ships 
and one submarine to enforce the naval blockade and arm embargo. Turkey’s Izmir Port 
and Incirlik military base were also available for the use of NATO during the intervention 
in Libya. The NATO ended its mission on October 31, 2011.     
After the intervention, Libya had to go through a reconstruction process. This was 
what Turkish construction companies had been waiting for. Turkey’s efforts in Libya paid 
off. Hitherto, Turkish firms have held 544 projects in Libya with a total value of USD 27,7 
billion. (Turkey Ministry of Trade 2014) Turkish investment in Libya has exceeded 37 
billion dollars already. Currently, Libya is the third biggest market for the investment of 
the Turkish firms. While before the Arab Spring the trade volume between Turkey and 
Libya was around USD 2,5 billion, only one year later at the end of 2012, the trade volume 
between the two countries had reached USD 3.5 billion. (Koray 2013) 
To sum up, the growing economy of Turkey provided Turkey with the ability to 
follow a more assertive foreign policy by expanding its investment and diplomatic mission, 
particularly in its region. Turkish industrial growth compelled the AKP government to find 
markets for the Turkish companies, and maintain stability in these markets. This also 
129 
required creating a clear framework for the economic interactions. (Official data is 
provided in the 5th chapter)  However, in the Arab Spring, Turkey’s economic interests 
were severely being threatened in countries, like Libya. Hence, Turkey’s partaking in the 
military intervention stemmed from its intention to protect its economic interests.   
Under the AKP rule, Turkey developed substantial relations with Islamic groups in 
the ME. When the Arab Spring arrived, these groups gained more power and were being 
elected in a number of countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Therefore, Turkey 
would try very hard to help the elected government to succeed. Turkey perceived the 
elected government as strategic allies. In the following section, I will explain how Turkey 
tried to protect its alliances in the process of the Arab Spring. 
Strategic Alliances with Like-Minded Governments 
Turkish motivation for promoting democracy has become more strategic during the 
Arab Spring. By the time the Arab Spring took place’ Turkey had developed substantial 
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Iran, and Syria in the ME. Turkey’s warm 
relations with these groups attracted considerable criticisms from the West as the West had 
already backtracked from promoting democracy in the ME in 2006.  
However, this did not stop the empowerment of the Islamic groups in the ME. 
Parties associated with the Brotherhood emerged as the most powerful political actors in 
Arab Spring countries in 2011-2012 national elections. For example, Egyptian Freedom 
and Justice Party obtained 47.2% of the votes, Tunisian Al-Nahda (Renaissance) 
movement obtained 51.1% of the votes, and the Libyan Justice and Development Party 
gained 17 sits (the second biggest party), in national elections. The election of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, with which Turkey developed strong ties before the Arab Spring, empowered 
the Turkish role in the region substantially. The victory of the Islamic groups since 2005 
pushed Israel into historical isolation.  
After the AKP came to power, it heavily invested in developing strong relations 
with states in the region due to a combination of strategic and ideological factors. For 
example, Turkey signed a Free Trade Area agreement with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Jordon in 2007. Although, a Turkish-Egyptian Strategic Dialogue Framework 
Memorandum was signed in Istanbul, on November 3, 2007, the relations were not elevated 
to desired levels until the Arab Spring. After the democratic elections in Egypt in 2011, 
which resulted in the victory of the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party, Turkey and Egypt 
signed the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HSCC). As it is discussed in the 
previous sections, Turkey had similar agreements with the other neighboring countries, 
which paved the way for “Shamgen Free Trade Zone” that allowed the free flow of people 
and goods between Jordon, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. (Turkey Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2014)  
However, it is important to realize that Turkey’s previous efforts to improve ties 
with regional actors substantially contributed to its role in the region after the Arab Spring. 
Winners of the Arab Spring, the Islamic groups, have had a favorable approach towards 
the Turkish role in the region. The AKP strengthened its relations with the Islamic groups 
in a number of ways, such as mutual visits, the training of the members of Islamic parties 
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in Turkey, holding mutual conferences, supporting Palestinians against the Israelis, and 
providing financial assistance.73  
This continued after the Arab Spring, when Turkish top officials who visited 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya indicated their wills for strong cooperation and offered financial 
assistance to the newly elected governments. In this regard, Turkish state provided the 
Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party with 1 billion USD aid in the form of concessional 
loan, half of it to be paid in 2012 and the other half 2013. (Development 2012) The support 
that the AKP provided to the Islamists by Turkey was translated as playing into the 
sectarian dynamics of the region by the seculars in the region. (Alessandri and Altunisik 
2013) Nonetheless, provision of this aid was a clear indication of the AKP’s inclinations 
towards the conservative forces in the Arab ME, who were its ideological partners.  
The Turkish AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood, which obtained power in Egypt 
and Tunisia, had a common approach in a number of areas. For example, the relations 
between Israel and Turkey were bitter due to the Mavi Marmara tragedy. The Muslim 
Brotherhood was a strong critic of Israel in its treatment of the Palestinians. Like Turkey, 
the Muslim Brotherhood also backed the Syrian opposition against Assad.  Furthermore, 
the Muslim Brotherhood criticized pro-Assad Iran for its detrimental role in Syrian crisis. 
(Al-Monitor 2013) Morsi, who was also an influential member of Egypt’s the Muslim 
Brotherhood, revealed: “We should all express our full support of the struggle of those who 
are demanding freedom and justice in Syria and translate our sympathies into a clear 
political vision that supports peaceful transfer of power to a democratic system. (Tisdall 
                                                            
73 Turkey provided the Morsi government with USD 1 billion after he was elected to the presidential office.  
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2012) Moreover, similar to Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood has been at logger heads with 
Iran over its Syrian policy. Also, both the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood oppose the 
intervention of foreign powers in the region; both Turkey and the Brotherhood aim to form 
a peaceful political atmosphere and a fertile ground for the cooperation between the 
Muslim nations.    
However, removal of Morsi from power by a military coup d’état, the prolonging 
civil war in Syria, which could have had spill-over effect on Turkey, and the unstable 
political environment in Tunisia, caused by the killing of the Mohamed Brahmi, the leader 
of the nationalist opposition, all damaged Turkey’s new alliances in the ME. In order to 
prevent this deteriorating situation in the ME, Turkey has been providing full support to 
the opposition in Syria, providing technical, financial, and diplomatic assistance to Tunisia, 
and has recently downgraded its diplomatic relations with Egypt under the interim 
government, after the military coup. (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014)      
 The likelihood of a successful democratic transition required a supportive 
international and domestic environment. The international environment was not quite 
supportive toward the newly elected Islamic parties. For example, the US had traditionally 
provided Egypt under the Mubarak rule with substantial financial support. However, the 
US withdrew this aid from Egypt when r the Freedom and Justice Party was in power. The 
provision of 1.5 billion USD aid to Egypt one month before the military coup d’état has 
been perceived as financing the military coup in Egypt (Stanly, The Telegraph 2013) by 
Turkey. The unfavorable approach of the US and the EU towards the elected Islamic 
governments in the region has deeply disappointed Turkey.  
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In this regard, despite Turkey’s history as a staunch Western ally, its policies 
towards the post-Arab Spring ME have not been quite in line with the Western interests. 
Therefore, Turkey found itself at loggerheads with the West regarding their attitudes 
toward the democratically elected Islamic groups. The divergences between Turkey and 
the West were so deep that they pushed Turkey into a strategic loneliness in the ME after 
the removal of Morsi from power. Turkey has been doing  whatever it has been able to do 
so as to  strengthen its international position, and supporting the oppositions in the Arab 
Spring countries has become a part of this.  
To conclude, it can be said that Turkey supported the American democracy 
promotion in the ME within the BMENA framework. The reason for Turkey’s support was 
its belief in the positive outcomes that democratization would produce, such as economic 
development, good governance, respect for human rights, enforcement of the rule of law, 
and regional integration. If democratization of the region was to produce these outcomes, 
both Turkey and the other states in the ME would benefit from it. Supporting BMENA 
would also repair the damaged Turkish-US ties after the disapproval of March-1 Bill in 
Turkey. However, Turkey had some reservations. Democratization, according to Turkey, 
had to happen incrementally, consistently, in an internally driven fashion, and without 
external intervention. In this regard, Turkish and the EU stances were very similar.  
When the Arab Spring took place, both Turkey and the West had to take a side. 
Turkey considered the Arab Spring to be a positive development; thus, its interpretation 
was that events had started to flow in the right direction. Turkey considered people’s 
demand for human rights, good governance, rule of law, and economic development as a 
part of global movement for democratization. For Turkey, these were the rightful demands 
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of people. In this regard, these demands would not be and should not be reversed, as the 
region profoundly needed such a transformation.  
As Olsen suggested, when interests are at stake, the primary concern of states 
becomes their interests rather than their values.74 When the conflict escalated, Iraq, Libya, 
and Syria, and Turkey became preoccupied with their security and economic interests. In 
Libya and Syria, Turkish democracy promotion became militarized. While Turkey was 
compelled to partake in military intervention against Gaddafi by the US, Turkey has been 
providing military assistance to the Free Syrian Army in Reyhanli refugee camp. Turkey 
could not use its military power in Iraq under the US control. As a result, Turkey utilized 
soft power tools to promote democracy in Iraq, which Turkey considered to be the only 
way to keep Iraq’s unity - as one piece, which was crucial for Turkey’s own territorial 
integrity.   
By the time Arab Spring took place, Turkey had established substantial economic 
ties in the Arab ME. Turkish investment dramatically increased in the region. Also, 
Turkey’s trade with Arab countries reached considerable levels. In this regard, Turkish 
business sectors needed stability in the region more than anything else. Moreover, a clear 
and understandable rule of law would contribute to the fertile trading environment in the 
region. To begin with, Turkey tried to create a predictable trading environment by sharing 
experience and practical training with its partners in the ME. Turkey also decided to 
support the protestors to create a long term stable environment in the region, as in the 
Turkish point of view, opposing people who demanded change was fruitless.  
                                                            
74 Graye R. Olsen, Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post-Cold War Africa: How Serious is 
Europe and for What Reason?, African Affairs, 97/388: 366, 1998. 
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Another crucial dimension of Turkish democracy promotion was related to the 
alliances Turkey had built before and in the course of the Arab Spring. The election of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt and Tunisia, and the Hamas rule in Palestine 
strengthened the Turkish role in the region. In Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood, gaining 17 
seats, ran second in the national election. Turkey supported the opposition in Syria so that 
a Turkish-friendly government would come to power there, serving its long term strategic 
interests. In the states bordering Mediterranean Sea, a strong Islamist network emerged. 
When the military coup d’état took place in Egypt, Turkey strongly condemned it and 
downgraded its diplomatic relations with Egypt as Turkey lost its closest Arab ally, Morsi. 
In this regard, Turkey’s support for democratization—from supporting the opposition 
groups to opposing the military coup d’état, and from there to providing support for Tahrir 
Square—has been a matter of defending its strategic alliances. Turkey also considered such 
an alliance to be beneficial for the region as a whole. 
Most importantly, when Turkey’s strategic interests were being threatened, Turkey 
tried very hard to reconcile its interests with its ideals. However, when Turkey realizes the 
impossibility of such reconciliation, Turkey gives priority to protecting its strategic 
interests.  
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CHAPTER V: STRATEGIES (1): TURKEY’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
THROUGH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
Since the AKP came to power, Turkey has engaged with the ME more assertively. 
One of the ways of engagement has been through the promotion of democracy. Turkish 
official democracy promotion in the ME started in 2004 through the BMENA (Broader 
Middle East and North African) initiative. This project was initially launched by the US to 
promote democracy and open market in the ME. Turkey under the AKP strongly supported 
the idea of democratization of the ME due to a number of significant identity-based and 
strategic considerations, explained in the previous chapters comprehensively. 
In this chapter, my goal is to explain the strategies and projects through which 
Turkey promotes democracy in the BMENA region. My findings indicate that Turkey has 
promoted democracy through a number of channels, such as enlargement, experience 
sharing, providing a good role model, military intervention, normative pressure, and 
“Official Development Assistance” (ODA). In this chapter, I will focus on ODA alone. 
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The reason is that by examining ODA in a time series manner, I will be able to indicate the 
map of Turkey’s foreign aid, how much Turkey invests in a country, why Turkey invests 
in some countries more than the others, and how Turkey channels its ODA into the target 
states. The other aforementioned strategies of democracy promotion will be explained in 
the following chapter.   
Since the beginning of the Arab Spring Turkey’s support to the democratization in 
the ME has gained a more strategic orientation. In the last three years, Turkish financial 
assistance (as a part of its ODA) to the region has skyrocketed. Furthermore, this chapter 
also confirms that Turkey’s humanitarian considerations have been overridden by its 
strategic interests when the strategic interests were being threatened. The financial 
assistance to the like-minded Islamic parties in Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine in this regard 
are the practices to form strategic alliances in the ME. Turkey’s engagement with Syria 
and Iraq through supporting democratization is a result of its desire to ensure its survival. 
Turkey’s engagement with Libya is a result of Turkey’s economic interests. In Iraq, Syria, 
and Libya, Turkey does want to form strategic alliances, but this motivation is secondary 
to Turkey’s security and economic interests in these countries. Moreover, Turkey’s 
strategic calculations are being articulated within Turkey’s cultural context by the AKP, 
which claims a regional power role for Turkey and which has deep roots in political Islam.      
In this chapter, I consider ODA as a part of Turkey’s democracy promotion 
strategies. There are substantial reasons for this. Turkey does not have well-designed 
democracy promoter institutions, such as USAID and NED. Turkey categorizes all of its 
official aid, such as humanitarian, technical, and democracy assistance, under its ODA. 
TIKA (Turkish Development and Cooperation Agency) performs its development and 
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democratization activities in coordination with the Turkish Republic’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Therefore, I will try to contextualize Turkish ODA to the BMENA region within 
the framework of democracy promotion. While doing this, I will provide examples from 
the other parts of the world to better comprehend Turkish democracy assistance initiatives.  
Turkey has a long history of ODA provision. Turkey is a founding member of 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), and has been 
proposed by the OECD to become a member of DAC (Development Assistance 
Committee)75 in 2012. The OECD was founded to discuss matters related to sustainable 
economic development in the member countries. The DAC coordinates relations with and 
economic assistance for developing world. The members of the DAC are well-known with 
the high amount of humanitarian aid they deliver to the developing world. Not yet a 
member of DAC, Turkey has been reporting its assistance to the DAC since 1990. The 
financial aid delivered to the developing world by the OECD through the contributions of 
the member states is called “Official Development Assistance” (ODA). “Official 
Humanitarian Assistance” (OHA) is a component of ODA. (Global Humanitarian 
Assistance 2014) The largest recipients of Turkey’s ODA were, in order of magnitude, 
Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Palestine, Kazakhstan 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2012. (TIKA 2012) 
In the following section, I will try to explain the Turkish ODA in more detail. I will 
start with the official institutions through which Turkey channels its ODA, and then I will 
explain the development and geographic distribution (region-base and country-base) of the 
                                                            
75 DAC is a prestigious club of the developed nations that provide official humanitarian aid to the countries 
in need. In this regard, the practice of giving and receiving subordinates the needy nations to the donors.  
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Turkish ODA under the AKP administration. Afterwards, I will examine the status of 
Official Humanitarian Assistance (OHA) within Turkey’s ODA.    
Official Institutions and the Provision of ODA 
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees Turkey’s institutions that deal with 
development, humanitarian assistance and Turkey’s policy priorities. TIKA, Turkey’s 
International Cooperation and Development Agency76, is the primary institution 
responsible for channeling ODA to the target states through a number of mechanisms. 
These mechanisms include the governmental institutions, national or international CSOs, 
public and private partnership, and multilateral international organizations.77 Turkey’s 
“Disaster and Emergency Management Office (AFAD) and Turkish Red Crescent 
(Kizilay) are the two sub-governmental institutions that help TIKA to deliver Turkey’s 
ODA to the target states. Targets are determined by TIKA in coordination with Turkish 
Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of Turkey’s foreign policy priorities. 
However, TIKA is responsible to the Turkish Prime Ministry.78 TIKA has 33 coordination 
offices in 30 countries globally. However, TIKA’s helping hand has extended to over 100 
countries in different regions of the world. (TIKA 2014)  
                                                            
76 TIKA official webpage defines TIKAs role like this: TIKA (Turkish Development and Cooperation 
Agency) “carries out the task of being a cooperating mechanism for the state institutions and organizations, 
universities, non-profit organizations and the private sector. In addition it functions as a platform for these 
actors to come together and it records the development aid carried out by Turkey.”   
77 TIKA Development Report 2012.  
78 For further information, see TIKA webpage, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/about-us/1; Turkey Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs webpage, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa; Global 
Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2013. 
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As TIKA is the umbrella organization that coordinates the ODA among the Turkish 
governmental and non-governmental institutions, TIKA needs a detailed examination. 
TIKA was established in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was initially 
designed to coordinate the Turkish development aid to the newly independent Central 
Asian Republics.79 To begin with, TIKA focused on helping build a sufficient state 
structure in Central Asia. Later, TIKA started to get involved in cultural, social, and 
economic cooperation with newly independent Central Asian countries. By 2000, TIKA 
had gained substantial experience in the field of development assistance. Parallel to 
globalization, TIKA expanded its reach to the global level as well. TIKA started to operate 
in regions as diverse as the ME, Balkans, Southeast Asia, Americas, and Africa. However, 
Turkey is interested particularly in culturally identical areas or regions where Turkey has 
substantial strategic interests when delivering its ODA.   
As Turkey expanded its reach worldwide, it also increased the amount of its 
development assistance considerably to respond to its global level development agenda.  
Turkey’s development aid consisted of about USD 85 million in 2002. This amount went 
up to USD 1 billion 273 million in 2011. Currently, Turkish ODA goes well beyond USD 
4 billion. (TIKA 2012) “TIKA is ranked amongst the Turkish organizations that carry out 
most technical co-operations.”80 TIKA is involved in the areas of education, economy, 
                                                            
79 Central Asian Turkik Republics are Azerbaijan, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. 
80 TIKA webpage, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/about-us/1; TIKA experts define technical assistance like this: 
“Technical cooperation refers to strengthening the capacities and effectiveness of individuals, organizations 
and institutions through transfer of ideas, technologies, knowledge and skills to foster development in 
partner countries.” TIKA Development Report 2012, p. 18. 
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social and physical infrastructures, security, capacity building, culture, construction, 
health, (TIKA 2014) and politics.  
A number of Turkish official institutions are involved in the ODA. The top 
governmental institutions that contribute to the Turkey’s ODA are Office for Coordinating 
the Syrian Guest Affairs, Turkish Armed Force, Turkish National Police, Manas 
University, Under Secreteriat of Treasury, Higher Education Loans and Dormitories 
Agency, TOKI (Turkey’s Official Construction Development Agency), Ahmet Yesevi 
University, Ministry of Health, TRT (Turkey’s official TV channel), Presidency of Turks 
Living Abroad, Turkish Red Crescent, and AFAD (Turkey’s Emergency Management 
Office). (TIKA 2012)   
In the following section I will explain the Turkish ODA in more detail.  
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Detail  
Turkey accepts the OECD definition of ODA (Official Development Assistance). 
According to OECD, ODA is “a loan or grant from an official source to a developing 
country or a multilateral agency for the promotion of economic development and welfare. 
It is reported by the members of the DAC along with several other government donors and 
institutions according to strict criteria each year. It includes sustainable and poverty 
reducing development assistance for sectors such as governance and security, growth, 
social services, education, health, and water and sanitation.” (Global Humanitarian 
Assistance 2014) Development assistance is considered ODA if three conditions are met: 
The first one is that public sector should be providing it. The second is that the goal should 
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be fostering economic development and welfare; and, finally, it should contain at least 25% 
of grant element, and this is concessional. (TIKA 2012)  
Turkey, since 1950s, has been providing ODA to the developing and 
underdeveloped nations in different parts of the world. However, Turkey’s development 
aid has gone through substantial transformations since then. Two crucial factors played a 
role in these transformations: Turkey’s new economic dynamics and Turkey’s increasing 
sense of regional responsibility towards its neighbors. Previously, Turkey tried to influence 
the Central Asian Turkik Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Russia. The 
establishment of TIKA was a natural result of this intention. In the 2000s, Turkey under 
the AKP rule turned its face to the BMENA region. In this process, the amount of ODA 
provided for the surrounding countries has substantially increased. This also indicated the 
two foreign policy priorities of Turkey: Central Asia between 1990 and 2002 and BMENA 
between 2002 and 2014. (Turkey Foreign Affairs Ministry 2014) As a result of Turkey’s 
extended activities in these areas, Turkey emerged as a forceful actor in the international 
development and cooperation field. (Turkey Foreign Affairs Ministry 2014) 
Turkey launched its ODA policy on June 5, 1985 by delivering aid to a number of 
impoverished African countries, such as Gambia, Somalia, and Sudan. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union provided the right context for Turkey to provide assistance for the Central 
Asian Turkik Republics. In the minds of the Turkish administration, Turkey shared a 
common ethnic origin and language with the Turkik Republics.81 Within the context of this 
                                                            
81 I intentionally use “in the Turkish Administration Psyche,” as I do not believe the ethnic origins of the 
Turkish nation and people in Central Asia are the same. It is true that there has been substantial 
immigration from Central Asia to Turkey. However, Turkey is also the land of various groups, such as 
Kurds, Arabs, Greeks, Lazs, Cerkezs, etc. Therefore, Turkish state probably utilized the common identity to 
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new foreign policy formulation, Turkey designed TIKA to help the politically and 
economically troubled Central Asian republics. TIKA would help these post-Soviet states 
to build a working state infrastructure. In 2002, after obtaining power, this time Turkey, 
under the AKP rule, turned its attention towards the ME.  The identity-based and strategic 
factors, explained in the previous chapters, were the main driving reasons. The AKP’s 
willing participation in BMENA82 initiative provided evidence for the AKP’s intentions to 
contribute to the democratization in BMENA countries. Turkey’s new policy orientation 
towards BMENA considerably increased the amount of Turkish aid to the region.   
However, what makes Turkey an interesting case is that Turkey has been a recipient 
and simultaneously, a donor of ODA for a long time. For example, “in 2011 gross ODA to 
Turkey increased to US$3.7 billion making it the sixth largest recipient globally. Prior to 
2009, Turkey had not even been amongst the world’s top 20 recipients of aid since 1991, 
which was the year when aid was given to help to recover the country from the Van 
Earthquake.” (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014) Also, for years Turkey has been a 
hot spot for democracy promoters. American and European democracy assistance groups 
have been very active in Turkey. (Karakas 2010) Interestingly, Turkey under the AKP rule 
has emerged as a respectable actor in the area of ODA. At present, Turkey has an active 
                                                            
advance its economic interests in the region. In fact, in TIKA’s official webpage, it is claimed that Turkish 
Development Aid is provided to the regions where Turkey has substantial economic interests.   
82 BMENA is the abbreviation of Broader Middle East and North African Initiative. It includes the whole 
Arabic speaking countries in the ME and North Africa. Although it was proposed to Include Turkey, Iran, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan, due to substantial criticisms from the EU, Pakistan and Afghanistan were 
removed from the list. See Chapter III for further information.   
144 
role in promoting development and democracy in different parts of the world, particularly 
in BMENA. (Bagci and Sinkaya 2006) 
I consider ODA as a part of democracy promotion if it is done by democratic states. 
States might provide assistance to target states as a way to transform their regimes. 
However, ODA might have an indirect impact over the democratic transformation of the 
target states as well. For example, the US supported the Latin American states with ODA 
to help build their capacity, for a long period of time. (Carothers, Elusive Synthesis 2010) 
During this interaction, the US naturally transferred its democratic mechanisms and 
process to these countries, providing a good example for ODA’s indirect impact on limited 
democratization. States have clear interests in helping other states organize themselves in 
similar lines. (Smith 2010) Furthermore, both the EU and the US stipulated democratic 
reform to the countries that demanded financial assistance from them. (Borzel and Risse 
2009) In this regard, ODA could be a part of democracy promotion policy.                                                
However, conditioning the provision of ODA to stimulate political, economic, and 
social change within the target state undermines its sovereignty. Sovereignty emerged a 
significant norm in the post-Westphalian international order after 1648. (McFaul 2004-
2005) Although powerful states often disrupted this norm by conquering other states, it 
nevertheless remained as an important norm between them until the First World War.  At 
the beginning of the 20th century, when the big empires were being destroyed, this norm 
lost some of its value. Nevertheless, after the Second World War, in the process of 
decolonization, this norm gained global attention again. In the last several decades, an 
interesting development took place: some other significant norms have become accepted 
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by the international society. (McFaul 2004-2005)  These are the norms of human rights, 
democracy, and open market economy.  
McFaul (2004-2005) argues that “norms protecting the sovereignty of states still 
trump norms protecting the rights of individuals, but the balance is shifting. Currently, 
global organizations, such as the UN and World Bank, the CSOs, and a significant number 
of democratic states, mainly in the West, promote human rights and democracy. (McFaul 
2004-2005) Increasingly states abusing human rights at home need to give an account for 
its violations to the international society of their conducts. However, states might take 
advantage of the human rights abuses in another country to intervene in that state’s 
domestic affairs for their strategic concerns. In other words, they disguise their strategic 
concerns and try to make their intervention appear as if they were acting for the benefit of 
that state. 
ODA has been created to help develop target states’ administrative, economic, 
security, social, educational, and health sectors. It also helps with water and sanitation, 
crucial for survival of individuals. (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014) However, I find 
it important to add one more variable to this list, which is the “political sector.” The Turkish 
case indicates that states are involved in a modest exercise of power competition when 
promoting democracy. The donor states determine the targets on the basis of a calculation 
of their strategic interests83 articulated within their respective cultural environments. 
Nurdun, a top TIKA official, reiterates that the delivery of the Turkish ODA is determined 
                                                            
83 I make this assertion on the basis of the Turkish case. For example, see Kulaklikaya and Nurdun, Turkey 
as a new player in development cooperation, 2010. Turkey has been engaging with Iraq and Syria to ensure 
its national security and maintain economic interests. In this regard, for example, the largest amount of 
ODA in 2012 was being delivered to Syria, where conflict has escalated due to the Arab Spring.  
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on the basis of Turkey’s strategic calculations. (Kulaklikaya and Nurdun, Turkey as a New 
Player in Development Cooperation 2010) It is not a coincidence that Turkey delivers the 
largest portion of its ODA to Central Asian republics, Turkey’s eastern neighbors, and the 
Middle Eastern states, which are Turkey’s southern neighbors. All these states possess 
substantial natural resources, making them important for the strategic interests of the 
Turkish state. Similarly, it is not a coincidence that the US started to promote democracy 
in Latin America, the southern neighborhood, where it fought against the expansion of 
Soviet Russia (Carothers, Elusive Synthesis 2010) and worked to open the Latin American 
markets to its products.84 
While the Western world has progressively separated democracy assistance from 
development aid since 1980s, (Carothers, Elusive Synthesis 2010) Turkey still considers 
assisting a target state to transit to democracy as a part of its ODA strategy. Turkey 
categorizes all the official aid targeting the outside world under the category of ODA. 
Turkey classifies the sum of its official and unofficial aid under the category of TDA (Total 
Development Aid). (TIKA 2012) For example, Turkey considers its humanitarian 
assistance which has amounted to USD 2.5 billion to Syrian guests85 within Turkey 
between 2012 and 2014 ( Hurriyet 2014) and its financial assistance which has amounted 
to USD 1 billion to the Islamist government in Egypt as a part of its 2012 ODA. (TIKA 
2012) In both cases, Turkey’s intention has been to help the opposition forces to achieve 
the democratic transformation in the BMENA region. This transformation is considered to 
                                                            
84 Also, see William Robinson Cox. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, the US Intervention, and 
Hegemony. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
85 Turkey officially refers to Syrian Refugees as “Syrian Guests.” 
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strengthen the Turkish economic and security interests as Turkey is seen as a role model 
by the oppositional forces in BMENA. (Akgun and Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey 
in the ME in 2013 2014)  
The original rationale behind promoting democracy through development aid was 
the modernization theory of Lipset.86 Lipset treated urbanization, economic development, 
and improving literacy rates as the indicators of modernization. In Lipset’s mindset, 
democratization was the natural result of modernization. In the modernization process, 
industrialization would foster economic development, resulting in the expansion of the 
middle class. The growing middle class, recognized for their habits of consumerism, would 
demand freedoms to live the life style they prefer. This required minimum government 
intervention in civic life. Therefore, in Lipset’s viewpoint, the growing demands of the 
middle class would finally foster democratization. This happened in the West, and there 
was no reason why it would not happen elsewhere.  
Yet theory of modernization was challenged by major scholars, such as Huntington. 
(Huntington 1968) According to Huntington, in a country where socioeconomic standards 
of people rapidly grow, the process could actually result in de-modernization, if the process 
is not rightly managed by the political apparatus. The government in such cases should 
respond to the growing demand of people for equality, justice, rights and freedoms. 
Huntington’s de-modernization thesis would create vivid debates among the American 
policy makers and scholars over the utility of democracy promotion for the US interests 
and over the strategies to promote democracy.  
                                                            
86 See Carothers, Elusive Synthesis, 2010; Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, 1973. 
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The process in which the theory of modernization was being challenged would 
result in the creation of specific programs, called democracy assistance. (Carothers, Aiding 
Democracy Abroad: Learning Curve 1999) These programs were designed with a clear 
focus on elections, political parties, civil society, business associations or trade unions, rule 
of law, media, and the parliament in the target states. (Carothers, Assessing Democracy 
Assistance: the Case of Romania 1996) They would be carried out by state organizations, 
such as the USAID and CSOs in coordination with the USAID. (Carothers, Aiding 
Democracy Abroad: Learning Curve 1999)  
There were also strategic calculations behind the utilization of the ODA by the US 
government. The ODA was used as a tool to prevent or to reverse the spread of communism 
in Latin American and Eastern European countries. (Carothers, Assessing Democracy 
Assistance: the Case of Romania 1996) From the American point of view, the needy people 
were the most vulnerable among the others, and communism could respond to their demand 
for social justice. (Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: Learning Curve 1999) In this 
regard, the US had to help the needy states to strengthen their capacities to serve their 
people in a more efficient and effective manner. Furthermore, if democratization was 
achieved in target states, the US would gain victory against the Soviet influence. 
Democratization in this sense meant the victory of pro-US parties in target states, and 
surely, they would make better partners in trade and international politics for the US. 87 
(Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: Learning Curve 1999)   
                                                            
87  Also, see McFaul, Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences in the Orange Revolution, 2007. 
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Most importantly, states have clear interest in helping other states organize 
themselves in similar ways. (Smith 2010) This facilitates the economic, social, educational, 
bureaucratic, and political interaction between them. However, the most sizeable share in 
this interaction goes to the state that transfers its norms and institutions to the target states. 
For example, after the Latin American countries institutionalized the neo-liberal economic 
policies, their economies were dominated by the American goods. Similarly, after Iraq and 
Syria liberalized their market rules, their markets were dominated by the Turkish goods. In 
this regard, the biggest beneficiaries in these cases are the countries with greater 
economies.   
Similar to the US, Turkey has supported democracy in the ME for a number of 
strategic interests as well. Turkey’s shared identity with ME states facilitated Turkey’s 
interaction with the region. At times, Turkey had to act on the basis of the shared identity 
as well. This happened particularly when the human rights were being profoundly abused, 
such as in Palestine and recently in Syria.  
The Turkish case indicates that Turkey has been involved in a modest provision of 
development aid to developing states in Balkans, Africa and Asia, since 1980s. Within the 
context of technical assistance, Turkey transferred its democratic experiences to a number 
of countries, such as Syria, Tunisia, Palestine, and Iraq. Turkey has built physical 
infrastructure necessary for a functioning democracy, such as building a parliament in 
Somalia. Consequently, I think ODA plays an important role in democratic transformation 
of the target states. Needless to say, a functioning bureaucratic apparatus that ensures the 
minimum enforcement of rule of law and that provides a certain degree of societal services 
is a precondition for democracy. Linz and Stepan, further stipulate the existence of an 
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economic, political, and civil society, an efficient bureaucracy, and a functioning rule of 
law as the preconditions of democracy. (Linz and Stepan 1996) 
Table 6 indicates Turkey’s Total (official and governmental) Development 
Assistance (TDA) and “Official Development Assistance” (ODA) to the developing world 
between 2003 and 2012. The statistics display a steady increase in the amount of TDA 
Turkey provided to the developing world. Although between 2003 and 2011, Turkish TDA 
increased in a parallel fashion (almost equal), in 2012 Turkish Official Aid suddenly 
increased, doubling the private aid flowing from Turkey into the developing world. While 
Turkish private aid remained at USD 903.18 million, Turkey’s ODA went up to USD 
2533.3 million. By 2011, the Turkish OHA has reached to 1.0 billion USD, making up 40% 
of Turkey’s ODA. (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2013)  
Table 6. Turkey's Development and Humanitarian Assistance 
 
*TOTALOFFPRI: Total Official and Private Aid 
*OFFDEVASSIST: Official Development Assistance 
This has ranked Turkey as the fourth largest donor globally; the US being the first, 
the EU institutions being the second, the UK being the third, and Turkey being the fourth 
largest donor. Turkish Private Assistance includes the “Other Official Flows” (OOF)88 and 
                                                            
88 This includes assistance, such as debt relief.  
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“Direct Investment” by private sector (DI) to the target countries. The Turkish OOF 
amounted to 56.53 million USD in the form of loan facilities in 2012. Turkey included DI 
within its ODA since it stimulated economic development in the target states. Turkish DI 
in target countries in 2012 amounted to 735 million USD. (TIKA 2012) Another source of 
TDA was the Turkish CSOs’ own resources. Turkish CSOs’ development assistance in 
2012 amounted to 111.65 million USD.   
Table 7. TDA Components for 2012  
 
*Source: TIKA Development Report 2012. 
Turkish ODA and Democratization in the BMENA Region 
In 2012, “46.6% of Turkish assistance was delivered to the Middle East, 31% to 
Africa, 18% to South and Central Asia, and 3% to Balkans and East Europe.” (TIKA 2012) 
Table 8 indicates the region-base Turkish Official Development Assistance. Turkey 
delivered development aid to a diverse set of nations in the world, including all existing 
continents. The table examines the period between 2003 and 2012. As data on Turkish 
ODA for 2013 and 2014 is not available yet, I could not include it in this table. On the 
other hand, the largest amount of aid (USD 1,694.21 million) is being provided to the 
BMENA countries, which consist of North Sahara and the ME countries, in 2012. BMENA 
is followed by the Central and South Asia in terms of amount of provision of the Turkish 
ODA (USD 436.08 Million).    
 Aid TDA DI NGOA OOF
Amount 
Million
USD 
 
3436.48 735 111.65 56.53 
152 
Although provision of the Turkish ODA to the Central and South Asian countries 
is not specified in the Table 9, the OECD statistics indicate that Afghanistan was the largest 
recipient of the Turkey’s ODA among the Central and South Asian countries. Turkey has 
built health clinics, schools, mosques, and roads, and has been training Afghani civil and 
military bureaucrats as well as providing technical aid to build a working state 
infrastructure in Afghanistan. (TIKA 2012) Afghanistan is not an official BMENA country, 
yet Turkey has had substantial assistance there. 
Table 8. Total Amount of Turkish ODA by Regions, 2003-2012, in Million USD 
 
Turkish ODA to BMENA increased from USD 2.45 million to USD 1,694.21 
million between 2003 and 2012. (See Table 8) Turkey’s ODA to BMENA had been going 
upward gradually until 2011. In 2012, one year after the beginning of the Arab Spring, 
Turkish ODA leaped to astronomic levels in BMENA. While Turkish ODA to BMENA 
was USD 351.12 million in 2011, it had gone up to USD 1,694.21 million by 2012. On the 
other hand, Turkish ODA to the Central and South Asia had been steadily increasing. Even 
the 2008 global financial crisis did not diminish the Turkish ODA to these two regions. 
Although data about 2013 and 2014 is not included in these tables, it is safe to assert that 
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the Turkish ODA has increased to a much larger amount in 2014. This is a result of 
Turkey’s substantial aid to war-torn Syria, and the other Arab states that have been 
experiencing a regime transition, such as Tunisia and Libya. For example, AFAD indicated 
that since 2012, Turkey has spent USD 2.5 billion on Syrians alone. (AFAD 2014)  
TIKA determines the target of development aid through the guidance of the Turkish 
Foreign Affairs Ministry on the basis of the Turkish foreign policy priorities. (Kulaklikaya 
and Nurdun, Turkey as a New Player in Development Cooperation 2010) As it could be 
seen in Table 8, the amount of ODA Turkey spends on different regions indicates Turkey’s 
foreign policy priorities. Until 2011, Turkey has prioritized Central and South Asia, 
delivering the highest amount of aid. Although, in this process (2003-2011) Turkish ODA 
to the BMENA countries has increased substantially, it has not exceeded the ODA to the 
Central and South Asia. However, after the Arab Spring, Turkish ODA to the BMENA 
region increased astronomically. This means that Turkish foreign policy priorities have 
shifted from Central and South Asia to the BMENA in the course of Arab Spring. Turkey 
established strong relations with the Islamic actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Hamas, in BMENA before the Arab Spring. Turkey increased the amount of ODA to the 
transitioning BMENA countries to help sustain the newly elected friendly Islamist 
governments and to finalize the struggle in Syria.  
The Country-Based distribution of the ODA in the BMENA 
Turkish ODA to the BMENA has followed an increasing trend since 2003 under 
the AKP rule. However, there is a positive relationship between the regional developments 
and Turkish ODA. It is clear that Turkey uses ODA as an instrument to engage in the 
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troubled countries where it has substantial strategic interests. For example, following the 
2003 American intervention in Iraq, Turkish aid jumped from USD 1,25 million in 2003 
to USD 24,57 million in 2004. It continued to increase until 2009 (USD 51,33 million). 
However, it is seen that the financial crisis of 2008 affected the Turkish ODA to Iraq as 
well, causing a decline to USD 39.31 million in 2010. Due to the emergence of Arab 
Spring, Turkey started to reallocate its ODA to a different set of countries. 
Table 9. Turkey's ODA to the BMENA Countries for 2003-2012 in USD Million 
 
*Source: OECD Statextracts, http://stats.oecd.org/#  
*DAD: Development Assistance Database 
* Afghanistan is not a BMENA country 
Egypt 
The impact of Arab Spring on the distribution of the Turkish ODA is very obvious 
(TIKA 2012) in Table 9.  For example, Turkish development assistance to Egypt was 
insignificant when Mubarak was still in power. In 2011, when the Egyptian democratic 
elections were being held, the Turkish ODA to Egypt increased to USD 3.51 million. After 
Countries  2003  2004  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  2011  2012
Algeria  0.07  0.05  1.05 0.75 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.51  0.49  1.1
Egypt  0.03  0.26  1.2 0.62 0.72 0.95 0.91 1.3  3.51  503.92
Libya  .. .. 3.77 1.05 1.07 1.71 0.91 1.01  53.11  3.1
Morocco  .. 0.26  1.06 0.35 0.38 0.49 0.49 0.45  0.75  1.44
Tunisia  .. 0.02  1.29 0.56 0.56 1.29 0.7 0.34  0.61  60.39
Iran  1.02  12.23  3.91 5.15 7.44 15.45 14.8 16.62  11.34  12.8
Iraq  1.25  24.57  12.92 18.85 46.68 47.68 51.33 39.31  27.83  19.39
Jordan  0.03  0.44  0.62 1.04 1.1 1.4 0.93 1.75 1.58 3.53
Lebanon 0.02 0.34 0.3 36.1 15.7 26.59 11.53 26.82 7.06 7.95
Syria 0.1 1.93 4.56 3.62 5.69 4.11 4.62 9.52 162.03 1019.93
Palestine 0.01 4.49 11.16 20.34 14.22 20.18 48.2 27.83 25.92 51.23
Yemen 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.04 0.08 0.44 1.24 6.01 0.45 4.52
Afghanistan 0.7 8.74 28.56 57.65 71.61 141.96 96.46 107.32 130.89 151.75
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the election of Islamist Justice and Freedom Party to power, Turkish ODA to Egypt 
skyrocketed. Turkey delivered USD 503,92 million to Egypt. This was almost 500 times 
more than the aid provided to Egypt in 2010. Turkey provided this assistance to Egypt in 
the form of concessional loan within the framework of an agreement between the Turkish 
Under Secretariat of Treasury and Egyptian Ministry of Finance. The actual loan amounted 
to over USD 1 billion. The first trench, USD 500 million, was delivered to Egypt in 2012, 
and the second trench, 500 million USD, was decided to be delivered in 2013. The cited 
goal was to foster economic development and welfare in Egypt through financing public 
infrastructure projects. (TIKA 2012) This was the first time Turkey lent a loan to a target 
state at this extent. (TIKA 2012) 
There have been a number of projects aiming to strengthen Egyptian state 
infrastructure. For example, in 2012, Turkey brought several Egyptian students to train 
them in transportation infrastructure. Nevertheless, the crucial point was that The AKP 
wanted to support its partner, the newly elected Egyptian Islamist Justice and Freedom 
Party by giving this loan. The 2013 Egyptian military coup d’état probably had detrimental 
effects over the Turkish ODA to Egypt afterwards, as Turkey called back its ambassador 
in Egypt. By acting in such a manner, Turkey indicated its disapproval of the direction that 
the new Egyptian leadership was taking.  
Libya 
There is a similar pattern in Libya as well. Before the Arab Spring in 2010, Turkish 
ODA to Libya was USD 1,01 million. In 2011, the Turkish ODA, displaying a dramatic 
increase, went up to USD 53,11 million. Interestingly, the OECD statistics did not include 
the USD 300 million given to the Libyan rebels by Turkey in 2011 before they entered 
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Tripoli. However, the election of Liberal (non-Islamist) “National Alliance Forces” to 
power resulted in a decrease in Turkish ODA, delivering only USD 3,1 million to Libya in 
2012. However, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey continued to develop 
excellent economic relations with Libya after the Arab Spring. Surely, the financial 
assistance, totaled to USD 300 million, provided to the rebels in July 2011 positively 
affected the relations between Turkey and post-Gaddafi Libyan regime. On the other hand, 
the decline in Turkey’s foreign aid to Libya could be a result of Libya’s high returns from 
its natural resources, such as oil and natural gas. Although the Turkish foreign aid to Libya 
declined in 2012, Turkey continued to train the Libyan officials. For example, in 2014, 850 
Libyan police officers were trained in Turkey. (Bloomberght 2013) 
Tunisia  
Tunisia displays similar patterns as well. Between 2003 and 2011, Turkish ODA to 
Tunisia was insignificant, only around USD 1 million. After the election of the Islamist 
“Justice and Development Party” to power, the Turkish ODA to Tunisia suddenly increased 
to dramatic levels, USD 60,39 million. High level of cooperation between Turkey and 
Tunisia since the election, marked by 32 agreements in the areas of society concerning 
politics, security, and economy, (Ihlas Haber Ajansi 2014) had probably taken this number 
to a much upper level by 2014.    
TIKA supports Tunisia in social, economic, vocational, technical, political, and industrial 
areas. TIKA also tried to help Tunisia build a strong administrative and civic infrastructure.  
This way Turkey tried to contribute to the development in Tunisia. Turkey increased its 
assistance to Tunisia, particularly after the Jasmine Revolution in 2011. TIKA projects, 
starting with supporting the social and administrative infrastructure in Tunisia in 2012, 
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expanded to fields as diverse as politics, tourism, security, health, capacity building, and 
agriculture.     
TIKA has initiated 32 projects since the Jasmine revolution. TIKA, for example, 
supported the establishment of an efficient fishery sector and textile workshops, opened 
date processing centers, and provided technical assistance in a number of other fields. 
Turkey also donated 522 vehicles, including ambulances, fire engines, and garbage 
collection trucks, to the new government in Tunisia. Turkey helped Tunisia create regional 
and sectoral development strategies and a mechanism for attracting investment. TIKA was 
also involved in various social projects in collaboration with the Tunisian government, 
such as providing food and bread to the most impoverished sectors of the Tunisian society 
on daily basis.  
In political terms, the Turkish AKP established tight relations with the Tunisian 
Islamist Justice and Development Party (Al-Nahda); Turkey provided Al-Nahda officials 
with training in political campaigning, party organization, election monitoring, the 
inclusion of women, etc. In the administrative fields, Tunisian diplomats were given 
vocational training in Turkey. TIKA facilitated the training of Tunisian governmental 
statisticians by experts from the Turkish Statistical Institute. Turkish police provided 
practical training to 581 police staff from Tunisia within the framework of the 
Modernization of Justice Department and Security Cooperation Agreement; and this took 
place both in Turkey and Tunisia. Turkey also has helped Tunisia develop policies to 
support women and the disabled participation in economic, social, and political life. (Ihlas 
Haber Ajansi 2014) Through all these mechanisms and services, Turkey transferred its 
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democratic values to Tunisia. As it could be seen, this mostly happened through 
experience-sharing. 
 
Syria  
Turkish ODA to Syria followed the same pattern with the other Arab Spring 
countries. Turkish ODA to Syria initially increased from USD 0,1 million in 2003 to USD 
5,69 million in 2007. As a result of Global financial crisis, it goes down to around USD 4 
million in 2008 and 2009. It went up to USD 9.52 million again in 2010. After the arrival 
of Arab Spring to Syria, the Turkish ODA went up to USD 162,03 million in 2011. It 
continued to increase up to 1,019.93 billion USD in 2012. As the conflict continued in 
Syria, Turkey allowed over 1 million Syrians pass its borders. Some of them stay in refugee 
camps. Turkey provided those staying in Turkey’s refugee camps with food, formal 
education, recreation areas, and vocational training. The other Syrians have been trying to 
make a living in Turkish cities by working unofficially for Turkish companies.89 (See 
Table 10) The AFAD just revealed that Turkey’s aid to Syrians has reached to USD 2.5 
billion. (AFAD 2014)  
                                                            
89 In Gaziantep thousands of Syrians work for private companies without a governmental approval. 
However, an official representing the Turkish state told me that the government needs to turn a blind eye to 
this. If the Syrians do not find a source of income in Turkish cities, they will fall into crime, more harmful 
for the Turkish society. Furthermore, he reiterated that (many Turkish industrialists and businessmen told 
me the same thing) “we needed to bring immigrants to our cities. Our industrialists were not able to find 
enough work-force due to the rapid development of economy. The available workforce did not accept the 
proposed salaries or prices. Therefore, the coming of the Syrian refuges to Turkey greatly benefitted the 
Turkish economy by providing cheap labor and work-force.” (the interview took place in Fall 2013 in 
Gaziantep) I can easily argue that the contribution of the Syrian refugees to the Turkish economy is greater 
than the cost that Turkey spends on them. 
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Turkey has assigned officials from the Turkish Foreign and Turkish Domestic 
Affairs Ministries to coordinate issues concerning Syrian guests. Turkey created an 
institution called the Office for Coordinating Syrian Guest Affairs. (TIKA 2012) For 
example, in Gaziantep, Turkey assigned a coordinator to help the Syrian refugees to 
integrate into the local society. (Interview with a number of Syrians living in Gaziantep 
2013) Syrians became more organized among themselves as a result, opening Syrian 
schools, work places, and cultural associations. (Interview with Ahmed Al-Bandery, a 
Syrian Businesman in Gaziantep 2013) Furthermore, the Syrian refugees living in Turkish 
cities are being provided with material support, such as food, shelter, and money on regular 
bases by the provincial governments. (Interview with a Top Governmental Official in 
Gaziantep 2013) Considering all these, it is clear that Turkish ODA in addition to 
humanitarian aid has increased to way higher levels than the government has reported. For 
example, TIKA did not include the assistance provided by the local municipalities and by 
local ordinary people within its TDA. If these were being added to the statistics, surely the 
numbers would go well beyond USD 1 billion for Syria.  
Table 10. Turkish Official OHA to the Syrian Guests in Eight Major Cities, in USD 
Million 
 
Provinces Aid (USD)
Malatya 4
Adana 20
K. Maras 43
S. Urfa 295
Gaziantep 128
Osmaniye 25
Hatay 296
Adiyaman 27
Kilis 164
Total 979
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*Source: TIKA Development Report 2012 
Finally, as the Syrian conflict is yet to be resolved, Turkey has been providing full 
support to the Syrian opposition to win the war against Assad. As it was argued in the 
previous chapter, this has become an existential issue for Turkey. According to many 
sources, Turkey has provided military aid to Syrian opposition as well. However, Turkey 
rejects the provision of military aid to the Syrian rebels, and there is no official data to 
support the Turkish military assistance to Syria. Taking these factors into consideration, it 
is clear that Turkish support to the Syrian opposition will continue to increase, until a 
Turkish friendly administration comes to power or until Turkey reaches the certain 
conclusion that the Syria opposition does not promise any future to bring Assad down.   
Palestine 
Turkish ODA to Palestine has been steadily increasing since 2003.  In 2009 it went 
up to around USD 49 million, it dropped to around USD 25 million in 2010 and 2011, and 
then went up to around USD 51 million in 2012. Probably,  the decline in 2010 and 2011 
was partly caused by the global financial crisis that also affected Turkey, and partly by 
uncompromising behavior of different political parties in Palestine, preventing them from 
acting as a united force against Israel, extremely angering Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In this 
regard, the decrease in the amount of aid in 2010 and 2011 could be perceived as a type of 
punishment to Hamas rule by Turkey. However, later, Turkey changed its policy, re-
increasing its support to Palestine to USD 51 million. The post-Arab Spring environment 
that brought Turkish friendly groups to power in a number of Arab countries, such as 
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, probably stimulated the idea that Turkey should support its 
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newly elected allies in the ME more forcefully. As a result, we witness an increasing trend 
in the Turkish ODA to Palestine, Egypt, and Tunisia.     
Yemen 
As Turkey has very little strategic interests in Yemen, even after the Arab Spring, 
the ODA to Yemen remains in insignificant levels, USD 4,53 million in 2012. However, 
as I discussed in the previous chapters, Yemen has been one of the co-chairs of DAD 
(Democracy Assistance Dialog) along with Turkey and Italy, launched within the 
BMENA’s Forum for the Future Program in 2004. In this regard, Turkey has carried out 
projects to support democratization in the BMENA region, particularly in the areas of 
women’s rights. However, Emrullah Isler, an MP of AKP, reiterated that “we are not 
concerned with Yemen as much as Syria. Syria is our next door. Whatever happens in Syria 
directly impacts Turkey. Therefore we need to engage in Syria.” (Interview with Emrullah 
Isler 2012) This clearly explains the reason behind the low amounts of the Turkish ODA 
to Yemen.  
The Other BMENA Countries  
The Arab countries which had no or very little uprisings received the least 
development aid. For example, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordon received very little aid from 
Turkey under the AKP rule between 2012 and 2013.  Until 2006, Turkey provided an 
insignificant amount of ODA to Lebanon, but in 2006 the amount of the Turkish ODA to 
Lebanon increased to over USD 36 million. Lebanon had been provided around USD 26 
million for each year between 2006 and 2010. In 2011 and 2012, the ODA to Lebanon 
decreased to around USD 7 million. After 2010, Turkey redistributed the amount of ODA 
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between the countries in the ME, sending the most to the transitioning Arab Spring 
countries.  
Although Turkish ODA to Iran has been was insignificant, Iran needs to be 
contextualized differently from the other ME states. First of all, Turkey does not feel the 
cultural, political, historical, and geographic affinity towards Iran, as it feels for the Arab 
ME. While the Arab ME was a part of Ottoman Empire—Turkey thinks of itself as the heir 
of the Ottoman Empire—, Iran has been perceived as a rival or an alternative Muslim 
civilization in Turkish mindset. The aforementioned statistics clearly indicate the areas that 
Turkey prioritized in it foreign affairs. These are Central Asia and the Arab ME. Also, Iran 
already has had a functioning self-sufficient political system, which actually operated 
based on elections and a clear and effective rule of law. In this regard, Turkey does not feel 
the need to further support development of Iran, at least officially. Moreover, the target 
state has to be open to the delivery of ODA as well. From our previous analysis in this 
dissertation, we know that a number of Arab states approached Turkey for experience 
sharing. It has been suggested by TIKA experts that the distribution of a large part of 
Turkish aid   depends upon the demands of the target nations. (TIKA 2014) In this regard, 
the Iranian demand for the Turkish ODA has not been as significant as of the other states 
from BMENA, Central Asia, and Balkans. 
Turkey’s Official Humanitarian Aid (OHA) 
Turkish OHA is a subcategory of the Turkish ODA. Turkey has a long history of 
responding to international humanitarian crisis. For example, when Pakistan was 
devastated by a mortal earthquake in 2005, Turkey was the largest government donor that 
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delivered aid to what it called the brotherly nation of Pakistan, with USD 141 million. By 
2012, Turkish governmental humanitarian aid had dramatically increased to USD 775 
million. This way, Turkish humanitarian assistance had exceeded 1 billion USD by 2012. 
This made Turkey the 4th largest global donor of OHA. (Global Humanitarian Assistance 
2014) The amount of Turkey’s humanitarian assistance within its ODA exceeded 41.4% 
of its aggregate ODA in 2012. In 2012, Turkey became the 15th largest donor of ODA in 
OECD.90  According to Global Humanitarian Assistance Reports, Turkish humanitarian 
assistance was mostly delivered to the surrounding regions.91 The OECD data indicates 
that the Turkish ODA was channeled to Arab Spring countries such as Syria, Egypt, and 
Tunisia,92 as a way of supporting friendly political forces in the region in 2011 and 2012.   
Table 11 indicates the amount of Turkey’s Official Humanitarian Assistance 
(OHA) within its ODA. The statistics show that there has been a substantial increase in 
OHA since 2001. While Turkey’s OHA was USD 3 million out of its USD 151 million 
ODA, the amount of Turkish OHA increased to USD 233 million in 2005, while the total 
Turkish ODA went up to 759 million USD in 2005. Between 2005 and 2009, the amount 
of OHA within ODA substantially decreased due to the global financial crisis. However, 
starting from 2010, Turkish ODA re-increased. While in 2010, Turkish OHA went up to 
264, the total ODA had increased to USD 1,273 million by 2011. As indicated in the 
                                                            
90 OECD Official Website, Turkey.  
91 Global Humanitarian Assistance, Turkey 
92 OECD Statextracts, http://stats.oecd.org/# 
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previous section, the total amount of the Turkish ODA had increased to USD 2533.3 
million by 2012, due to people’s uprisings in the Arab ME.     
According to TIKA, OHA helps the target country in the form of food, shelter, 
water and sanitation, economic recovery, infrastructure, education, and other types of aid. 
However, the Turkish OHA has been generally processed to the target states to provide 
educational aid, food, multi-sectoral assistance, health related assistance, shelter and non-
food items, and other services or aid unspecified by the donor.  The unspecified items 
probably include the political aid which states were reluctant to report. The amount of 
Turkish OHA targeting only Syrian refugees in Turkey has exceeded USD 1 billion. (TIKA 
2012) As Turkey has followed an open door policy towards the Syrian refugees, a large 
portion of the Turkish OHA went to the expenses of the Syrian refugees. (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance 2013) Although Turkey reported 350 thousand registered 
refugees in 2013, (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2013) the unofficial number has gone 
way beyond 1 million due to Turkey’s open door policy towards them hitherto.   
Table 11. OHA and ODA in Million USD 2001-2011 
 
Total OHA Other ODA ODA
2001 3 148 151
2002 3 152 154
2003 5 109 113
2004 66 424 490
2005 233 527 759
2006 150 669 819
2007 52 583 635
2008 31 709 740
2009 55 698 752
2010 146 799 944
2011 264 1,009 1,273
*Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance 
 
*Other ODA: Example, debt relief
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*Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance 
Turkish OHA was concentrated on a small number of states between 2006 and 
2014. While until 2011, Turkish humanitarian assistance had been provided to Pakistan, 
Iraq, and Somalia for the most part (67%), (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2013) since 
the beginning of the Arab Spring, the large portion of the Turkish OHA has been delivered 
to Syria.   
To conclude, it can be said that Turkey’s democracy promotion has been carried 
out mostly within the context of its ODA. Arab Spring compelled Turkey to redistribute its 
assistance between countries, allocating the biggest portion to the countries in transition. 
Turkish ODA has indicated substantial increase in the last three years as a result of its over-
involvement in Arab Spring countries. For example, around USD 1.5 billion of USD, 3.5 
billion Turkish TDA was delivered to the Egyptian Justice and Freedom Party and the 
Syrian refugees in 2012. In this regard, Turkey has shifted its focus from Central Asian 
republics primarily to the Arab countries in transition under the AKP administration. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey’s identity and strategic interests have played a 
major role in Turkey’s involvement in the Arab Spring countries.       
The statistics also provide us with very interesting findings regarding the regions 
prioritized by Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Russia, Turkey started to engage 
with the Central Asian republics through TIKA and Turkish civil society. Since the AKP 
came to power, Turkey turned its focus towards the BMENA. The Turkish case also 
indicate that once a TIKA-like institution is created for a particular reason under a 
particular government, it continues to perform the tasks it is created for even after the 
removal of the government that created it. However, its capabilities and goals could change 
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based on the available resources and the policy priorities of the time. While TIKA was 
created to perform development assistance in Central Asia in 1990s, it adopted a global 
agenda parallel to rapid economic growth under the Islamic AKP government in 2000s.  
It is crucial to realize that both in 1990s and 2000s, Turkish foreign policy agendas 
are highly impacted by the US. After the dissolution of the USSR, the US tried to expand 
its influence over the Central Asian republics. The US motivated one of its closest allies, 
Turkey, to play a greater role in Central Asia. Turkey would find an easy acceptance by 
the newly found Turkik republics due to the shared identity in race and language. Motivated 
by the US, Turkey, under the leadership of Nationalist leader Turgut Ozal, started to engage 
with the republics.  
Similarly, after the 9-11 terrorist attack, the US launched BMENA initiative to 
bring democracy to the ME as the US considered lack of democratization in the region as 
the root cause of radicalization. This time, Turkey under the leadership Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, found the idea of playing a leadership role in bringing democratization to the 
region highly appealing. For Erdogan, democratization, open market economy, and the rule 
of law were good for people in the region, including Turkey. As a result, in both cases, the 
Turkish foreign policies were being highly influenced by the American foreign policy 
priorities. 
However, the difference was that although the US trackbacked from promoting 
democracy in the ME, the AKP, on the contrary, increased its assistance to the opposition 
forces that wanted democratization in the ME at the expanse of its relations with the US. 
The provision of USD 1 billion to the Justice and Freedom Party in Egypt and USD 1 
billion to the Syrian refugees by Turkey in 2012 is a good example for this case. The US 
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felt threatened by the empowerment of the Islamic parties in the ME as they were highly 
critical of the Western role in the region. However, Turkey as a Muslim power, did not feel 
the way the US felt. Therefore, Turkey did not see any reason for why to trackback from 
supporting democratization in the region.  
Generally, democracy promoter Western states have well-designed institutions to 
implement democracy assistance programs. The USAID, NED, NDI, and NRI are good 
examples of this, but Turkey does not have a well-designed institution founded solely to 
promote democracy in the target states. This has a deeper reason: Turkey does not define 
its activities in BMENA as the promotion of democracy although it has been a part of 
BMENA initiative since 2004.93 Therefore, Turkey’s democracy assistance is delivered to 
the target countries within the scope of its TDA. In this regard, TIKA, as the primary 
governmental institution, delivers ODA to the target states. However, parallel to Turkey’s 
economic growth, TIKA’s progressive transformation into an institution like USAID has 
been inevitable.  
Turkish support for democratization of the BMENA has been driven by its strategic 
interests and values. Although before the Arab Spring, values and the strategic interests 
were in harmony, in the course of Arab Spring, strategic interests have become more 
dominant in Turkey’s democratic assistance to the region. Parallel to this, Turkey has 
increasingly adopted more coercive means, such as the military intervention in Libya to 
collapse the Gaddafi regime. In this regard, it is safe to assert that in the course of Arab 
Spring, promotion of democracy via supporting the opposition groups has turned into a 
                                                            
93 BMENA initiative is launched by the US to promote democracy in the ME. 
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matter of survival and power competition for Turkey; and progressive employment of force 
in this regard is a natural result of this change in policy orientation of Turkey in the ME.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI: STRATEGIES (2): TURKISH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
THROUGH MENTORING, NORMATIVE PRESSURE, AND 
DEMONSTRATIVE EFFECT 
In the previous chapters, I explained Turkey’s promotion of democracy through its 
Official Development Assistance and through utilization of military power in the ME. In 
this chapter, my goal is to examine mentoring, demonstrative effect, normative pressure, 
conditionality, enlargement, and humanitarian assistance by CSOs as the other ways 
through which Turkey promotes democracy in the ME. I explain the Turkish mentorship 
in the ME in more detail in this chapter. However, Turkey’s mentorship is directly linked 
to the Turkish ODA. The money spent on technical assistance and experience sharing 
comes from Turkey’s ODA budget. However, in order to give a more specific account of 
this factor, I also included it in this chapter. 
1-Mentoring 
One of the ways Turkey promotes democracy is through mentoring the state 
officials and political party members of the other countries. Turkey has been providing 
assistance to surrounding countries to help build their capacities. (TIKA 2012) When the 
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AKP came to power, Turkey started to prioritize the ME in its foreign policy agenda. 
Therefore, under the AKP administration, Turkey progressively supported the creation of 
similar political and economic frameworks between Turkey and corresponding states to 
facilitate the political and economic interactions. Turkey also trained the officials of the 
target states in a number of areas, such as security, economy, and politics. In this section, 
my goal is to examine Turkey’s democracy promotion by mentoring. In this regard, experts 
representing Turkish Armed Forces, Ministry of Education, Turkish Police, Turkish 
Statistical Institute, Turkish Undersecretariat of Treasury, and the AKP mentor the officials 
of the target states.  
Training provided by Turkish security forces is a significant source of 
institutionalization of democratic values in the target states. Turkish Armed Forces, which 
is a NATO army, engages “in activities of programme assistance and technical cooperation 
in training, transport, energy, cultural cooperation, administrative and civil infrastructure 
sectors,” as well as serving in “peace-building operations”. (TIKA 2012) Turkish Armed 
Forces were also involved in peace building efforts in countries, such as Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Turkey’s contribution to peace-building efforts has steadily 
being increasing; and this was estimated around USD 36 million in 2006, USD 51 million 
in 2009, USD 77 million in 2011, and USD 87 million in 2012. (TIKA 2012)  
However, activities of the Turkish Armed Forces are not confined to the technical 
areas. For example, Turkish Armed Forces organize various courses to promote the 
participation of women in public life in Balkans and Southeast Asia. Turkish Armed Forces 
have also been involved in a number of educational activities in the countries they have 
operated, such as supporting the schools of those countries. (TIKA 2012) Within the 
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framework of Partnership for Peace Training Center, Turkish Armed Forces trained the 
personnel from the armed forces of countries as diverse as Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, 
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Albania in 2012. Turkish Armed Forces also support 
Turkey’s policies towards the Syrian guests with its available resources. (TIKA 2012)  
In addition to the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish National Police have been 
training police officers of countries, such as Tunisia, Macedonia, Bangladesh and Somalia. 
(TIKA 2012) The goal has been to exchange experience between the national police 
organizations of the attendee countries. The training program aimed to create a “common 
understanding in fighting crimes and to harmonize professional terminology” (TIKA 2012) 
among the attendee countries. However, the fact is that the security forces of the attendee 
countries emulate Turkish system while receiving training in Turkey.     
It is also important to note that Turkish security forces provide training quite similar 
to that provided in the West. There are substantial relations between the US and the Turkish 
security forces. The top Turkish police officials are being trained in several top US 
universities.94 They are being taught how to deal with crime in a democratic setting. 
Turkey’s recent democratization was strongly influenced by these well-educated officers. 
Through the aforementioned programs, Turkish security apparatuses transfer their 
experiences and knowledge to their counterparts in the Balkans, ME, Africa, and Central 
Asia. In this regard, Turkey significantly contributes to human infrastructure and the 
                                                            
94 I met several top level Turkish Police officers who were obtaining their doctoral degrees in a number of  
US universities, such as Kent State University and University of Cincinnati, in political science, sociology, 
and justice studies areas. 
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reorganization of the security sector of the target countries on the basis of democratic 
credentials. 
Education is another way through which Turkish values are being spread in 
Turkey’s neighborhood. Educational aspect of Turkish foreign policy is particularly 
helpful in improving human infrastructure in the target states (Kirisci 2012) In terms of 
education, Turkey has various programs, such as awarding successful students and 
providing them with the opportunity to obtain their higher educations in Turkish 
universities and the Turkish Military and Police academies. The TIKA statistics indicate 
that between 1990 and 2011, 40 thousand international students received their higher 
education in Turkey. This has happened within the framework of Turkey’s “Grand Student 
Project”, launched in 1990. (TIKA 2012)  
To provide some details, Turkey provided assistance to 354 Iraqi students in the 
form of scholarship and other types of aid, such as clothing. Turkey also enabled 24 
doctoral students with scholarships from Gaza Islam University under the Academic 
Support Program. (TIKA 2012) As a part of “Research and Doctoral Scholarship for 
Foreigners” project carried out by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of 
Turkey (TUBITAK), Turkey brought 9 Palestinian, 3 Iraqi, 58 Iranian, and 1 Syrian 
student,  in addition to students representing a number of other countries for their post-
graduate studies. Turkey also provided assistance to 174 Syrian, 232 Palestinian, 504 Iraqi, 
and 660 Sudani college students in 2010. In addition, Turkey organized awards and 
scholarship programs for the master students to continue their educations in Turkish 
universities. (TIKA 2012)   
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Another aspect of Turkey’s educational program concerns the deployment of 
teachers to the other countries. For example, “322 teachers were deployed to 13 countries 
including Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Moldova and Tajikistan” (TIKA 2012) as a part of 
an educational project implemented by The Ministry of National Education and the 
Presidency of Turks Living Abroad and Relative Communities. These teachers promote 
Turkish art, culture, language, and literature in target countries. This way Turkey has been 
diffusing its values in the surrounding countries.  
Exchange programs have proved quite useful in promoting democracy. For 
instance, Morningstar, former United States ambassador to European Union, reiterated that 
“exchange programs have been especially successful” in terms of successful democracy 
promotion. According to Morningstar, thousands of high-school and college students that 
came from the former-Soviet countries returned to their countries with highly positive 
views of the US, having acquired democratic values. They influenced their surroundings 
(family, friend, and coworkers) in their countries. This created a multiple effect according 
to Morningstar. (Morningstar 2009)  
Exchange students in Turkey get the chance to recognize an imperfect democracy 
with its strengths and weaknesses. Generally, international students that receive their 
education in Turkey come from closed, undemocratic regimes. Therefore, during their 
residence and education in Turkey, they get the chance to get to know a democratic system 
still in the making. When they return to their countries, they carry with them the values 
they have acquired in Turkey. (Kirisci 2012) I cannot forget a conversation with one of my 
Kazakh friend in this regard. He reiterated that when they go back to their countries, the 
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Kazakh state thinks that they are being overly Turkified, antithetical to Kazakh state’s 
interests. Therefore, he added that the Kazakh state might terminate the educational 
cooperation program with Turkey.95 On the other hand, these students could very well play 
a bridge role between Turkey and their countries of origin.   
In this regard, similar to what Morningstar stated for the US, students that graduate 
from the Turkish universities become volunteer consulates of Turkey as they absorb the 
Turkish cultural and political values. When they leave, they leave with the love of Turkey 
inside, and they promote Turkey in their countries. Turkey is trying to find ways to increase 
the number of international students in the Turkish universities. (TIKA 2012) 
Another way that Turkey promotes democracy in the surrounding countries is by 
mentoring the officials of the target states about economic matters. For example, Turkey’s 
Undersecretariat of Treasury trains the surrounding countries’ officials in the areas of 
Private pension system, capacity building for supervisory authority, financial services, 
exchange regime and OECD liberalization codes, public debt and risk management, 
insurance, and establishing a single treasury account system. This program included 
countries as diverse as Iran, China, South Africa, Colombia, Macedonia, and Tunisia. 
(TIKA 2012)  
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that Turkish economic and financial systems 
operate according to the neo-liberal economic policies and open market rules and 
regulations. Within the framework of these types of training programs, Turkey basically 
teaches the officials of these countries how to organize their economy according to open 
                                                            
95 Conversation with a Kazakh friend during my college education in Ankara in 2005. 
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market rules. This is not an intentional move to promote democracy by Turkey. (Kirisci 
2011) The promotion of democratic values happens automatically in the course of practical 
training and implementation. In this context, Turkey just teaches the targets how to set a 
successful system.  
However, this is in Turkey’s interests: if the target states organize their economic 
and political systems similar to those of Turkey, the economic and political interactions 
between them become much smoother. Harmonization of the rules creates a greater clarity 
and predictability in both the Turkish and targets’ markets. This is particularly helpful for 
businessmen who have investment in more than one country in these countries. Just as how 
the European businessmen ask the Turkish authorities to facilitate their investments in 
Turkey by making legal changes, the Turkish businessmen ask the other countries in the 
region, such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt, to make changes in their legal frameworks 
to create a more conducive atmosphere for their FDI. For this reason, they also put pressure 
on the Turkish government to do its part.  
As I denoted earlier, (non-educational) consultancy and know-how transfer is a 
significant part of Turkish democracy promotion. However, similar to the aforementioned 
cases, Turkey does not help to build the capacity of the target states to promote democracy. 
The diffusion of democratic values happens in the process of interaction. Also, Turkey’s 
mentoring indicates Turkey’s foreign policy priorities. After the Arab Spring, Turkey 
would turn its attention, and reallocate the biggest part of resources to the BMENA region. 
(TIKA 2012) 
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For example, Turkey provided consultancy services in sectors, such as health, 
finance, and security to a number of countries in 2010.96 123 Turkish experts provided 
Syria with consultation and know-how services. Also, Turkey assigned 111 Experts to 
Palestine, 100 to Afghanistan, 99 to Lebanon, and 72 to Iraq in 2010. (TIKA 2014) 
Hundreds of experts were also assigned to help a number of other countries, such as 
Kazakhstan and Kosovo. The total number of Turkish experts assigned to train the officials 
of the target countries was 1795 in 2010. The number of officials of the target states who 
were provided in-service training by Turkish experts in 2010 was 12143. (TIKA 2014) 
Finally, Turkey is also involved in political training. Political training is carried out 
by the AKP. Over 20 political parties mainly from Asia and Africa ask the AKP to train 
them in areas, such as political campaigning, party organization, and party out reaching. 
The parties that ask for training come from very diverse backgrounds. For example, there 
are Muslim, non-Muslim, Islamic, conservative, nationalist, and liberal parties among 
those who demand such training. These parties come from diverse countries, such as the 
Kurdish Regional Government, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and some other countries from 
Africa and Asia. The AKP provides them with political party training by organizing work-
shops, conferences, and panels.  
For example, an Islamic party from the Arab world asked the AKP for political 
party training.97 The AKP accepted the offer, and organized a one week long workshop. 
Throughout the workshop, the AKP trained the representatives of that political party about 
                                                            
96 As Turkey’s assistance in education area is the largest, the education unit is examined as a different 
category by TIKA.  
97 I am not able to disclose the name of this party due to the ethical research conduct rules.  
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how to organize a successful party, carry out election campaigns, connect to youths and 
women, deal with authoritarian governments, and maintain grassroot campaigns. 
Furthermore, the AKP took them to different party buildings and state institutions (such as 
the Turkish Parliament) to show them the Turkish democratic setting, and how they 
functioned within this framework. Moreover, the AKP has developed tight relations with 
the trained parties due to these types of interactions.       
The AKP has successfully transformed these conservative parties in some areas. 
Among its counterparts, parties with deep roots in political Islam, the AKP is the most 
progressive in terms of women’s rights. More importantly, the Arab counterparts of The 
AKP do not have any concern for the involvement of women in politics. My interview with 
an expert from the AKP Foreign Affairs Commission sheds light on this point. She 
reiterated that a number of political parties from the Middle East asked them for political 
party training, most of whom being the conservative parties. She complained about the lack 
of women participants in the committees, which is quite surprising for Turks. 
When they came for training, the lack of women within the 
participant group attracted our attention, and we had to explain 
them how important the women participation in politics was, by 
telling them that we received 54% of our votes from women. I 
asked them to bring female members with them for the next time. 
Although, they initially found the idea of the necessity of women 
participation in politics strange, in the next training session, they 
included women members within their groups. It is really strange 
for us to see a political understanding that excludes women. 
(Interview with an expert from the AKP’s Foreign Affairs 
Commission 2003)  
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 An important way that the AKP interacts with the ME is through panels. For 
example, an Ankara-based think tank, called Institute of Strategic Thinking which is also 
close to the AKP, organized a panel to discuss the Turkish-Egyptian relations after the 
military coup in Egypt, in Spring 2014. The participants included some well-known 
Turkish and Egyptian scholars, an Egyptian Journalist, and a top official from the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, who was a former minister of the Morsi Cabinet. The speakers 
discussed democratization in Egypt in comparison to the democratization in Turkey. They 
tried to draw lessons from the Turkish experience of democratization. 
However, one important point was that the Turkish scholars emphasized the 
importance of non-violent way of maintaining their democratic struggles within Egypt. 
According to them, the military rule in Egypt already announced the Muslim Brothers as a 
terrorist group, and any act of violence, even from a distant member of the movement, 
could help the military rule to reinforce its claims. In this regard, they warned the Muslim 
Brotherhood to be careful about this, and to stay away from violence. This idea received a 
lot of support from the Egyptian speakers. In this regard, the AKP plays a highly 
constructive role, by its emphasis on peaceful ways of democratic struggle, in the process 
of change in the ME.            
2-Demonstrative Effect 
Huntington argues that democratization in a country can provide a positive example 
to the surrounding countries about the achievability of democratization and the way to 
initiate and maintain it. Huntington calls this the demonstrative effect. (Huntington 1991)  
For Huntington, the most successful case of democratization through demonstrative effect 
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happens in regions. Kirisci argues that transformation in the surrounding countries is 
strongly influenced by Turkey’s demonstrative effect. (Kirisci 2012) In this sense, Turkey 
does not intend to promote democracy, but Turkish values are diffused to the countries that 
it interacts with, automatically. Turkey only provides a successful model that they can 
emulate. In this regard, in the following part, I examine demonstrative effect as an 
important source of Turkey’s democracy promotion. 
One way the positive Turkish model is channeled to the BMENA is through 
tourism. Table 12 indicates that in the last ten years, the number of tourists from the 
surrounding countries to Turkey has been increasing due to the relaxed visa regime 
enforced by the AKP government with the other countries in the BMENA. For example, 
when the AKP came to power, the number of the tourists from the ME was around 780 
thousand. However, this number went up to around 2.5 million in 2012.  
Table 12. The Number of Tourists from the BMENA to Turkey 
 
Furthermore, Turkish model has found its way into the ME through a number of 
other channels. The most important channel is the regional and global media, which 
brought the Turkish economic success, Turkey’s democratization pains, and peaceful 
foreign policy in the past ten years to the attention of millions of viewers in the region. 
Furthermore, highly popular Turkish TV series created a positive image of Turkey in the 
2002 2004 2008 2011
780.431 1.031.226 1.917.329 2.438.206
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute
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ME.98 The aforementioned channels, such as experience sharing and educational 
opportunities, also provided the top officials and students from the region to see and 
emulate the Turkish model. As a result, people who came to Turkey saw how Turks 
maintained their lives. When they returned, they wanted to have the same system. In regard 
to Turkey’s demonstrative effect, democratic values find their ways to the target states 
during socialization.   
3-Normative Pressure 
Normative Pressure (such as criticizing anti-democracy leaders and praising pro-
democracy ones) is often used by international or supranational organizations, such as 
NATO and the EU as a way to promote democracy. This entails the “incorporation of new 
member states into an existing system of values, roles, and behaviors” (Kentmen 2012) In 
this new environment, the new member states are pressured to adhere to the shared norms 
and values. Normative pressure also includes openly announcing the democratic deficit of 
a state, calling the leader of a country during important decision making that affects its 
democracy to put pressure, promoting democratic norms in panels and conferences to make 
them more salient, monitoring elections, publishing reports on human right records of the 
states, and creating links between civil society organizations of the target and the donor 
countries. (Borzel and Risse 2009) 
                                                            
98 For the Impact of the Turkish Soap Operas, also see Youtube Video. Arab World is transfixed by Turkish 
Soap Operas. World Focus Video Podcast, April 22, 2009. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ptJedfuGJtM; Al-Arabiya News, Turkish Soap Star Sparks Divorces in 
the Arab World, 29 June 2008. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/06/29/52291.html 
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Turkey, in many instances, has used a diverse set of normative pressure to open up 
a target country to democratic development. For example, Erdogan openly declared the 
need for democratic transformation in 2003 while delivering a speech in Harvard. 
(Erdogan, Democracy in the Middle East, Pluralism in Europe: Turkish View 2003) Also, 
before the fall of Mubarak, the prime minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on 
him to initiate a process of democratic reform, strongly demanded by his people. (Today's 
Zaman 2011) Furthermore, Erdogan called on the Muslim leaders to reform the political 
systems of their countries in Cidde Saudi Arabia in 2005. “Abdullah Gül, President of 
Turkey, was the first head of state who visited Egypt on 3 March 2011 in the aftermath of 
the Tahrir Revolution. Then, President Gül paid another visit to Egypt on 7-8 February 
2013 and reiterated, on that occasion, Turkey’s messages of solidarity and cooperation with 
the friendly and brotherly Egyptian people.” (Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014) 
Abdullah Gul emphasized the need for democratization in the ME in ICO (Islamic 
Conference Organization) in Tehran, Iran in 2003. (Gul 2003) Furthermore, Erdogan tried 
to convince Syria’s Assad to leave the power and transfer to democracy when the Arab 
Spring hit Syria for about six months. (A. Sahin 2012) Finally, while Turkish leadership 
strongly condemned the 2013 military coup d’état in Egypt, which ended the rule of 
Freedom and Justice Party, they motivated the Tahrir square, the supporters of Freedom 
and Justice Party, to continue their resistance to get their democratic rights back. (Bugun 
Gazetesi 2013)    
Turkey, as a part of its democracy promotion policy, has monitored elections in a 
number of countries. For example, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed a group 
of ten representatives, called “Turkish National Observers Committee” (TNOC), to 
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monitor the election in Tunisia. (Ulutas 2011) Turkey also sent TNOC to observe the July 
7, 2012 national elections in Libya. (Turkish Embassy in Trablus 2012) The TNOC which 
consisted on a diverse body of individuals, such as scholars, MPs, experts of Turkish 
Foreign Mission, also monitored the 2006 national elections in Palestine. (Turkey Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2014) Turkey also sent the TNOC to observe elections in diverse 
countries, such as Azerbaijan and Egypt.  
Moreover, Turkey started to promote the Muslim rights through the establishment 
of Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Within this context, Turkish Ambassador 
Omur Orhun started to prepare reports on the conditions of Muslims in different EU 
countries, such as Sweden. With the election of Turkish candidate, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu 
as the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Turkey 
strengthened its role as the promoter of the Muslim rights. However, this also indicates 
Turkey’s aspirations to represent and lead the Muslim world. 
4-Conditionality 
Conditionality is another effective democracy promotion instrument. It is also 
called the “carrots and sticks”99 strategy. It can be positive or negative in nature. 
Conditionality entails that states making progress in democratization are rewarded while 
states regressing in democratic development are punished. “This method rests upon the 
assumption that countries are rational actors that value benefits over costs. (Kentmen 2012) 
                                                            
99 For example, economic pressure, such as sanctions against governments abusing human rights or 
economic rewards, such as trade benefits and balance of payments for governments that support 
democratization. 
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For, example, in the past the US Congress stipulated assistance to the Ukraine to encourage 
it to progress in its democracy and to pressure Ukraine to solve its trade disputes with the 
US. (Morningstar 2009) 
Turkey has recently started to employ this strategy so as to  promote democracy in 
the region. For example, USD 1 billion ODA was delivered to Egyptian Justice and 
Freedom Party under Morsi leadership. This could easily be called as the carrot that Turkey 
provided Egypt for strengthening its government’s capacity, necessary for a working 
democracy. Furthermore, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic relations with Egypt under 
the interim government after the 2013 military coup d’état.  This could easily be regarded 
as Turkey’s stick strategy for promoting democracy in Egypt.  
5-Peace Building 
Peace building is another way through which states promote democracy. For 
example, in Ukraine, Bosnia, Palestine, Caucasus, and Sudan, the EU has launched twenty-
one missions on the basis of the European Security and Defense Policy. This tool is often 
utilized in Post-Conflict states and regions with the purpose of reconstruction, stabilization, 
and peace-building. Peace keeping operations, aiding security reforms, policing and border 
control, and supporting the rule of law are some of the activities carried out within this 
context. (Borzel and Risse 2009) Turkey has been involved in peacebuilding activities in a 
wide range of countries, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Lebanon. (TIKA 2012) 
In this regard, Turkey has been supporting peace and stability in unstable democratizing 
countries.  
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6-Enlargement 
Democracy is also being promoted through enlargement. Enlargement is often 
discussed within the EU expansion context. (Everts 2004) The EU, in the enlargement 
process, makes use of “carrots and sticks.” These positive and negative incentives motivate 
the candidate states to democratize. Interestingly, Turkey initiated a regionalization project 
by creating a visa free zone with Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. It is called Shamgen, 
intentionally named this way to associate it with the EU’s Schengen agreement. Although 
democratization was not a stipulation for membership to this regional formation, Turkey’s 
democratic norms were diffused to these countries through Turkey’s socialization with 
them. For example, Turkey was able to transfer its experience regarding open market 
economy to Syria successfully. This substantially transformed the legal framework of the 
Syrian economic system. (Interview with A Young Syrian Scholar in Miami 2012) 
However, the Shamgen regionalization experiment failed in the course of Arab Spring. The 
member states had to make a strategic choice. Turkey’s pro-democracy policies started to 
threaten the undemocratic members of Shamgen, resulting in its failure.  
In conclusion, this chapter attempts to explain the strategies through which Turkey 
promotes democracy in the ME. I argued that Turkey promotes democracy or diffuses its 
democratic values in the ME through at least six channels. These are mentoring, 
demonstrative effect, normative pressure, conditionality, hard power, and enlargement. As 
I have already given a detailed account of the Turkish ODA as a strategy to promote 
democracy in the region, I did not mention it in this chapter. Furthermore, as I broadly 
discussed the conditions under which Turkish democracy promotion becomes militarized 
in the fourth chapter, I did not include it in this chapter.     
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CHAPTER VII: STRATEGIES (3): TURKISH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY 
TURKISH CIVIL SOCIETY 
In the previous chapters, I examined the Turkish state’s promotion of democracy 
under the AKP rule in the last 12 years. However, the Turkish civil society is also involved 
in a modest exercise of democracy promotion. In fact, some of the major and most 
organized projects in this regard are carried out by the Turkish civil society. In this regard, 
I would like to explain the contribution of the Turkish civil society organizations (CSOs) 
to Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the ME. In this chapter, initially I determine 
the major CSOs that are involved in democracy promotion. Next, I explain the activities of 
these CSOs. Further, I expand on the weaknesses and the strengths of the Turkish CSOs 
that do the most in the ME in terms of the promotion of humanitarian and democratic 
values. Finally, I explain how independent the Turkish CSOs are from the Turkish 
government.   
I develop my arguments in this chapter based on face to face interviews with CSO 
representatives and statistical data from the Turkish Statistical Institute. I determined the 
most relevant CSOs on the basis of the scale and nature of their activities outside Turkey. 
TIKA Development Reports and my interviews with CSO members helped me 
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substantially in this regard. It must be kept in mind that the Turkish CSOs are involved in 
a wide range of activities, ranging from opening educational and health institutions to 
orphanages and from providing emergency aid to the crisis hit areas to the direct promotion 
of democracy.   
The democratic institutionalization on the basis of European harmonization 
packages provided the Turkish civil society with a fertile ground to flourish both in number 
and in influence. The 1980 constitutional changes resulted in the closure of around 20.000 
CSOs, which almost consisted of the half of the total number of CSOs that time. (Park 
2012) In the past 10 years, a wide range of CSOs were being established in Turkey 
representing a highly diverse set of people, such as Kurdish, religious, secular, and women 
groups as well as sport clubs. The governmental statistics indicate that the number of CSOs 
in Turkey has increased by 44% in the last decade. In 2000, there were 60,931 CSOs, and 
this number increased to 88,210 in 2011. (Saglam, Today’s Zaman 2011) Moreover some 
of the CSOs started to expand their activities to the international level, which contributed 
greatly to non-governmental support of Turkey to democratization. 
Parallel to rapid economic growth and democratization in Turkey, Turkish CSOs 
started to get involved in larger projects with greater numbers, such as building schools, 
hospitals, orphanages, and mosques in the target countries, such as Somalia and 
Afghanistan. (Dogan, Unofficial Interview with Ali Dogan 2013)  While, in 2002, GDP 
per capita was $3,500 in Turkey, it increased to over $12,000 in 2012, in 10 years.  
Individuals who gained more wealth started to contribute to the budget of the Islamic 
humanitarian CSOs in a greater extend. Islamic CSOs in Turkey do not accept funds of 
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foreign origin; (Interview with Ahmet Unsal 2012) their resources are confined to the aid 
from individuals living in Turkey, and rarely to wealthy Muslims living abroad. In this 
regard, the freedom environment fostered in the process of the EU membership and 
economic development benefitted the Turkish CSOs greatly. In this new environment, the 
CSOs started to act more independently, carrying out some of the global-scale 
humanitarian projects.   
TIKA rightly describes the role of the Turkish CSOs as: “In line with the recent 
Turkish foreign policy, Turkish CSOs, deeply rooted in centuries of charitable foundations 
tradition, play a significant role in Turkish development assistance in a multitude of 
geographies across the globe. Turkish CSOs engage in assistance activities of 
accommodation, health, clothing, food in situations of humanitarian crisis as well as post-
crisis activities of education, vocational training, cultural and health aid etc. to heal disaster 
victims.” (TIKA 2012) (See Table 13 for the change in the amount of civil humanitarian 
assistance between 2005 and 2012) 
Table 13. Turkish Humanitarian Assistance by CSOs between 2009 and 2012 
Million USD 
 
*Source: TIKA Development Reports 2005-2012 
TIKA’s reports indicate that a number of Turkish CSOs actively partake in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. These are TOBB, Adana Dosteller (Adana Friendly 
Date  2005 2006 2009 2010 2011  2012 
Amount  $56.70 $78.25 $109.00 $105.68 $199.52 $151.08 
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Hands), Beshir Social Society of Aid and Solidarity, Dost Eli (Friend’s Hand), Sadaka Tasi 
Society, Turkish World Research Foundation, Turkish Religious Foundation, Yardimeli 
(Helping Hands) Society, Doctors Worldwide, Turkemeneli Foundation, and a number of 
other small CSOs. (TIKA 2012) However, the most notable CSOs in terms of  promotion 
of democracy are TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Research Foundation), IHH, 
Kimse Yokmu, MAZLUMDER, Doctors Worldwide, Gulen Group, and Deniz Feneri. In 
the following section, I would like to give a detailed account of the activities of the major 
Turkish CSOs with regard to their contribution to Turkey’s democracy promotion agenda.   
1-TESEV 
TESEV, a partner of DAD (Democracy Assistance Dialog), promotes 
democratization in Turkey and the wider Muslim world. TESEV organizes panels, 
conferences, and roundtable meetings to discuss democratization of the BMENA. TESEV 
prepares a fertile platform for the exchange of ideas between governmental officials and 
significant civil society leaders. Through this way, TESEV has helped dissemination of 
information regarding the democratic transformation of Turkey and the BMENA. (TESEV 
2014) This aspect of TESEV has also helped develop a civil society dimension of 
democracy and democracy promotion in BMENA region.  
TESEV has three particular interest areas, which are Democratization Program, 
Foreign Politics Program, and Good Governance. (TESEV 2014) For example, some of 
the previous activities of TESEV include, but are not restricted to, disseminating 
information on reforming the institutions of justice, the new democratic constitutional 
process, the basic principles of a democratic constitution, democratic reform of police, 
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intelligence, and military in Turkey, democratic solution of the Kurdish issue, 
establishment of regional governance in Turkey, and finally freedom of the media and 
freedom of expression. Furthermore, within the scope of its DAD role, TESEV has 
produced knowledge on Turkish-Israeli relations, Armenian Diaspora, Turkish perception 
in the ME over the years, and how to improve the Turkish role in the region. (TESEV 2013) 
Most importantly, TESEV has played a particular role in helping improve the social, 
economic, and political conditions of women in the ME in cooperation with its Western 
and Middle Eastern counterparts. (TESEV 2005-2006)  
While the AKP has promoted democracy in Turkey and BMENA, TESEV has 
performed democracy promotion as a CSO. TESEV has significant partnerships with 
western institutions, such as National Democratic Institutes (NDI), No Peace Without 
Justice (NPWJ, Italy),  and National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the Middle 
Eastern CSOs, such as the Human Rights Information and Training Centre (HRITC, 
Yemen). TESEV, a significant partner CSO representing Turkey in DAD, has provided a 
great platform for the exchange of ideas between the CSOs and the governments in the 
region.100  
2-The Gulen Community 
In addition to TESEV, the Gulen group significantly contributes to the diffusion of 
democratic values as a civil society actor in areas they operate. The Gulen group is well-
known for its efforts in starting up educational institutions globally. The Gulen community 
                                                            
100 For further information, please visit TESEV Website at http://www.tesev.org.tr/Eng/  
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opens primary and high schools, college prep-schools, universities, language courses, 
cultural centers, residential holes, dormitories, and student houses almost in all countries.  
          The leader of the group is Fethullah Gulen. He is being recognized as an important 
religious scholar, public intellectual, and an Imam. He currently lives in a remote area in 
Pennsylvania, the US. According to Bilefski and Arsu, Gulen “has long advocated 
tolerance, peace and interfaith dialogue, drawing on the traditions of Sufism, a mystical 
strain of Islam generally viewed as being moderate.” (Bilefsky and Arsu 2012) However, 
many in Turkey accuse him for trying to infiltrate into the state apparatus. (Bilefsky and 
Arsu 2012) Despite the accusations, the Turkish courts have pronounced Gulen not 
guilty.  
Educational activities of the Gulen group are important in the sense that they diffuse 
the Turkish values through their educational activities, emphasizing the culture of tolerance 
and cohabitation, deeply rooted in Turkey’s Sufi background. When the importance of 
tolerance and multi-culturalism are considered for a functioning democracy, importance of 
the activities of the Gulen schools could be realized in a better way. For example, Gulen 
schools in Bosnia contain a diverse body of students, such as Serbs, Croats, and the Muslim 
Bosnians. These are three groups that fought severely after the resolution of Former 
Yugoslavia. The same case could be witnessed in Sudan and Afghanistan as well.101      
                                                            
101 The Author’s interview with a number of key movement members in different time periods and 
locations between 2010 and 2014.  
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The Gulen group also possesses a large media network consisting of national and 
international newspapers and TV channels. For example, the Zaman Press that is owned 
by the Gulen Group is circulated in the EU and Central Asian republics in addition to 
Turkey. The Hira journal that disseminates knowledge on culture, religion, and science, is 
published in Arabic, and has been gradually gaining popularity. The Hira is the Arabic 
addition of the Sizinti in Turkish and the Fountain in English. The publishing companies 
close to the Gulen movement translate the books on the Turkish understanding of Islam 
into Arabic. (Kirisci 2012) This is important in terms of the promotion of democracy, as 
Turkish culture and religious understanding rooted in Sufism is transferred to the target 
countries by these channels. It is needless to mention that Sufism, which emphasizes 
tolerance and kindness towards the creation of God, is quite compatible with Western 
democratic values; and it is being diffused to Turkey’s neighborhood partly by Gulen 
schools.    
Although the number of Gulen schools per country is very small, their effects 
should not be underestimated.  The graduates of the Turkish colleges and private schools 
are being appointed to the key bureaucratic positions in their countries. 102 There are two 
significant reasons for this: Firstly, students are accepted to these schools after they take 
competitive exams, so the students accepted are generally among the smartest. Students 
                                                            
102 Gulen schools teach multiple languages in the target countries. In addition to the official languages of 
the target countries, they teach English, Turkish, and sometimes Russian, French, German, and Arabic 
according to the rules of the target country. Furthermore, the students of Gulen schools are among the best 
in academic performance in their countries. Naturally they come to important positions after completing 
their degrees. One thing to keep in mind is that these students are also raised admiring Turkey and Turkish 
culture. Therefore, they take Turkey as a role model. Source: Multiple conversations with teachers working 
in Gulen schools in different countries between 2010 and 2014.     
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receiving the top scores in the entrance exams of these schools are awarded with 
scholarships; secondly, students need to pay tuition. Therefore, only the children of rich 
families and the smartest kids have the chance to be accepted to these schools in 
impoverished states of Asia, Africa, and Balkans; and these schools are generally being 
established in the cultural, economic and political centers of host countries. In this regard, 
Gulen schools can easily be regarded as elite raising schools. Children graduating from 
these elite schools are placed in the best possible positions in their home countries. The 
graduates of these schools get a great chance to lead their countries based on the 
professional and life experiences they acquire in Gulen schools.103  
Gulen community carries out its humanitarian activities to the crisis areas through 
Kimse Yokmu (Is Anyone There) organization. Kimse Yokmu focuses on providing aid, 
such as food, clean water, shelter, and medication to needy people, particularly during crisis 
times. (Kimse Yokmu 2014) Kimse Yokmu also builds schools, hospitals, temporary 
houses, tents, and orphanages in areas hit by natural disasters. For example, Kimse Yokmu 
opened an orphanage, health clinic, school, and a place to provide hot meal on daily basis 
in Haiti after the recent earthquake. (Kimse Yokmu 2014) Similar services were provided 
to Pakistan after the earthquake of 2005 and flood of 2010. Kimse Yokmu has also provided 
humanitarian assistance to countries as diverse as Somalia, Palestine, Bangladesh, 
Azerbaijan, and Bosnia. (Kimse Yokmu 2014)    
                                                            
103 The Author’s interview with a number of key movement members in different time periods and 
locations between 2010 and 2014. 
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3-MAZLUMDER 
Another significant CSO that contributes to Turkey’s democracy promotion agenda 
is MAZLUMDER (Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People). 
It prepares reports on human rights issues in the Muslim world. For example, 
MAZLUMDER published reports on human rights in Turkey, Arakan, Bahrein, and 
Bangladesh.  MAZLUMDER has also been organizing conferences, panels, round table 
meetings, demonstrations, and human rights awareness sessions. This way, 
MAZLUMDER contributes to Turkey’s democracy promotion agenda by creating 
awareness about the place of human rights within the Islamic context and human right 
abuses within the Muslim world. In this regard, MAZLUMDER is the conservative Muslim 
voice of universal values in the Muslim world representing Turkey. 
On the other hand, it is quite clear that MAZLUMDER is particularly interested in 
the human rights problems in the Muslim world. As a result of this profound interest in the 
Muslim affairs, MAZLUMDER has developed strong relations with Islamic civil society 
and political actors in the region. (MAZLUMDER 2014) A key member of MAZLUMDER 
reiterated that “we have a lot of credibility in the ME. Sometimes the officials ask help 
from us when they need to address an issue in the ME.” (Key Member of MAZLUMDER 
2012) Different from Gulen group, MAZLUMDER obviously and solely focuses on the 
Muslim world. While carrying out its human rights campaigns, MAZLUMDER has 
successfully utilized and is motivated by its Muslim identity.104  
                                                            
104 I inferred this from our conversation with my interviewees from MAZLUMDER and from examining 
the materials on their websites.  
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4-Doctors Worldwide  
Doctors Worldwide (Yeryuzu Doktorlari) is another significant CSO that provides 
humanitarian aid in the form of health assistance in countries with diverse identities and 
locations in the world. Doctors Worldwide are involved in a wide range of humanitarian 
activities. Initially, the Doctors was started by volunteer doctors performing free surgical 
operations in impoverished countries of Africa and Asia several times a year. Later, the 
Doctors got involved in building health clinics, hospitals, and educational centers in failed 
states, such as Somalia. Somalia does not have a working state system that could provide 
its people with the most basic services they need. Considering this desperate situation, the 
importance of the assistance of CSOs, as that of the Doctors, could be understood better. 
The Doctors bring Somalia the system it needs through health sector. It brings well 
educated doctors to train the doctors and technicians in Somalia. The Doctors have also 
opened hospitals in Yemen and Palestine. (Interview with a Doctors Worldwide Official 
2013) In the following section, I would like to explain the type of relationship these major 
CSOs have with the AKP government.       
Dependent or Independent 
Turkish CSOs play an important role in disseminating knowledge, raising human 
capital, building relations with the civil and governmental actors in the target countries via 
networking, and providing humanitarian aid. All of these are important factors of 
knowledge-based society and important components of democracy and its promotion. 
Turkish CSOs have also expanded their reach to a global scale in the last few years as a 
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result of the freedom environment provided by the EU membership process and economic 
development in Turkey.  
The AKP’s coming into power in Turkey has accelerated and strengthened the 
position of the Islamic CSOs performing humanitarian activities. Until then, the Islamic 
CSOs and political forces had functioned sporadically. Therefore, the accurate description 
of what happened was the mobilization of the political and civic forces that shared the same 
world view around the same ideals, humanitarian activities and the promotion of human 
rights. (Yanik 2013) Soon the state under the AKP leadership coalesced with these CSOs, 
and started to work with them in a more coordinated manner in conjunction with the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Red Crescent. (Interview with a 
Doctors Worldwide Official 2013) 
For CSOs to do their job effectively, they need to have a certain level of 
independence from the government. To empower their democracy, the CSOs need to play 
a balancing role against the government.105 Independent CSOs also constrain government 
abuse of state power. In the last 12 years, all of the aforementioned CSOs have developed 
close relations with the AKP government. However, this does not mean that they are being 
controlled by the Turkish state in any way. These CSOs were conducting humanitarian 
works long before the AKP government came to power. Turkish CSOs have been 
performing their activities despite the restrictions of the Turkish state for a long period of 
                                                            
105 Ketola, EU Democracy Promotion in Turkey, 2011  
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time. However, as most of these CSOs are Islamic in nature, the election of the AKP to 
power empowered their roles both domestically and internationally. 
For example, by using its influence in police and civilian bureaucracy, the Gulen 
community helped the AKP government to take the military under the civilian control. 
Recently, the Gulen movement has severely criticized the Turkish government for 
partaking in corruption, which came to the public attention on December 17, 2013. The 
Gulen community also criticized the AKP government and unconstitutional firing and 
reassigning thousands of police officers to undermine the 17 December corruption scandal 
in which several members of the AKP cabinet was involved, including the Turkish PM. 
However, as it could be seen in the Gulen movement case, despite a successful cooperation 
in the last several years, the AKP government and the Gulen movement are now at the 
loggerheads. This is a good example of CSOs’ independence from the government in 
Turkey. 
To give another example, according to MAZLUMDER, the AKP has done better 
than the previous governments in terms of the democratization of Turkey. However, 
MAZLUMDER, a Kurdish Islamic CSO, does not think that the AKP has done enough in 
terms of institutionalizing democratic values regarding the protection of the rights of the 
underdog groups, such as Kurds and devoted Muslims. (Unsal 2012) 
On the other hand, Doctors Worldwide does not have a political orientation as much 
as the Gulen movement and MAZLUMDER. Therefore, although they are not controlled 
by the state, they have not been confronting the state either. TESEV is a secular 
organization. Therefore, there is no ideological tie between TESEV and the AKP 
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government. Finally, it is clear that Turkish democracy promoting CSOs are highly 
independent from the Turkish government in their activities. When the policies of the 
government oppose their agendas, they take a highly critical stance towards the 
government. In the following section, I would like to discuss the contributions and the 
limitations of the Turkish CSO activities on the basis of interviews with CSO practitioners.  
However, the greatest weakness of the Turkish CSOs is that only when a 
governmental policy harms their interest, do they raise their voices. They do not unite their 
resources to fight for the rights and freedoms of the civilians as a whole. For example, as 
Ketola successfully indicates, secular Turkish women groups have quite an 
uncompromising approach against the rights of religious women to cover. In this regard, 
unfortunately, in Turkey, the role Turkish CSOs play, as a whole, is far from where it is 
supposed to be so as to strengthen Turkish democracy.     
The Strengths and Limitations of the CSOs 
It is crucial to realize that humanitarian involvement can simultaneously be a 
strategic investment to serve Turkish interests. For example, one of the interviewees from 
Doctors Worldwide CSO that did not want his name to be disclosed suggested that 
“Turkish nation started humanitarian aid in Somalia without any consideration of strategic 
calculations, only for humanitarian reasons. However, the humanitarian aid to Somalia 
created a strong bond between Somalia and Turkey beneficial for Turkish interests. Turkey 
has become the most trusted ally of Somalia, and we have influence over the government 
of Somalia… It is important in terms of having a foot in mid-Africa. Once (North) Somalia 
was controlled by Ottomans, and the government surely, as a part of its historical mission, 
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finds it necessary to partake in resolving the crisis that Somalia is going through at the 
moment.” (Interview with a Doctors Worldwide Official 2013)  
When I asked where Turkey stood in comparison with the US and the EU in terms 
of influence over Somalia, he told me that “we are not even close to them. They have big 
budgets for such works, and they make well-designed long term consistent plans. Our 
resources are much smaller; the way we work is not consistent; we do not work on the basis 
of well-structured long time plans like the West. What brings us the added value is that we 
deliver aid to crisis hit areas ourselves. The aid we provide is concrete and it directly meets 
people’s immediate needs, such as food, shelter, and larger projects, such as constructing 
orphanages, hospitals, roads, parliament, schools, water wells, and airports. People see 
these, and they have great impact on people’s daily lives and facilitate the functioning of 
the Somalia government. On the other hand, the aid delivered to Somalia for example, 
through the UN institutions, reaches people in need really late.  When it reaches, often the 
crises are already over. In this regard, the timely delivery of UN humanitarian aid in crisis 
hit areas is inefficient and less effective.” (Interview with a Doctors Worldwide Official 
2013) 
Another interviewee gave some additional information about the way Turkish 
CSOs work providing humanitarian aid. He started with criticizing the UN by telling me 
that “the UN staff is afraid to interact with people in crisis areas. For example, in Haiti, 
after the last (2010) earthquake, because of security reasons, the UN delayed the delivery 
of the items for the urgent needs, such as food and shelter. People started to get violent 
because of hunger. On the other hand, we started to deliver the aid that we brought from 
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Turkey immediately. We established our tents to distribute food, clothes, and shelter, and 
we constructed a tent health clinic and a place for orphans immediately. Furthermore, we 
recruited Haitians to work with us for the delivery of the humanitarian aid. Fortunately, we 
were not faced with any dangerous situation there. The UN approach to people in crisis 
areas is biased. They see these people as dangerous.” (Interview with a member of Kimse 
Yokmu 2012)   
On the other hand, Ahmet Unsal’s remarks, gives us important clues in terms of the 
influence of the Turkish Islamic CSOs in the ME. According to Unsal, “MAZLUMDER 
has a considerable level of credibility in the Muslim world. Using this credibility, we try 
to bring the conflicting Islamic groups together to facilitate the settlement of their 
problems.” (Unsal 2012) Although Unsal made these claims on the basis of his own 
experience as a top official in MAZLUMDER, the other major CSOs, which have Islamic 
sensitivities, are perceived the same way. For example, the Gulen group and Doctors 
Worldwide have a highly positive image in the ME as a result of their humanitarian 
activities.  
Although in terms of the provision of humanitarian assistance, the Turkish groups 
are not as professional as the Western groups, in some other areas the Turkish civil society 
could be doing an equally good, if not a better job. For example, TESEV publishes high 
quality reports about different issues in the ME. Moreover, the Gulen schools, most of 
which are among the top schools wherever they have been started up, have become a brand 
that represents Turkey worldwide.    
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In conclusion, the Turkish civil society has recently emerged as an important actor 
in Turkey’s relations with the other countries. The Turkish civil society has deep roots of 
charitable foundations. The Turkish CSOs function in the area of humanitarian assistance, 
education, health, politics, and economy. The major Turkish groups to be named are 
TESEV, the Gulen Community, MAZLUMDER, and Doctors Worldwide. While these 
civil society actors contribute to the democratic development and transformation of the 
target states, they also create strong bonds between the people in target states and the 
Turkish people. Although these groups cooperate with the government in the areas where 
they have common goals, they focus on their own agendas when it diverges or conflicts 
with that of the government.  
Turkish CSOs have important weaknesses, but their strengths in some other areas 
compensate for their weaknesses. One important weakness of the Turkish CSOs is that they 
lack a long term and well-designed plan for their activities. In this regard, the strategic 
benefit of their activities might disappear in a short period of time. The strength of the 
Turkish CSOs originates from their direct interaction with people, particularly in crisis hit 
areas. Furthermore, some civil organizations have become successful in creating global 
brands. The Turkish Islamic CSOs are in a more advantaged position when it comes to 
establishing firm relations with the groups in the region. Their shared identity with region 
plays a facilitative role in this regard.   
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CHAPTER VIII: THE LIMITATIONS, STRENGHS, AND SPECIFICITIES OF 
TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIC ACTIVISM IN THE ME 
Hitherto, I have explained the domestic and international contexts in which Turkey 
launched its official democracy promotion policy in the ME, Turkey’s motivations for 
promoting democracy, the conditions under which Turkey’s democracy promotion policy 
is being militarized, the strategies through which Turkey has promoted democracy, and the 
role of the Turkish civil society in Turkey’s democracy promotion policy. However, 
without explaining the limits of Turkey’s democratic activism in the ME, this research 
remains incomplete. Furthermore, as I stated at the very beginning of this dissertation, I 
would also like to explain how Turkey’s democracy promotion policy differ from that of 
the West.  
In this chapter, I will first explain the perception of BMENA region about Turkey. 
The perceptions are important particularly as they tell how receptive the ME is to the 
regional power role that Turkey claims. Next, I will examine whether Turkey’s democratic 
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activism is effective, if not, what the reasons are for that. Finally, I will introduce the 
specificities of Turkey’s democracy promotion policy in the ME.      
BMENA’s Perception of Democracy and the Turkish Role 
In terms of democracy, as in the rest of the world, people in the ME had a highly 
favorable opinion of democracy. As McFaul argues, democracy has a near-universal 
appeal. (McFaul 2004-2005) This is also the case in the ME. Moreover, according to the 
Pew-Research Global Attitudes Project Survey, people in the ME find Turkey as a sincere 
promoter of democracy in the region, unlike the promotion of the US and Israel. Not 
surprisingly, countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, where Turkey did not have urgent 
security interests at stake and where Turkey quickly called on their dictators to leave power 
when the protests started, were the ones that had the most favorable opinion of Turkish 
democratic activism in the region in 2011 and 2012. However, the Egyptian and Syrian 
public opinions towards Turkey changed between 2012 and 2013.      
Table 14. Continuing Desire for Democracy 
 
 
*Source: Pew-Research Global Attitudes Project, 2012. 
Countries 2011 2012 Change
Lebanon 81% 84% 3
Turkey 66% 71% 5
Egypt 71% 67% -4
Tunisia - 63% -
Jordan 72% 61% -11
Pakistan 42% 42% 0
Continuing Desire for Democracy
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Although key Turkish policy makers relate the new interests in the Middle East 
towards Turkey to Turkey’s EU accession process, the polls show that “Turkey’s vastly 
improved image in the Middle East over the last decade is often attributed to its new active 
foreign policy in the region, its economy and popular culture.” (Levack and Percinoglu 
2012) 
A public opinion poll conducted by TESEV in 2012 indicates that the average 
positive perception towards Turkey in the BMENA was 75%. While in North Africa and 
the Arab peninsula, around 84% of people had positive perceptions towards Turkey, in 
Levant, it was 66% and in Iran 71%.106 However, the popularity of Turkey dropped to 59% 
in 2013, the sharpest decline being in Egypt and Syria, where Turkey has had acted highly 
partisan during the Arab Spring. 
Table 15. People Think That Turkey Favors Democracy in the ME 
 
*Source: Pew-Research Global Attitudes Project, 2012. 
Table 16. I totally agree that Turkey can become a model for BMENA region 
countries 
 
                                                            
106 North Africa includes Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt; the Arab Peninsula includes Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman.    
Lebanon 49
Turkey 58
Egypt 78
Tunisia 74
Jordan 70
Pakistan 38
People think, Turkey favors 
Democracy in the ME (%)
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*Source: TESEV 2013 Public Opinion Poll Survey in BMENA Region (Akgun and 
Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East in 2013 2014) 
Table 16 indicates that Turkey is still seen as a model in the region by 51%. People 
who think that Turkey could become a model do so for Turkey’s growing economy (34%), 
democracy (24%), secular political system (19%), Muslim background (20%), and its 
strategic value (6%). Although the polls show that only 20% of people in the BMENA 
think that Turkey’s Muslim identity is what makes Turkey a model, if this religious 
component was not there, presenting Turkey as a model to the region would be quite 
meaningless; one of the European countries could pretty well play that role.   
Table 17. Turkey’s Role in the ME 
 
Egypt 42%
Jordan 66%
Lebanon 49%
Palestine 72%
S. Arabia 65%
Syria 21%
Iraq 62%
Tunisia 74%
Gulf 58%
Yemen 70%
Libya 67%
Date Influence Model Cohabitation Bigger Role
2011 70% 61% 67% 71%
2012 61% 53% 58% 66%
2013 64% 51% 55% 60%
Turkey’s Role in the Middle East
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*Influence: Turkey has become more and more influential in BMENA Region politics in 
the recent years. 
*Model: Turkey can be a model for BMENA Region countries. 
*Cohabitation: Turkey is a successful example of coherence of Islam and democracy. 
*Bigger Role: Turkey should play a bigger role in the BMENA Region. 
*Source: TESEV 2013 BMENA Public Opinion Poll (Akgun and Gundogar, The 
Perception of Turkey in the Middle East in 2013 2014) 
Table 17 indicates interesting facts about how people perceive Turkey in the ME. 
On one hand, belief for Turkey’s playing a model role dropped from 61% in 2011 to 51% 
in 2013. On the other hand, people still think that Turkey is an influential actor in the 
BMENA region. While in 2011, the rate of people who thought this way was 70%, this rate 
decreased to 61% in 2012, and then climbed up to 64% in 2013, a period where Turkish 
policies are the most questioned in the ME.  Finally, the rate of people who think that 
Turkey should play a greater role in the ME has dropped from 71% in 2011 to 66% in 2012, 
and then to 60% in 2013 in the BMENA region. However, most of people still think that 
Turkey should play a role, despite the troubles that Turkey has faced in Egypt (the removal 
of its closest ally, Morsi, from office) and Syria (Turkey’s support for anti-Assad groups  
has made Turkey an unpopular actor there).  
One of the questionnaires tried to measure the positive influence of external actors 
on the process of Arab Spring in people’s perception. While in 2011, 56% of people 
considered Turkey to have a positive influence over the Arab Spring, this number declined 
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to 42% in 2012, and then to 37 in 2013. In this regard, Turkey had the highest ratio 
compared to the other actors, such as the US (24%), France (28%), Germany (27%), the 
UK (26%), Russia (29% in 2012, 38% in 2013) and China (29% in 2012, 38% in 2013) for 
the year 2013. However, an interesting fact is that the perception about the Russian and 
Chinese role has improved. (Akgun and Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle 
East in 2013 2014) This is a bad news as the democratic states are losing credibility in the 
region. This could lead people to imitate Russia and China instead of the democratic world.  
To sum up, there is a favorable environment towards Turkish role in the BMENA 
region. Only in Egypt and Syria, perceptions towards Turkey have sharply declined. 
Nevertheless, even in these two countries, substantial segments of the population support 
the Turkish role. These are the groups that Turkey has supported in these two countries 
during the Arab Spring. It can clearly be seen that perceptions change quite rapidly, 
meaning that a country can transform the perception in the target countries by following 
the right policies. In these regard, Turkey can improve the way people perceive it in Egypt 
and Syria in the long run by moderating the aspects of its policies towards these countries 
that people find unattractive.  
Moreover, people in the ME believe in the sincerity of the Turkish leadership in 
their support for democratization of the region. This is a big plus for Turkey. This means 
that Turkey still has credibility and soft power in the BMENA region. Turkey has the 
potential to make BMENA states do what it wants them to do by its attraction and 
credibility rather than by hard power tools. In this regard, Turkey should be very careful 
not to further damage its credibility in the region.  
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However, one point that needs to be paid serious attention is that the perception 
towards positive role that the democratic world, including Turkey, played during the Arab 
Spring has been declining while Russia’s and China’s roles has gained more credibility. In 
this regard, this is an alarming situation as people might prefer authoritarianism instead of 
democracy as a result of the inconsistent behaviors of the well-established democracies. 
However, an equally important issue is whether Turkey has the capacity to turn these 
positive perceptions into strategic gains in the region. In the following section, I will try to 
find an answer for this question.   
The Effectiveness of the Turkish Democracy Promotion 
As it has been indicated in the previous chapters, Turkey has substantially invested 
in its ties with the ME. Among the other things, one substantial goal of Turkey is to become 
a regional hegemon in the ME. This goal does not contradict Turkey’s other goals, such as 
promoting stability and democracy in the region. However, the question is whether Turkey 
is able to play such a role. If it is not, what is the reason for that? 
Statistics about Turkey’s economy and politics indicate that Turkey can actually 
play a major role in the ME if its shortages are being addressed. To give some detailed 
information, Turkey possesses the second largest NATO army. Turkey has also been 
building its high-tech weaponry systems progressively.107 Turkish economy is the 16th 
largest globally and 6th largest in the EU. (CIA World Facts Book 2013) While Turkey’s 
                                                            
107 For detailed information about Turkey’s military power, see Sabah Gazetesi, Rakamlarla Turkiye ve 
Suriye Ordulari, February 28, 2013. http://www.sabah.com.tr/fotohaber/dunya/rakamlarla-turkiye-ve-
suriye-ordulari?albumId=42823&tc=18&page=8 
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GDP was USD 232 billion when the AKP obtained power in 2002, it went up to USD 1125 
billion in 2012. Parallel to this, GDP per capita went from USD 3.500 in 2002 to over USD 
12.000 in 2012. (Webpage n.d.) Turkey’s export to the ME went from around USD 4.5 
billion in 2002 to around USD 33.3 billion in 2012. Turkey’s import from the ME jumped 
from around USD 3.1 billion in 2002 to around USD 24 billion in 2011. (Turkish Statistical 
Institute 2013) No other country in the region has the military and economic power at this 
magnitude. Turkey’s imperial experience in the region also sets it apart from the other 
states.   
The same positive trend has been observed in the support that Turkey provides for 
democratic transformation in the ME. To provide some details, Turkish ODA to the ME 
increased from USD 2.45 million in 2003 to USD 1.7 billion in 2012. (TIKA 2012) Turkey 
took part in a limited NATO military campaign against Gaddafi in Libya; Turkey opened 
its doors to Syrian refugees, and assisted the Syrian opposition in their fight against Assad. 
Turkey strongly supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia after their 
election to power. Turkey provided them with financial assistance, consultation, know-how 
transfer, and technical assistance in the areas of security, democracy, society, and economy. 
Turkey’s Islamic CSOs, most of which has global humanitarian agendas with a special 
focus on the Muslim World, also increased their engagement with the ME. (TIKA 2012) 
Although Turkey increased the amount of its aid that it provided for 
democratization and development of the states in the ME, Turkey’s human structure that 
could effectively and efficiently turn this investment into long term strategic benefits is 
missing. Turkish Foreign Mission is the primary institution that is responsible for 
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establishing the infrastructure for the realization of Turkey’s regional and global goals. 
(Kutluay and Dincer 2012) The human infrastructure could entail the low number of 
employees representing the Turkish Foreign Mission in the ME. It could also refer to the 
insufficient expertize on the ME in Turkey. In fact, Turkey’s failed Syrian and Egyptian 
policies well indicate Turkey’s urgent need for experts on the ME.    
In order to clarify this point, let me provide some details. Turkey has 25 foreign 
missions in the Arab ME. The total number of career staff working in the Arab ME is 135 
(See Table 18), and this means that Turkey is represented by 5 diplomatic staff in each 
Arab state. Only 6 employees out of 135 can speak Arabic. The 2011 statistics indicate that 
a sum of 26 employees can speak Arabic in Turkish Foreign Mission. This was 10 in 1990. 
Turkish Foreign Mission has traditionally complained about the heavy workload because 
of the insufficient employees that confined its operational capabilities. However, this 
problem has worsened as a result of Turkey’s increased engagement with the ME.        
Table 18. Institutional Infrastructure of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry 
 
1990 2000 2011
Embassies 73 91 114
Consulates 53 59 71
Permanent
Missions  8 11 11
Total Number
of Personnel
3.957 4.574 5.744
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*Source: Data in this table is obtained from the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry by 
Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mustafa Kutlay.  
Although Turkey has increased the number of employees in its Foreign Mission in 
the ME, this number is far from being sufficient. This becomes obvious particularly when 
we compare it with the foreign missions of the other major countries. For example, in 2011, 
the US had 66591 employees, and it allocated Euro 39336 million to its foreign mission. 
The number of employees working for the Turkish foreign Mission was 5533 for 2011. 
This number was 4574 in 2000 and 3957 in 1990. In 2011, Turkey allocated around Euro 
437 million to its Foreign Mission. Germany on the other hand allocated Euro 3194 million 
to its Foreign Mission in 2011. For the same year, the number of employees working for 
the German Foreign Mission was 12437. For 2011, Brazil allocated Euro 986 million to its 
Foreign Mission. The number of employees working for the Brazilian Foreign Mission was 
4150. (Kutluay and Dincer 2012) Other major EU countries, such as the UK, France, and 
Italy allocate much more resources to their Foreign Missions compared to Turkey. 
As the statistics indicate, Turkey is way below the US and Germany in terms of 
resources that it allocates to its Foreign Mission. Although Turkey’s human infrastructure 
is better than Brazil’s, Brazil allocates more budget to its Foreign Mission than Turkey. In 
this regard, in order for Turkey to be able to compete against the EU countries and the US, 
it needs to further improve its operational capabilities. (Kutluay and Dincer 2012) Only 
after the human infrastructure that carries out the projects is sufficient, can Turkey increase 
the effectiveness and the efficiency of the Turkish foreign mission in realizing Turkey’s 
regional ambitions. Turkey will achieve better results if it can pool its resources with that 
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of the EU and the US in the ME. However, because of differences in their identities which 
strongly impact their cost-benefit calculations, such cooperation in the area of supporting 
democratization in the ME does not seem to be a viable method.  
Turkey’s engagement with the ME is through many channels. As indicated in the 
previous chapters, TIKA, Turkish CSOs, Turkish Government, and the other Turkish 
governmental institutions provide assistance to the ME in their respective fields. However, 
despite such a large amount of investment, Turkish Foreign Mission remains weak as a 
result of its shortages in human infrastructure. This affects all other institutions as the 
Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry is the head institution that coordinates all the aid on the 
basis of Turkey’s foreign policy priorities. In this regard, Turkey’s democratic and 
humanitarian projects in the ME remain haphazard, short-term, on-demand, and without a 
meaningful long term strategic calculation by the Turkish officials. Even if Turkey 
formulates a long term strategic plan for its investment in the ME, the inadequate human 
infrastructure of Turkish Foreign Mission would not correspond to this long term plan.   
On the other hand, Turkey is perceived quite positively in the ME. (Akgun and 
Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey in the ME in 2013 2014) However, this positive 
perception of Turkey, as the developments in Syria and Egypt have indicated, could wane 
away in a short period of time, if the right decisions are not made by politicians. Under the 
AKP administration, Turkey has tried to maintain its strategic relations with states in the 
ME over official institutions and mechanisms. Inter-cabinet meetings that indicated 
strategic alliances and free trade zone agreements were good practices of this 
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institutionalization. Again the lack of experts that would be responsible for maintaining 
these relations on a regular basis has not been adequate as indicated above.     
Interestingly, lack of a well-structured plan and institution to support 
democratization in the ME has still had some positive implications. (Kirisci 2012) Turkey’s 
democracy is still in the making. What Turkey does most of the time in the ME is to share 
its experience. Parallel to Turkey’s democratization and economic development, its 
relations with the ME in areas of trade, tourism, media, entertainment, education, and 
bureaucracy have also substantially improved. The region witnessed the pains of 
democratic and economic growth in Turkey, and the global media, such as Al-Jazeera and 
CNN, played a role in informing people about this change. In fact, without the impact of 
the global media, as an intervening variable in this process, the transformations in Turkey 
would not produce the results witnessed at the present. Next, the democratic transformation 
in Turkey motivated groups in the ME to achieve the same outcomes. (Ulgen 2011) This is 
Turkey’s demonstrative effect. Turkey has achieved success through its demonstrative 
impact by becoming a source of inspiration for people in the region, which brought about 
the Arab spring. (Kirisci 2012) 
Positive public opinion about Turkey in the ME has placed Turkey in a more 
advantageous position over the Western states. According to 2013 SETA public opinion 
poll in the BMENA region, despite Turkey’s over-engagement with some countries in the 
region which caused a severe decline in positive perception towards it, such as in Syria and 
Egypt, over 50% of people still perceive Turkey positively, and want Turkey to play a 
greater role in the ME. In this regard, the ME has the good will that Turkey needs to 
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materialize on. (Akgun and Gundogar, The Perception of Turkey in the ME in 2013 2014) 
However, Turkey does not have the necessary human infrastructure and experience to 
materialize on this good will. (Dincer and Kutluay 2012)  
Furthermore, Turkey needs to be careful not to harm this positive perception in the 
region. Currently, there is a gap between Turkey’s aspirations and capabilities. Therefore, 
Turkey needs to follow a low profile in the region in line with its organizational 
capabilities. Once its organizational capabilities reach a meaningful level, then Turkey 
should try to realize more ambitious goals, such as the order giving role. At the moment, 
the only way to shape the political order in the ME for Turkey is to work as closely as 
possible with the international society, particularly the EU, the US, and the regional 
powers.     
One important question concerns, how Turkey differs from the US in terms of its 
activism in the ME. Moreover, what are some futures of the Turkish democracy promotion 
that are absent in the West? In the following section, I will try to answer these questions.  
The Specificities of the Turkish Democracy Promotion  
There are a couple of points that need to be distinguished about Turkey’s 
democracy promotion. Firstly, Turkey still does not have an official democracy promoter 
institute. Although TIKA is progressively transforming into such an institution, it is not 
there yet. (Kirisci 2012) Secondly, Turkish officials do not call what they do in the ME as 
democracy promotion. The reason is that democracy promotion has a negative connotation 
in Turkey. The rhetoric of democracy promotion is seen as a tool to exploit the natural 
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resources in the ME. Therefore, Turkish officials name what they do as supporting welfare, 
human rights, and stability in the ME.  
Moreover, the dominant view among the Western scholars is that states promote 
democracy in the target countries when their short-term strategic interests are not 
threatened or when democratization of the target states serve promoters long term strategic 
interests.108 (Smith 2010) The Turkish case is the case of a medium power which has no 
control over crucial political developments in its immediate neighbors. Simultaneously, 
Turkey partly promotes democracy to preserve its short-term security/survival as well as 
long term economic and security/alliances interests.  
To specify this point, Turkey’s engagement with Iraq under the American 
occupation and currently with Syria hit by the Arab Spring is a result of its concerns for its 
territorial integrity and national unity. Turkey, as a medium power, does not have the ability 
to oppose the US, which aimed to install democracy in Iraq after its occupation. In order 
for Iraq, which is heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and sect, to maintain its territorial 
integrity, Iraq needed to have a working state after the occupation. Thus, democracy 
promotion has become a useful tool for Turkey to ensure its survival by building a working 
Iraqi state. Otherwise, the divisions on the basis of ethnic or sectarian lines in Iraq could 
threaten Turkey’s territorial integrity.  
Turkish democracy promotion serves its long term strategic interests for three 
reasons: Firstly, Turkey believes that only democracy could create a long term stable 
                                                            
108 See also Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 1996.   
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environment, conducive to investment and sustainable peace in the ME; secondly, Turkey 
wants the states in the ME to organize themselves in the same manner so that economic 
and political interactions between Turkey and these states become easier; and thirdly, 
democratization in the Middle Eastern states helps bring the friendly, like-minded 
governments to power. Turkey does promote democracy for humanitarian reasons. 
However, this happens only when its strategic interests are not at stake. Therefore, 
regardless of their power capabilities, primary concern of states is their survival, and the 
humanitarian concerns have a secondary importance for them. (Waltz 1979)     
Furthermore, Turkey has the leverage of being a Muslim nation in the ME. Unlike 
the West, Turkey does not feel threatened by the empowerment of the Islamic groups in 
the ME. However, this is not the case for the US and the EU. For example, when in 2005 
and 2006, Islamic groups gained more power in the ME, both the US and the EU withdrew 
their support for democratization of the region. The reason was that they thought the 
election of these Islamic groups, strong critics of the Western policies towards the ME, was 
antithetical to the Western interests. (Youngs and Wittes 2009) On the other hand, Turkey 
did not think the way the West thought. Furthermore, Turkey called the backtracking of 
the West as double standards against the elected devoted Muslims. Suddenly, Turkey found 
itself at the loggerheads with the West as it continued to support democratically elected 
Islamic forces in the ME. Therefore, values of statesmen can strongly influence their 
policies towards the target states.  
Moreover, the AKP’s role conception towards the ME strongly influences its 
subsequent policies. The AKP perceives Turkey as the heir of the Ottomans. It also 
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conceives Turkey as a regional power in the ME. As a result, the AKP necessarily attributes 
the leadership and the role of being the organizer in the region to Turkey. Therefore, in the 
AKP psyche, democratization of the ME would help people to emancipate themselves from 
the dictators who are the remnants of the Western imperial past. Democracy would also 
help bring the like-minded governments to power in the ME. Then, long missed regional 
integration in the ME could be realized.   
The motivation for bringing like-minded governments to power seems to be the 
common point regardless of global power statuses of the states when promoting 
democracy. It is generally agreed that the US has many flaws and inconsistencies in its 
democracy promotion. Moreover, it has also been stated that the US support of democracy 
has been to serve the purpose of bringing American-friendly groups to power in target 
states. Similarly, Turkey has helped substantially the elected Islamic parties in Arab Spring 
countries as a matter of strategic alliance building. Often though, it is the harmony between 
states’ aspirations and power capabilities that mostly determines the chances that such 
policies will have to succeed. 
Hitherto, I have explained the limits of Turkey’s role and the differences between 
Turkey’s and the West’s democracy promotion policies. In the following section, I would 
like to explain the type of democracy Turkey promotes in the ME.  
The Type of Democracy Turkey Promotes in the ME 
As I argued in the previous chapters, Turkey promotes democracy in a number of 
ways, including regionalization, military intervention, experience sharing, political party 
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training, and demonstrative effect. Therefore, the nature of Turkey’s democracy promotion 
should be examined from a number of dimensions. 
To begin with, one way Turkey promotes democracy in the ME is by sharing its 
experience. Turkey transfers its democratic procedures, norms, institutions, and 
mechanism in the process of experience sharing to the states in the ME. Ikenberry argues 
that “a common identity among states facilitates the establishment of a stable and durable 
order. Values and a sense of community matter as a source of order—not just power and 
interests… States with similar political values and social purposes will be more likely to 
understand each other, which facilitates cooperation. If the common values are liberal and 
democratic, substantive norms exist that specify expectations about how conflicts are to be 
resolved.” (Ikenberry 2000) 
In this regard, the more neighbors around Turkey organize themselves in a fashion 
similar to Turkey, the easier it becomes to interact with its neighbors for Turkey. Turkey 
generally shares experience and transfers know-how in areas, such as finance, security, 
banking, border regimes, social services, and building physical and human infrastructures 
essential to the functioning of a state. Because Turkey’s democracy is far from perfect, it 
transfers its experience in democratic functioning of the states to the ME with all its flaws 
and weaknesses.   
In other words, Turkey promotes democracy in the ME through political party 
training. The AKP has been providing Islamic parties in the ME with training. Political 
party training entails how to run an affective election campaign, to set the party structure, 
to frame discussions, to set agendas, to connect with people, to outreach the youths and 
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women, and how to act in post-conflict settings. The AKP basically teaches the Islamic 
parties how to achieve success in their respective countries.  
The AKP has an Anglo-Saxon understanding of secularism that promotes the 
freedom of religious practices, a highly liberal political conception of women that stresses 
the participation of women in all sectors of life, a populist understanding of democracy that 
places the main emphasis on elections despite the pluralist rhetoric, and a conservative 
understanding of social issues, such as the alcohol consumption, mixed male-female 
student houses, and abortion. In this regard, these are the values that the AKP transfers to 
the participant political parties via training.  
Nevertheless, it does not mean that the participants automatically accept the 
promoted values. For example, the Egyptian Justice and Freedom Party opposed the idea 
of secular state promoted by Erdogan right away. Unlike the Egyptian Islamists, Tunisian 
Justice and Development Party embraced the idea of secular rule more readily.  
Turkey’s demonstrative impact has been one of the most influential ways to 
promote democracy in the ME. The reason is two folds. Firstly, Turkey diffuses its values 
to the surrounding countries via socialization through trade, tourism, cultural and 
educational exchanges. Secondly, global media has also effectively presented Turkey as a 
model to the ME. This was in line with the role ascribed to Turkey by BMENA initiative. 
In this regard, democratic and economic growth of Turkey was being presented to the ME 
via media networks, such as Al-Jazeera and CNN on regular basis. Without the 
endorsement of these media networks, even if Turkey achieved an impressive success, its 
impact in the ME would not be as powerful. Since Turkey had similar economic and 
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political problems with the Middle Eastern states, the positive developments in Turkey 
under the AKP rule, presented by powerful global media networks, created a substantial 
amount of interest towards Turkey. This paved the way for emulation of the Turkish values 
in a greater extend in the ME.         
In conclusion, this chapter indicates that the ME is still highly receptive to the role 
that Turkey wants to play in the ME. However, Turkey has some shortages that make its 
democratic activism and any other policy towards the region less effective. Turkey does 
not have the adequate human infrastructure to realize its goals in the ME. Furthermore, 
Turkey’s democracy promotion differs from that of the US firstly because of its strategic 
choices articulated within its respective cultural environment, its power capabilities as a 
medium power, its claim of regional power role in the ME, and its lack of an institution 
designed so as to promote democracy. The type of democracy Turkey promotes is similar 
to that of the West when the Turkish state shares its experience with the other states to 
develop human infrastructure and legal framework. Furthermore, the AKP plays a 
constructive role by mentoring the Islamic parties about how to adopt and achieve success 
in the authoritarian settings of their states and how to act in post-conflict political 
environment of their societies (such as the 2013 military coup d’état in Egypt).    
When the ME is examined, it is seen that the Arab world, despite what has 
happened, has a favorable opinion of Turkey and still thinks that Turkey could and should 
play a greater role in the ME. Only in Egypt and Syria, where Turkey has overly being 
involved, there is low support for the Turkish activism in the region (Egypt around 25% 
and Syria around 30%). Also, the Turkish promotion of democracy is considered sincere 
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as opposed to the Western promotion, which is being dismissed as hypocrisy. In this regard, 
Turkey has credibility, and people still think the Turkish stance matters. In this context, 
Turkey could actually play an important role in institutionalization of the democratic 
principles in the ME more than any other state.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION 
When the AKP was founded, Turkey was going through substantial social, political 
and economic processes. Among other things Turkey was devastated by the 1999 Istanbul 
earthquake, 2001 political crisis, economic devastations, and terrorism problem. Within 
this environment, the divide between the Islamists and the seculars as well as between 
Kurds and Turks sharply exacerbated. The Islamist Salvation Party government was 
removed from power by the pressure from the Turkish military in 1997. In this 
psychological context, some Turkish Islamists took a decision to establish the AKP.  
The AKP would be different from the Islamist party (National Salvation Party) in 
a number of ways. The AKP adopted a pro-Western, pro-democracy, and pro-open market 
economic system attitude.  In this regard, the AKP was founded as a globalization friendly 
political party. Furthermore, the AKP accepted the main pillars of the Turkish system, such 
as democracy and secularism. However, later the AKP would revise the Turkish secularism 
which had previously taken the American Anglo-Saxon understanding as a role model. The 
AKP would start prioritizing the urgent needs of people on its party list. This way, the AKP 
managed to stay away from ideological confrontations for a long period of time until 2008. 
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On the other hand, the AKP would try to retain the Western support to secure its existence 
within the unfriendly domestic political conditions of Turkey. In fact, without the Western 
support, the AKP would not be able to subordinate the Kemalist status quo in Turkey; and 
without the subordination of the Kemalists, the AKP would not be able to play the 
independent domestic and international roles it has been playing since 2008.   
The AKP’s leading members consisted of devoted Muslims who wanted to develop 
strong relations among the Muslim nations in all areas, such as politics, culture, and trade. 
Turkey’s identity as the heir of the Ottoman Empire had a prominent place in the psyche 
of the Turkish Islamists, which the AKP was a part of. The reason was that Ottomans 
represented the unification of a large segment of Muslims under the same political entity, 
providing them with security and stability for about 400 years. Therefore, in addition to 
leadership aspirations, the AKP also felt responsible for the nations the Ottomans governed 
once. The AKP was affected by some sort of anti-Westernism as well: the AKP found the 
Western imperial past to be the root cause of many significant problems in the Muslim 
world at the present.   
On the other hand, the AKP was well-aware that, its primary responsibility was to 
provide security for its people. The AKP also had to further Turkey’s wealth by finding 
new markets for the rapidly growing Turkish industry. The efforts of the AKP in both areas 
proved fruitful in a short period of time. The growing wealth in Turkey contributed to the 
resources of the Turkish state. Therefore, the AKP started to engage in the countries that 
Turkey has had substantial interests, particularly the ME, more assertively. The successful 
utilization of shared identity by the Islamic AKP government facilitated Turkey’s 
engagement with the ME. 
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The AKP engaged with the ME for many strategic and identity-based reasons. To 
begin with, Turkey’s survival was being threatened by American intervention in Iraq. 
Turkey also had interests in the region regarding economy and security. Secondly, it would 
be easier to develop mutually beneficial trade ties with the people in the ME because of the 
shared identity. However, for this to happen, the region needed an atmosphere of 
cooperation, peace and stability. An EU-like regional integration in the ME would provide 
the region with the long-missed stability. However, the realization of this goal was difficult 
when the dictators were still in power in the ME. Democracy would provide the people of 
the region with the chance to reflect their national will in decision making mechanisms of 
their countries. As the people of the region have a strong concept of being the members of 
the same Ummah (religious community), they would be willing to integrate with the other 
Muslims in the region. Therefore, democracy promotion would become a tool for Turkey 
to engage with the ME to realize these goals.  
When the US intervened in Iraq, Turkey’s national security was severely being 
threatened. The US intervention in Iraq initiated a process of regime change. Turkey as a 
regional power under the AKP leadership did not have enough power to prevent the US 
intervention in Iraq. Therefore, the AKP tried to influence the Iraqi government taking into 
consideration the new legal and political conditions which were in the making. The 
integrity and unity of Iraq became the primary security interest of Turkey. The partition of 
Iraq on the basis of ethnic and sectarian lines could have a spill-over effect on Turkey. In 
this regard, the AKP tried to push different ethnic and sectarian groups to participate in the 
democratic processes of Iraq by the utilization of diplomacy and rarely hard power. The 
goal was to increase the legitimacy of the new Iraqi authority by the participation of all 
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elements of the Iraqi society in the reestablishment of their country. Similarly, the AKP 
transferred Turkey’s democratic experience to Iraq to help create a functioning state and 
democracy there. Otherwise, Iraq would end in partition, which would be detrimental for 
Turkey’s territorial integrity.  
The US’ BMENA initiative, launched in 2004, created a significant incentive for 
the AKP to realize its goals. The AKP was able to retain the leadership position in the 
initiative since it was assigned as a co-chair of BMENA along with the US. The BMENA 
aimed to democratize the ME and North African Arabic speaking countries in addition to 
Iran and Turkey. Turkey as the most democratic Muslim state would be a positive role 
model for these nations. Therefore, the constructive Turkish role in the ME was supported 
by the US. Turkey was also backed to minimize the influence of Iran in the region. The 
BMENA anticipated regionalization in the ME, similar to that of the EU. The AKP strongly 
supported this; the BMENA would also provide the AKP with the opportunity to improve 
its relations with the Muslim nations.    
However, the AKP would raise several objections to the American way of 
promoting democracy. The AKP stressed a long-term, consistent, internally driven, and 
multilateral process of democratic transformation in the ME. This opposed the US’ liberal 
interventionist, instant, and externally pressed approach of democratization. Nevertheless, 
both the US and Turkey accepted the necessity of democratization in the region, which was 
beneficial for all parties involved. The EU had a stance similar to that of Turkey regarding 
the democratization of the ME. However, the EU would act similarly to the US when the 
Islamic groups gained power in the ME in 2005 and 2006 elections. 
223 
On the other hand, the engagement with Iraq proved quite useful for Turkey. The 
trade between Turkey and Iraq substantially developed in favor of Turkey. The Turkish 
private sector flew into Iraq to sell their products. The Iraqi economy was being 
progressively dominated by the Turkish goods. Then, the business groups demanded 
Turkey to develop similar ties with the other neighbors as well. The increased separatist 
Kurdish threat, triggered by the formation of Kurdish Regional Government in North Iraq, 
also compelled Turkey to work hard to coordinate their efforts on the Kurdish problem 
with the states that contained substantial Kurdish populations, such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria.  
As Turkey started to cooperate with these countries on the basis of security, it also 
developed strong trade ties. Trade became the most substantial way to diffuse the 
democratic experiences of Turkey to the surrounding countries. To provide an example, 
Turkey transferred its economic regulations to create a harmony between the Turkish and 
Syrian markets and border control rules. The experience was later extended to Lebanon 
and Jordon as well. Turkey was progressively being seen as a role model by the countries 
in BMENA. Both the AKP experiment and the Turkish economy received substantial 
attention. Islamic parties from all over the Muslim world wanted training from the AKP, 
such as from Tunisia, Palestine, North Iraq, and Egypt. Correspondingly, many countries 
asked Turkey for technical training and experience sharing in the areas, such as banking, 
finance, FDI regulations, and trade tariffs. The AKP also shared its experience on how it 
dealt with the Kurdish problem. It shared its Kurdish Opening reform packages with Syria. 
This way, Turkey’s values were being progressively diffused to the surrounding countries. 
Increased trade between countries paved the way for increasing tourism and cultural 
exchange. 
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However, the AKP started to worry about keeping and maintaining these newly 
acquired strategic gains in the ME.  The stability of the region was the most important 
condition for the continuity of this mutually beneficial process between the countries in the 
region. When the Arab Spring arrived, although it could have a destabilizing impact over 
the region, the AKP welcomed it. The reason was threefold: the feelings about Turkey’s 
historical and religious responsibilities towards people in the region, the pressure from the 
Turkish society, and the desire to maintain long term stability in the region. Long term 
stability was a requirement for Turkey’s survival, alliances, and economic interests. 
However, the demand of people for freedom and justice should not have been overlooked. 
Therefore, Turkey started to support the movements in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Turkey did not have the type of strategic 
interests in these countries that Turkey had in its neighbors: the developments in 
neighboring countries could risk the very survival of the Turkish state. On the other hand, 
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt were seen as important markets and strategic allies in the ME. 
These countries successfully replaced dictators with democratically elected leaders in 2011 
and 2012. The AKP developed strong relations with the Islamic actors in the BMENA 
before the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring opened the way for these Islamic actors to come 
to the leadership positions in their respective countries. Therefore, the previously 
established friendship ties between the Islamic actors in BMENA, including Turkey, turned 
into a strategic alliance, empowering all groups within this network. However, lack of the 
Western support to the Islamists in Egypt and the mistakes of the Egyptian Islamist 
government would fail this new geopolitical alliance formation. Erdogan’s strong pro-
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Morsi attitude after his removal from power would damage the relations between Turkey 
and Egypt under the new Egyptian administration.  
When the wave arrived to Syria, the AKP took a stance supportive of the forces 
demanding political change for a number of reasons. Firstly, the previous reaction of the 
AKP to the protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and Lebanon compelled it to act in the same 
normative lines. If it did not do so, it would be accused of hypocrisy, damaging its 
credibility and its role as a positive model in the region. Secondly, the AKP thought that 
similar to the previous cases, Syria would transit to democracy in no time, and Turkey 
would reap the rewards when the new friendly groups were elected. Thirdly, Turkey 
thought that the only way to maintain the long term stability in Syria, a country where 
Turkey has substantial security and economic interests, was to support the opposition. 
Fourthly, the AKP thought that people demanded and deserved to live in a democratic 
setting where they are being taken seriously for the decision they make about the future of 
their children.  
However, the conflict in Syria continued way longer than the AKP expected. 
Turkey’s national security started to be threatened again, similar to the situation after the 
American intervention in Iraq. Kurds in Syria demanded independence, in alliance with the 
PKK in Turkey. Radical Islamists also started to settle in Syria and Iraq under the name of 
ISIS. Terrorists from Syria launched some attacks within the Turkish territory, leaving 
many deaths and injured behind and creating a substantial amount of public pressure in 
Turkey. The AKP burned all the bridges with Syrian regime—once its closest ally in the 
region and provided full support to the opposition. This was a wrong step as the AKP did 
not really know much about the ethnic and religious combination, the ideological 
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background, and the goals of the opposition it supported in Syria. As a result, the AKP had 
to confront the crude reality. A Kurdish and radical Islamic formations have been in the 
making in Syria, and Turkey’s closest Western allies do not want Assad to leave as a result 
of their doubts about a possible radical religious empowerment in Syria.    
Syrian conflict has been very costly for Turkey. The developments compelled the 
AKP to be accountable for its actions and ideology. Many Muslims escaped from the 
conflicts in Syria. They sought refuge in Turkey. The AKP opened camps for them, 
providing them with education, vocational training, food, and shelter. When the AKP 
realized that camps were not enough for the refugees, it decided to let the refugees settle in 
the Turkish cities. Then the refugees started to work unofficially for the Turkish companies.  
Soon Turkey started to think more strategically regarding the refugees. It started to 
teach them the Turkish language. Turkey started to treat the Syrian refugees as the future 
allies of Turkey after the resolution of the conflict in Syria. They would bring the Turkish 
influence to their countries. This also meant that Syria would become a significant market 
for the Turkish industry. The Syrian refugees would prefer to buy Turkish products instead 
of the goods of the other countries, as a result of habits they acquired in Turkey. Since 
2012, Turkey has spent around USD 2.5 billion on the Syrian refugees. Considering that 
the USD 1.5 billion American aid, given to the Egyptian government annually, the extent 
of Turkey’s, as a regional power, investment in Syrian refugees could better be understood.      
On the other hand, the business sector in Turkey was in need of urgent workforce 
before the Arab Spring. The workforce in Turkey was shrinking as a result of the rapid 
growth of industry. Further, the available workforce was not willing to work with the salary 
or price the private sector offered to them. As a result, Turkish companies started to recruit 
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the Syrian refugees unofficially. This brought relaxation to the markets in highly 
industrialized Turkish cities, such as Gaziantep, Istanbul, and Izmir. This meant that the 
Turkish government turned a blind eye to the unofficial involvement of the Syrian refugees 
in work life in Turkey. In other words, the Syrian refugees have substantially contributed 
to rapidly growing Turkish industry by providing the cheap workforce it needed. Turkish 
economy grew by 4% in 2013, (Milliyet Gazetesi 2014), 1% more than the estimated 
results.   
The TDA (Total Development Assistance) statistics of Turkey indicate that before 
the AKP administration, between 1990 and 2002, Central and South Asia had the 
prominent place in Turkish Foreign Policy. The largest share of the Turkish ODA (Official 
Development Assistance) was delivered to this region. However, the AKP administration 
reallocated the amount of ODA to the recipient countries, allocating the greatest share to 
the BMENA region. The statistics indicate that in the course of Arab Spring the Turkish 
ODA to the transitioning Arab states, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya increased 
substantially. For example, USD 1 billion was provided to the Egyptian Islamist Justice 
and Freedom Party. Similar increases happened in Syria, Libya, and Tunisia as well. This 
provided a strong evidence for the AKP’s intentional support for the Islamic forces in the 
ME because of Turkey’s concerns for strategic alliances. 
Turkey’s own democratization process during the AKP administration gives 
important ideas about its motivation for promoting democracy in the ME. The AKP started 
to promote a liberal democracy at home. Meanwhile, the AKP changed the checks and 
balances in the Turkish political system in favor of the elected civilians through the 
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assistance provided by the EU and the US. However, this marked the beginning of the 
AKP’s conservative policies.  
On the other hand, the Arab Spring created an insecure political atmosphere for the 
AKP at home and in the region. The AKP started to perceive the developments that 
challenged its authority in Turkey, such as the Gezi Park protests, through conspiracy 
lenses. For the AKP, some global socio-economic forces were aiming to overthrow the 
government through such developments. From that point on, the AKP started to act more 
authoritarian, deviating from standards, provided by the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU 
membership. Parallel to this, the Turkish democracy promotion gained a more strategic 
dimension. Supporting democracy in countries such as Syria and Iraq has turned into 
efforts to ensure the very survival of Turkey. Similarly supporting democratization in 
Egypt and Tunisia has progressively meant supporting strategic alliances with the Islamic 
groups.  
On the other hand, considering the extent of the Turkish investment in political 
change in the Arab Spring countries, the question becomes: “what are the limits of Turkey’s 
impact?” Turkey possessed all power instruments to play the regional power role in the 
region. Turkey does a substantial amount of work in the field, such as mentoring and 
financing allies. Furthermore, there is a highly positive perception about Turkey in the ME. 
People in the ME believe in Turkey’s sincerity towards the region, and they want Turkey 
to play a greater role in the region. However, Turkey lacks the human infrastructure in its 
foreign mission to turn its investments into strategic gains in a highly receptive region. In 
this regard, Turkey needs to improve its human infrastructure to play a more assertive role 
in the ME.  
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  Moreover, as Turkey articulates its policies within its own respective culture, its 
strategic choices might differ from the choices of the well-established Western 
democracies. For example, the West is bothered by the election of the Islamic groups to 
power, due to their highly critical stance towards the role the West and Israel have played 
in the region. Turkey, on the other hand, finds the election of Islamic groups to power as a 
natural outcome of people’s choice in the ME. Furthermore, due to similarities between the 
ideals of the AKP and Muslim Brotherhood in the region, the election of moderate Islamic 
groups empowers Turkey’s role in the region. As a result, Turkey and the West have 
diverging interests when it comes to the empowerment of the Islamic groups.  
The type of democracy Turkey, as a state, promotes in the region is very similar to 
that of the West in many aspects. For example, Turkey trains the Middle Eastern officials 
on how to run a successful state by teaching them the Turkish system, which is strongly 
influenced by Turkey’s membership to the Western institutions and Turkey’s historical ties 
with the West. Clearly, Turkey processes the values and experiences that it has gained in 
its interaction with the West to people in the ME. 
The AKP, as a political party rooted in political Islam, mentors the Islamic groups 
substantially by teaching them how to function in the authoritarian settings of their states, 
on the basis of its own experience in Turkey. In this regard, the AKP trains them on how 
to organize their parties, how to do political campaigning, how to survive in post-conflict 
political environment, such as after the military coup d’état in Egypt, and how to do 
grassroots outreach. In this regard, the AKP plays a highly constructive role in 
democratization of the ME.  
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Finally, Turkish CSOs are also involved in democracy promotion abroad. The 
Gulen group, TESEV, Doctors Worldwide and MAZLUMDER are the most significant 
groups that promote democratic values in the ME. The Gulen group is interested in the 
provision of humanitarian aid, educational activities, business, and press. MAZLUMDER 
is interested in human rights issues in the Muslim world. TESEV is an official democracy 
promoter think-tank, similar to NDI. Doctors Worldwide provides assistance regarding 
health to the target countries. The Turkish CSOs work independently from the government. 
When their interests converge with the interests of the Turkish government, they cooperate. 
However, when their interests diverge, they focus on their own agendas.  
To sum up, Turkey, under the AKP rule, has been involved in a modest exercise of 
democracy promotion. Despite all its flaws, Turkey has been significantly contributing to 
the process of positive change in the region. However, whether Turkey will continue to 
support democracy in the ME or not is partly related to the sincerity of the Western world 
in supporting democratization in the ME without discriminating between groups on the 
basis of their ideological orientations. Otherwise, if some groups, such as Islamists, feel 
that they are being forced out of the political systems by the support of the West, they might 
turn their faces towards more authoritarian models, such as those in China and Russia.           
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